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Chapter 1
Medical Malpractice: An Introduction
Professional malpractice has been associated with the medical profession from the moment
of its conception.1 Nevertheless, medical malpractice has asserted itself as one of the most
critical issues for healthcare providers and for health policy in the last three decades.2 In
particular, the most famous and documented experience in terms of medical malpractice refers
to the U.S., which starting from the end of the 1960s registered a strong but erratic increase
in both the frequency of malpractice suits and the average compensation awarded to victims.3
This process culminated in the mid 1970s when doctors, lawyers and insurance companies
started to complain about a real medical malpractice crisis.4 Such a crisis was mainly due to
the sparse availability of medical professional coverage and it has later been followed by two
other crises. In the 80s, the American malpractice insurance industry experienced a rapid
increase in premium rates that led to problems of aﬀordability of policies for medical liability.
In the late 90s and the beginning of 2000, besides high premiums, the sector also suﬀered
from a reduction in the availability of this type of insurance.5
Yet, in the last decades several other countries have faced and reported similar diﬃcul-
ties as far as medical professional liability insurance is concerned, regardless of the type of
healthcare system (i.e. mainly public or mainly private), the type of legal system (i.e. com-
mon or civil law), as well as the type of liability regime (i.e. no-fault or liability based on
negligence).6
1For an overview of the history of medical malpractice litigation, see Mohr (2000).
2Danzon (2000), p. 1343.
3For instance, Olsen (1999), citing Sloan et al. (1991), recalls that the U.S. insurance market for medical
professional liability remained largely stable during most of the 1950s. Malpractice insurance did not represent
a problematic business for private insurers, which used to sell these policies to doctors along with their motor
vehicle and home coverage.
4Grembi (2012), p. 89.
5For an overview of the American experience, see Posner (1986), Robinson (1986), and Nye and Hoﬄander
(1988).
6See, OECD (2006). In this regard, also the existing empirical literature provides evidence of the diﬃ-
culties suﬀered by the medical malpractice insurance market of other developed countries. See, for instance,
Dewees et al. (1991) for Canada and the United Kingdom or Danzon (1990) for Canada, Australia and the
United Kingdom.
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Among all possible determinants of malpractice crises, two factors are generally recognized
as major driving forces: the increase in the litigation rate and the growth of the amounts of
damages awarded to injured parties. Even though it is not possible to clearly identify the
causes of the origin of these two phenomena, there is a general consensus regarding the idea
that a number of trends contributed to them. The ﬁrst one is to be found in medical and
technological progress which has aﬀected the malpractice system in several ways.7 For in-
stance, an immediate consequence of the advances in medicine and technology is that doctors
nowadays can be monitored more closely, thus the assessment of physicians liability has be-
come relatively easier. On the one hand, this implies that unmeritorious claims can be more
easily identiﬁed. On the other hand, it means that it has also become possible to recognize
malpractice events that previously would not have been discovered due to outdated technol-
ogy.8 At the same time, medical progress has enhanced expectations of success, reinforcing
the idea of patients that medical accidents are usually caused by negligent doctors rather
than being fatalities.9 The second important tendency regards patients. Individuals have
not only changed their expectations, but are more and more aware of their rights,10 more
informed about the existing medical treatments and more prone to react if they believe to
have suﬀered a damage as a result of a health treatment.11 Over time, this greater awareness
of individuals has been accompanied also by an increase in patients’ rights that, in turn, has
implied new obligations for physicians (e.g. the right to informed consent). The third trend
is represented by the rising life expectancy and the progressive aging of the population that
are resulting in an increase in the portion of people seeking and needing medical care on
a long-term basis. Furthermore, these two phenomena have the additional consequence of
making patients’ medical conditions more complex. Older patients tend to develop a higher
comorbidity rate, that is, they tend to suﬀer from a combination of diseases that makes their
medical condition and/or their main disease more diﬃcult to treat. Lastly, there is a speciﬁc
tendency associated with the liability system itself. Over time, malpractice law – at least in
the OECD countries – has tended to gradually expand the right to compensation of injured
parties (e.g. by moving the burden of proof from the victims to the defendants).12
All malpractice crises have three main characteristics in common. First, they entail an
increase in the frequency of malpractice claims, which is not associated with a consistent rise
in the number of medical errors. Namely, not all the events of alleged malpractice that lead
to legal disputes are ultimately deemed as negligent errors in practice.13 However, even in
7Grady (1988).
8In this regard, Sage (2003) notes that “improvements in diagnostic technology have had dual eﬀects
on liability, not only increasing failure-to-diagnose claims, but also providing an evidentiary window on
misadventures that would otherwise remain anatomically concealed.”
9Sage (2003).
10In particular, OECD (2006) suggests that “thanks to improved communication resulting inter alia from
activism on the part of tailored associations and, in some countries, to direct inﬂuence and information
campaigns by attorneys and other providers of legal services or media, patients have become more aware of
their rights to payment of compensation for injuries and of the possibility for litigation to create new “rights”.”
11See, Amaral-Garcia and Grembi (2012).
12OECD (2006).
13See, Localio et al. (1991), O’Connell and Pohl (1998), and OECD (2006).
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the case of acquittal, clinicians are concerned about being sued, because the involvement in
a legal proceeding implies several costs (e.g., in terms of time and moral distress) and the
acquittal itself may come when the reputation of the clinician has already been damaged.
Second, all crises register a rise of malpractice insurance premiums, which makes it more
diﬃcult for healthcare providers to ﬁnd adequate coverage. Third, they lead to a more
frequent use of defensive practices by physicians, whose primary aim is not the minimization
of medical errors, but rather the reduction of the likelihood of being sued.14
Malpractice crisis are particularly worrying also for their possible implications for patients.
For example, they may lead to a reduction in the supply of medical services. Physicians, in
fact, may decide to abandon the riskier segments of the market and/or to limit the amount of
work because of the uneasiness in obtaining insurance coverage. At the same time, these crises
may negatively aﬀect the trust of people in the healthcare system and in healthcare providers.
The wide publicity given to high-proﬁle cases of malpractice and to the phenomenon of
medical accidents in general, supports the public perception of a low quality system riddled
with malpractice cases. Such a perception, combined with the belief of doctors of being
subject to an increasing number of frivolous claims, has the ultimate eﬀect of corroding the
patient-physician relationship.
In order to overcome the medical insurance problem, governments have developed diﬀerent
schemes. In several countries, such as Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United
States, diﬀerent associations or medical defense organizations have asserted themselves as the
main players in the medical insurance market. In order to cope with medical malpractice,
other mechanisms, such as self-insurance, risk retention and trusts, have also been adopted.
Nonetheless, the discussion of malpractice crises is an ongoing, sensitive policy issue still
seeking solutions and medical malpractice continues to represent a challenging and prominent
topic for both scholars and policymakers.15
As noted by Sloan and Chepke (2008), the complexity of medical malpractice is largely due
to the fact that its eﬀects reach a number of diﬀerent categories of subjects. This phenomenon
does not simply concern healthcare providers and malpractice insurance companies, but
it also aﬀects patients and, at the same time, it draws the attention of the legal system
and of policymakers (i.e. governments) in general. High insurance rates and diﬃculties in
ﬁnding appropriate coverage impact directly on clinicians and on their medical decisions. For
example, in the attempt to protect themselves from litigation, physicians may decide to over
prescribe medical examinations or to refrain from more complex procedures. Such decisions
diverge from the optimal medical choices based on the pursuit of solely the patients’ interest
and impact on the ﬁnal composition of the medical services received by patients, as well as
on the functioning of the health system in terms of both quality of medical provision and
health expenditure. These consequences may raise concerns in both suppliers and users of
healthcare, who may end up calling for government intervention. Patients may be unsatisﬁed
with the performance of the system, while clinicians may believe they are not suﬃciently
protected in order to perform well in their profession. At the same time, it is the liability
14Grembi (2012), p. 90.
15See, for instance, Mello (2006a), Mello et al. (2010), Kessler (2011) and Olsen (1999).
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regime that determines how and when injured parties may resort to litigation. Therefore, it
is the legal system that may favor or discourage malpractice suits and compensation requests.
A more or less favorable legislation towards patients impacts both the number of claims ﬁled
and the size of payouts. Yet, by aﬀecting these two elements, the liability regime modiﬁes
the malpractice pressure faced by physicians, as well as the perception of insurers about
the riskiness of the malpractice insurance business. In other words, the impact of medical
malpractice on one stakeholder group or the reaction of one group to this phenomenon triggers
additional eﬀects on the others. Hence, medical malpractice aﬀects a number of diﬀerent
areas (i.e. healthcare sector, insurance market, tort system and government activity) each
of which has its own objectives and constraints. Even though these areas are distinct from
each other, in practice they interact, consequently inﬂuencing each other and making medical
malpractice a particularly complex topic.
Medical Malpractice Insurance and the Related Market
Medical professional liability insurance falls into the wider category of property and casualty
insurance. Property and casualty insurance covers a broad range of diﬀerent policies. It
basically protects an insured individual or business against property loss and/or legal liability
for losses negligently caused by injuring another person or by damaging her property.16 The
most well-known and basic form of property and casualty insurance is motor vehicle liability
insurance. However, even if automobile liability and malpractice insurance belong to the same
broad category, they diﬀer substantially from each other. Furthermore, medical professional
liability has some distinctive features that clearly diﬀerentiate it from the other lines of
property and casualty insurance. For instance, a critical aspect for insurance, such as the the
segmentation of high-risk from low-risk purchasers, becomes even more diﬃcult to address
when it comes to medical malpractice coverage and this has important consequences for the
insurance rates applied.
In the market for medical malpractice coverage, insurers act as suppliers oﬀering coverage
to the customers represented by healthcare providers (e.g. doctors and hospitals) at a certain
premium. The pricing of insurance rates is a key issue that entails a high degree of uncertainty
since it is based on estimates of both the probability of a future loss and the size of this loss.
Generally speaking, insurance permits the shifting of an indeﬁnite risk from an economic
entity to another for a deﬁnite premium which should at least be equal to the actual value
of any future loss weighted by the estimated probability of this loss.17 Similar to any other
property and casualty insurance line, malpractice premiums should cover the expected cost
of losses and the expenses of the insurance company for issuing and administering the policy,
plus the proﬁt rate sought by insurers.18
16See, Sloan (2003), and Nordman et al. (2004).
17Webel (2005). In other words, the premium set by insurers should at least be equal to the so-called
‘actuarially fair premium’, which is precisely insurers’ expected loss (i.e. the loss times the probability of its
occurrence).
18In addition, premiums are also inﬂuenced by the expectations of insurers on future investment gains or
losses. See, Mello (2006b) and Nordman et al. (2004). In fact, much of the capital received as premiums
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In theory the setting up of premiums occurs on the basis of the risk transferred by the
insured to the insurer, who therefore should apply a diﬀerent insurance rate to subjects
with diverse inherent degrees of risk.19 Traditionally, to facilitate insurance pricing, insurers
classify insured individuals according to their risk of incurring a loss into diﬀerent groups
and then assign a premium to each of these groups.20 However, this operation turns out to
be a complex task, which posits greater diﬃculties with respect to medical liability insurance
than to other types of coverage. For example, automobile insurance is characterized by high
claim frequency and low claim severity. Therefore, there are many compensation requests
per insured individual, but the payouts per compensation request are limited. This is an
important aspect, because claims act as signals for insurance companies of the conduct of
their policyholders, of the judicial treatment of liability and of the award of compensations.21
Hence, a high frequency of claims enables insurers to rank rather precisely their policyholders
based on their probability of incurring a loss. On the contrary, malpractice claims show a
low frequency often combined with relatively higher amounts. This makes it more diﬃcult
for insurance companies to rank healthcare professionals according to their risk of being
involved in litigation. The result is that, as a matter of fact, insurers have sparse information
to evaluate the quality of a provider and to determine the risk of a malpractice claim.
The claims experience of policyholders is usually exploited by insurers also to adjust cur-
rent premiums.22 The information on past losses and expenses, and on the past experience of
healthcare providers in general, are extremely important. Still, medical professional liability
is much less experience-rated than other types of insurance (e.g. motor vehicle liability or
workers compensations).23 This is due to the low frequency of legal disputes and to the fact
that there are no fully reliable mechanisms for insurers to monitor the quality of the medical
services oﬀered and track the claims history of healthcare providers. As a result, risk seg-
mentation is usually performed on a geographical basis and according to medical specialty,
and rarely using individual measures of a purchaser’s quality or information on her malprac-
tice claims history.24 Speciﬁcally, malpractice insurers are able to make use of experience
rating only with respect to hospitals since the claims history of an healthcare organization is
more stable over time compared to that of individual physicians. However, even in the case
of hospitals, experience rating plays a partial role in the setting of insurance rates, which
for bearing the risk is usually invested by insurance companies that may act also as ﬁnancial intermediaries.
Speciﬁcally, according to Mello (2006b), the portfolios of insurance companies are fairly similar and usually
include about 80% of bonds, 10% of stocks, and 5-10% of cash and other minor investments.
19Webel (2005).
20See, Danzon (1991), and Webel (2005).
21See, Sloan (2003).
22Danzon (2000).
23As stressed by Fournier and McInnes (2001), experience rating entails two main beneﬁts “(1) cross-
subsidization of high-risk subscribers by those subscribers of low risk is reduced and (2) high-risk subscribers
are given incentives to ﬁnd cost-eﬀective ways to reduce risk.” For a discussion on the applicability and
consequences of experience rating in the case of medical malpractice insurance, see Sloan (1990) and Danzon
(2000).
24See, for example, Mello (2006b) and Danzon (2000). In particular, according to Danzon (2000), “Pre-
miums are a multiplicative function of limits of coverage (for example, $1 million per occurrence, $3 million
total for the policy year); medical specialty; and geographic location.”
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traditionally result in being experience-rated for less than 25% of their amount.25
Another important characteristic of medical malpractice is the so-called long ‘tail’. The
consequences of medical errors or alleged errors and the compensation requests that arise
from them can materialize after several years. In particular, they can materialize even after
the end of the insurance period. Conversely, for instance, in automobile liability the time
elapsed between the occurrence of an accident and damages payout usually is quite short.
This feature of malpractice coverage makes it harder for insurance companies to predict with
a reasonable degree of accuracy the expected future loss especially with respect to single
practitioners.26 In fact, on the one hand, it is diﬃcult for insurance companies to determine
how many suits will be eventually ﬁled in any given year.27 On the other hand, “using data
on relatively few claims, a medical malpractice insurer must estimate the likelihood that a
jury far in the future will hold the defendant liable, and the amount that jury would award in
damages.”28 This also makes the adjustment of insurance rates more diﬃcult. In addition,
the rules applied to a claim are, in principle, those existing at the time of the alleged injury.
Nevertheless, social and legal norms may change over time and these modiﬁcations “may
simultaneously aﬀect the loss distribution on all outstanding claims, spanning several policy
years and possibly multiple lines of insurance.”29 This translates to an element of aggregated
undiversiﬁable risk, which is speciﬁc to the reference coverage. In other words, this determines
further uncertainty for insurance companies in estimating future losses and, more in general,
in predicting how the malpractice business will evolve (e.g. variation in claims frequency or
modiﬁcations of liability rules).30 Finally, aside from the uncertainty on the potential number
of ﬁled suits, there is also the uncertainty related to the severity of these claims as the range
of compensation that victims can potentially receive is quite large even in the hypothesis
of similar injuries.31 This further element contributes to exacerbate the diﬃculties faced by
private companies to insure the risk of malpractice.
To address these problems, insurers are increasingly shifting from occurrence-based liabil-
ity insurance coverage to claims-made liability insurance coverage. According to the former
the policyholder is covered for all the incidents that occurred during the policy year inde-
pendently of when the compensation request is presented. By contrast, the latter assures
coverage only of the claims actually ﬁled during the insured period regardless of the timing of
25Mello (2006b).
26In any case, the fact that malpractice claims usually require a long time before being compensated
may also have a positive, even if minor, implication for insurers. In fact, as noted by Nordman et al.
(2004), the long timescales of malpractice litigation constitutes a greater chance for insurance companies to
yield investment incomes, which are useful especially to oﬀset the underwriting transactions of insurers. In
addition, the authors specify that “insurers are able to invest amounts held in surplus, unearned premium
reserves and loss and loss adjustment expense reserves.”
27See, OECD (2006).
28Sloan and Chepke (2008), p. 225.
29Danzon (2000), p. 1363.
30For instance, Danzon (2000) stresses that one of the drivers of the dramatic increase in the number of
malpractice suits in the 1970s and again in the 1980s in the U.S. were precisely the changes in social and
legal norms. Insurers have been unable to predict these changes, thus they were under-reserved and suﬀered
signiﬁcant shocks to their insurance capacity.
31See, OECD (2006).
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occurrence of medical accidents. As a result, there is a progressive shift of risk from private
insurance companies to healthcare providers, which negatively impacts on how much health-
care providers pay to be insured and on the risk exposure they cope with.32 Claims-made
policies imply a long tail of exposure for those medical errors that have not yet led to the
ﬁling of a suit. This means that providers may have greater diﬃculties in ﬁnding appropriate
coverage if they need or want to change insurance company. First, if they cannot immediately
switch from one insurer to another, they will have to retain the risk of the claims belonging
to the mentioned long-tail. Second, in order to cover these errors healthcare providers may
have to buy additional tail policies or to pay higher premiums to the new insurer.
Summing up, medical professional liability insurance is characterized by some speciﬁc
features such as the diﬃculty in distinguishing between high-risk and low-risk healthcare
providers and the long duration of claims that exacerbate the risk faced by insurance compa-
nies. As a result, over time this type of insurance has proved to be a particularly problematic
sector for private insurers and malpractice crises have had the eﬀect of further increasing
the diﬃculties of insurance companies to operate in this market. In particular, the main
impact on the insurance market caused by malpractice crises consists of a further increase in
insurance rates and in a reduction of the availability of these policies.
The Tort System for Medical Malpractice
Among the several objectives pursued by tort law, the two primary goals are deterring individ-
uals from engaging in negligent behaviors and compensating injured parties for the damages
suﬀered due to the negligence of others.33 With respect to medical malpractice, this implies
that the medical liability system should be able to provide healthcare professionals with the
correct incentives to apply standard levels of precaution and to avoid negligent accidents.
On the other hand, it should also assure the compensation of victims of malpractices cases.
Speciﬁcally, malpractice law based on fault imposes on healthcare professionals the duty
to comply with a speciﬁc legal standard of care, whose breach gives rise to negligence of
the professionals. As a consequence of their negligent conduct, healthcare providers are
considered liable for any damage caused to the patient. Theoretically, this system works
eﬃciently since
“the courts step in to provide compensation and deterrence in cases in which self-regulation
has failed to prevent a breach of accepted standards of care; plaintiﬀs’ attorneys serve as
gatekeepers, separating meritorious from unpromising claims; and liability coverage ensures
that providers are not bankrupted by a single large payout and that resources are available to
compensate patients.”34
In reality, however, the functioning of the malpractice system is more complex and the
actual eﬀectiveness of the law for medical malpractice in ensuring the above-mentioned ob-
jectives has raised major concerns among scholars.35
32See, for example, Mello et al. (2006b), Nordman et al. (2004), and Danzon (2000).
33See, for example, Miceli (2004).
34Studdert et al. (2004), p. 284. See, also Burkle (2011).
35A number of studies have been devoted to examining the diﬀerent alternatives to a negligence liability
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In particular, there is still no evidence that the threat of a civil lawsuit discourages medical
injuries.36 Moreover, two aspects of the malpractice system generally subject to criticisms are
the long duration of legal disputes37 and the high level of expenses involved in the litigation
process.38 At the same time, the system is not foolproof. So that, though not frequent, it
may happen that a negligent healthcare provider is found not liable. Whilst, it may also,
and more frequently, occur that a non-negligent provider is brought to court with the risk of
being found liable and the inevitable burden of bearing the costs entailed in a legal dispute.39
In addition, a common perception is that the system falls short also in its capacity for
assessing the damages for the victims of malpractice. Besides the extreme position of those
who claim that malpractice compensations are substantially the result of a random process,40
there is the widespread belief that these compensations substantially fail to satisfy criteria of
fairness.41 On the one hand, injured parties, who suﬀered similar damages, end up obtaining
quite diﬀerent awards. On the other hand, others receive compensations that appear not to
be commensurate with the severity of the health impairment experienced.42
The most general concern arises with respect to the quantiﬁcation of noneconomic dam-
ages. In deciding the compensations to grant to victims of medical malpractice, the tort
system has to quantify both the economic and the noneconomic damages suﬀered by injured
parties.43 However, given its non-monetary nature, this latter component of damages is more
subjective and problematic to estimate.44 As a result, the capability of the tort system of
quantifying non-pecuniary losses has been repeatedly questioned as diﬀerent juries and/or
judges belonging to the same state, area, if not even the same city, reach widely diverging
decisions on the amount of damages to award. Traditionally, this variability has raised ma-
jor concerns as it increases the unpredictability of malpractice claims with possible negative
eﬀects on the credibility of the compensations system (i.e. on the deterrence function of
the tort system), on the liability insurance system as a whole and on the insurability of
malpractice risk.45
rule and their results in terms of optimal deterrence with respect to medical malpractice. See, for instance,
Epstein (1988) and Weiler (1991).
36By contrast, evidence on the deterrent eﬀect of tort law is available with respect to other legal areas
such as motor vehicle liability, see Dewees et al. (1996) and White (2004). For instance, according to Localio
et al. (1991) only 2% of adverse events are actually followed by the ﬁling of a claim against the healthcare
provider.
37See, Kessler (2011) and Cohen and Hughes (2007).
38Studdert et al. (2006). For instance, Danzon (2000) stresses the high transaction costs of the U.S.
system. Speciﬁcally, for each single dollar paid in malpractice premiums, victims receive only about 40 cents.
39Hyman (2002).
40U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2002).
41See, for instance, Studdert et al. (2011).
42See, for example, Bovbjerg et al. (1989).
43For a more detailed discussion of the notion of noneconomic damages, and of the problem related to
their assessment, see Chapter 3.
44Webel (2005).
45See, Bovbjerg et al. (1989).
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The Healthcare System
Aside from the criticisms that have emerged with respect to the tort system for medical
liability, medical malpractice has aroused concerns also about its possible eﬀects on the
healthcare system in terms of both costs and access to medical care.46 Firstly, physicians may
respond to higher insurance rates by increasing medical fees, that is, by passing malpractice
costs on to patients.47 Secondly, the malpractice system should lead physicians and, more
in general, healthcare providers to undertake appropriate levels of care against iatrogenic
injuries. Still, in practice the system may for various reasons perform poorly, leading to over-
or under-deterrence.
As discussed by Sloan and Chepke (2008), the asymmetry of information that charac-
terizes the relationship between doctors and patients, may cause the phenomenon of under-
deterrence. In theory, malpractice law should avert under-deterrence by allocating the burden
of iatrogenic accidents to doctors. Moreover, medical professional liability may also produce
the opposite eﬀect, that is, it may provide incentives for excessive care.48 In fact, if the
legal standard of precaution is uncertain or too strict,49 healthcare providers may be induced
to over-perform or over-require diagnostic and/or therapeutic treatments to limit the risk
of litigation. For the same reason, they may also decide to refrain from certain types of
treatments or cases that involve higher chances of legal disputes.
Both these types of behavior are an expression of the wider phenomenon of defensive
medicine according to which healthcare providers adopt defensive practices that are not
beneﬁcial – or only to a limited degree beneﬁcial – to patients. Hence, under these circum-
stances, clinicians do not primarily make these decisions in the interest of patient’s health, but
rather with the intention of avoiding malpractice litigation.50 This interpretation allows us
to distinguish between the two supra-mentioned types of defensive conduct that doctors can
undertake. These conducts are deﬁned as positive and negative defensive medical practices.
In particular, physicians adopt positive defensive medicine when they perform additional
tests and diagnostic and/or therapeutic procedures mainly in order to limit their malpractice
exposure. Conversely, negative defensive medicine occurs when healthcare providers avoid
certain patients or medical treatments, that entail a high probability of malpractice claims
in order to reduce the risk of being sued. In any case, the fact that physicians want to reduce
their risk exposure to malpractice litigation impacts on their behavior. The decisions about
the medical procedure to perform are inﬂuenced by factors other than patients clinical condi-
tions with potential negative eﬀects on patients’ well-being, on the resource allocation within
46See, Zuckerman et al. (1986).
47See, for example, Danzon (1991) and Sloan (1982).
48Kessler (2011).
49Craswell and Calfee (1986).
50For the present work, therefore, we resort to the interpretation followed by Kessler and McClellan (1996)
and related studies, which is also the one generally accepted under a policy perspective. For instance, an
eﬀective example of how defensive medicine is traditionally interpreted in the policy context is contained
in the 1994 report written by the U.S. Oﬃce of Technology Assessment (OTA): “defensive medicine occurs
when doctors order tests, procedures, or visits, or avoid high-risk patients or procedures, primarily (but not
necessarily solely) to reduce their exposure to malpractice liability.”
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the healthcare sector, on medical care provision, on public consensus, and on healthcare
expenditures.
Finally, complaints about the malpractice system concern also its possible negative eﬀects
on patient safety. Instead of reducing iatrogenic injuries, a liability system where the doctors’
fear of litigation is high, may actually hinder patient safety initiatives.51 For example, patient
safety movements strongly encourage healthcare professionals to engage in activities such as
adverse events reporting to foster the understanding of medical errors and their causes.
Nonetheless, physicians may be reluctant to disclose this information, because they may fear
that the same information can be later used in a trial or acquired by insurance companies
making it more diﬃcult to ﬁnd appropriate malpractice coverage.52
Government Intervention
The widespread perception of a malpractice crisis has prompted public intervention to re-
form the law for medical malpractice. Traditionally, as noted by Studdert et al. (2004),
policymakers have focused their attention on three main types of intervention.53
A ﬁrst category of reforms aims at limiting the recourse to lawsuits in order to foster
alternative methods of resolution and discourage individuals from presenting unmeritorious
claims. These measures include the imposition of shorter statues of limitation, that is, the
time within which legal proceedings may be brought after that the injury has been detected.
Another possible intervention is the introduction of screening panels (‘review boards’ or
‘conciliation panels’). In their basic form, these panels are boards composed of diﬀerent
types of professionals – including physicians – with the task of examining the evidence of a
malpractice case to evaluate whether the case has suﬃcient merit to go to court.54 Further
measures to prevent plaintiﬀs from presenting unmeritorious claims are the introduction of
certiﬁcates of merit and the imposition of limitations to attorney fees. The former requires
injured parties to obtain, before or immediately after the claim is ﬁled, a certiﬁcate from
a qualiﬁed medical expert attesting the merit of the case in order to proceed to court.55
Diﬀerently, the latter imposes a limit on the portion of damages that the attorney of the
plaintiﬀ can receive as contingency fee. Its rationale is to induce plaintiﬀs’ attorneys to
refuse cases with minor or no merit by modifying their incentives in investing in a case.56
A second category of public interventions examines the possible variations of liability rules
in order to lower the frequency of malpractice lawsuits and the actual size of defendants’
payouts. In this sense, a reform proposal is to modify the ‘collateral-source rule’. This
measure allows the deduction from the compensation that must be paid to the plaintiﬀ, of
any amount received by the plaintiﬀ herself, as compensation for the injury suﬀered, from
51See, for instance, Liang (2000) or Studdert et al. (2004).
52Mello (2006b).
53For a detailed discussion of the diﬀerent possible tort reforms and their potential eﬀects, see Mello and
Kachalia (2010).
54See, Eggen (1990) and (2013).
55See, for example, Parness and Leonetti (1997).
56Mello and Kachalia (2010).
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other sources (e.g. health insurance).57 A reduction of claim frequency can be also obtained
by foreseeing stricter standards for demonstrating violations of informed consent or, more
in general, lower legal standards of care. Diﬀerently, in order to decrease the payouts of
defendants, a possible reform consists in the elimination of joint-and-several liability. So that,
in cases with multiple defendants, the ﬁnancial liability of each defendant is commensurate
with their respective share of responsibility for damaging the plaintiﬀ.58
A third category of reforms focuses on the reduction of the size of the compensation
awarded to injured parties. In this regard, the intervention that has attracted the most
attention is the imposition of caps on damages and all its diﬀerent conﬁgurations (i.e. ﬂat
caps, tiered caps and schedules).59 An alternative reform to damages caps are periodic
payments. This measure enables or obliges insurance companies to repay damages over
a longer time frame and not in a lump sum. In this way, insurance companies can buy
annuities from other insurers “which cost less than paying the entire award up front. Insurers
are also able to retain any amounts that the plaintiﬀ does not actually collect during his or her
lifespan.”60 Hence, the argument in favor of periodic payments is that they help insurance
companies to level their expenses on a longer time frame and to buy annuities.
Empirical research on the eﬀects of tort reforms on the main determinants of malpractice
pressure and, thus, of medical malpractice crises (i.e. the frequency and severity of malprac-
tice suits and malpractice premiums) supports two main considerations. On the one hand,
policy interventions directly aimed at limiting the expected compensations are those that
generally yield better and stronger results in terms of reducing the variability and average
size of malpractice payouts and of lowering insurance premiums. In particular, this is the
case of caps on damages, which are commonly believed to reduce average payouts and in-
surance rates.61 Whilst, on the other hand, those reforms that do not directly deal with the
magnitude of malpractice awards have proven to be less eﬀective in coping with malpractice
and to lead to less consistent results.62 For example, pre-trial screening panels turn out to
have substantially no eﬀect on the frequency of malpractice claims and, consequently, also
on insurance rates.63 Similarly, there is no strong evidence of an actual eﬀect on the number
and size of ﬁled claims, as well as on premiums, with respect to the limitation of attorney
fees, the modiﬁcation of the collateral-source rule and the elimination of joint and several
liability.64 Conversely, one ‘indirect’ tort reform that has been found to be actually capable
of eﬀecting insurance rates, is shorter statute of limitations.65 Nonetheless, the impact of
57See, Mello (2006a).
58See, for instance, Viscusi et al. (1993).
59For a more detailed discussion of the characteristics and functioning of the diﬀerent types of caps, see
Chapter 3.
60Mello and Kachalia (2010), pp. 19-20.
61See, Kessler (2006) and Mello and Kachalia (2010). By contrast, the eﬀects of periodic payments have
not been extensively investigated, thus the evidence available is too limited to reach some general conclusions.
62Kessler (2011).
63See, for instance, Zuckerman et al. (1990) and Eggen (2013).
64With respect to the limitation of attorney fees and the elimination of joint and several liability, see
Waters et al. (2007), whereas see Born et al. (2009) in relation to the collateral-source rule.
65See, for example, Blackmon et al. (1990) and Kilgore et al. (2006).
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this measure on the frequency of claims remains uncertain given the evidence available.66
Structure of the Dissertation
In the last two decades, the law and economic literature has devoted much attention to
medical malpractice and its implications. Speciﬁcally, its most signiﬁcant contribution has
consisted in the empirical analysis of both the functioning of the malpractice system (e.g.
claim frequency, size of compensations, insurance premiums) and of the possible malpractice
tort reforms. In particular, a large body of research has focused on the American context,
which has experienced the most heated policy debate and with respect to which data is more
easily and widely accessible.67 On the contrary, studies on civil law countries, as well as on
public healthcare systems, are much more limited. The present thesis aims at contributing
to the investigation of medical malpractice and malpractice reforms in a civil law jurisdiction
with a public national health system, using Italy as case-study and, at oﬀering some policy
recommendations.
In particular, we examine the adoption of caps on noneconomic damages – the tort reform
usually identiﬁed as the most eﬀective to cope with medical malpractice crises – by providing
both an institutional analysis of the speciﬁc context of implementation of this policy and an
empirical evaluation of its eﬀects. We do not consider ﬂat or tiered caps, but a more complex
and less studied type of ceilings: schedules of noneconomic damages. The broad research
question consists, therefore, in investigating the eﬀects of this reform in an institutional
framework where the vast majority of claims are settled before courts and healthcare services
are mainly provided through public facilities. This question translates in the analysis of
two more speciﬁc ones. The ﬁrst question we want to answer is how limiting compensations
for pain and suﬀering through schedules impacts on the attractiveness of the malpractice
insurance market both in terms of the presence of private insurers in the market and of
insurance rates paid by healthcare providers. By limiting the compensation obtainable by
victims, scheduled damages are commonly expected to yield lower malpractice premiums
and to also facilitate the evaluation of insurers’ risk exposure. This last expectation can
be interpreted as an increase in the attractiveness of the reference line of insurance for
private insurers, thus it should consist in an increase in the number of companies oﬀering
malpractice coverage. In other words, our ﬁrst purpose is to verify whether, and to what
extent, schedules of non-pecuniary losses are actually eﬀective in achieving the results for
which they are designed. In this way, we are also able to shed light on the elements aﬀecting
the decisions of private insurers in malpractice markets.
Schedules, however, do not solely aﬀect insurance companies. A policy that limits the
awards received by injured parties may modify the degree of malpractice pressure perceived
by physicians. In response to such a change, healthcare providers may vary their medical de-
cisions leading to a more or less frequent use of defensive medicine. Consequently, the second
66See, Mello and Kachalia (2010).
67The American National Practitioner Data Bank – an information clearinghouse created by the U.S.
Congress – requires every healthcare provider, who pays for a malpractice case, to submit a report on the
malpractice payment itself.
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research question aims at investigating whether, and to what extent, healthcare providers
react to the implementation of schedules by modifying their medical decisions. This second
strand of analysis, therefore, provides additional insights on the functioning of schedules,
improving the understanding of those eﬀects that go beyond the primary scope of this policy
intervention. The examination of the relation between malpractice pressure and the levels
and composition of healthcare provision is particularly signiﬁcant from a policy perspective.
Furthermore, this aspect becomes especially relevant in a public healthcare system such as
the Italian one, since the general considerations drawn from the study of the U.S. experience
cannot be automatically generalized to such a context. The fact that care delivery by public
hospitals may be aﬀected by the degree of malpractice risk has direct consequences on the
functioning of the system with possible eﬀects on healthcare expenditures and on the fairness
and equity of the public provision of medical care.
In order to perform both these analyses, we study the speciﬁc features of both the Italian
healthcare and judicial systems in order to identify and highlight the main peculiarities of
this institutional framework and to better appreciate the channels through which malpractice
pressure works in such a context. Without fully understanding these aspects, it would not
be possible to properly evaluate the empirical ﬁndings and to discuss their possible policy
implications. In this perspective, the institutional analysis is important also to support the
empirical approach and tailor it to the speciﬁcities of the reference case.
From an empirical perspective, the novelty of this work is twofold. First, it studies a
system of schedules of compensations for levels of damages rather than simple ﬂat caps.
Second, it includes in the empirical analysis the performance of the judiciary, measured as
the civil backlog of courts. Traditionally, tort reforms have been analyzed regardless of the
performance of the institutional framework in charge of their implementation. Diﬀerently, our
expectation is that the functioning of the judiciary alone is capable of inﬂuencing the main
players of the malpractice system (i.e. physicians, injured parties and insurance companies).
The fact that a court can dispose a proceeding in a longer or shorter time provides diﬀerent
incentives to injured patients to initiate a legal dispute. At the same time, a more or less well
performing judiciary may exacerbate or weaken the risk of litigation perceived by healthcare
professionals with possible eﬀects on the level of precaution undertaken by clinicians and on
the number of medical accidents. Private insurance companies may consider judicial slowness
as a positive element that allows them to invest the premiums collected for a longer time.
However, they may also consider it as a threat that makes it more diﬃcult to estimate when
and how many damages they will have to pay, exacerbating the assessment of their risk
exposure. To improve the understanding of these dynamics is useful not only to study the
impact of noneconomic damages schedules, but also to gain greater knowledge on the channels
and mechanisms through which medical malpractice may work in a public healthcare system.
Speciﬁcally, the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 oﬀers an overview of the orga-
nization and functioning of both the Italian healthcare and medical liability systems. Italy
is characterized by a publicly ﬁnanced health system ﬁnancially distressed and with a strong
planning component. In such a system, most clinicians are public employees, thus they work
in hierarchically organized structures and are entitled to receive medical malpractice coverage
as part of their employment contract. Similar to the majority of European countries, Italy
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does not have a speciﬁc statute law regulating doctors liability, but the latter is interpreted
as a contractual liability and medical malpractice claims are decided according to a fault
system.
Besides discussing the rationale and the possible forms and eﬀects of noneconomic dam-
ages, Chapter 3 describes the evolution and the introduction of noneconomic damages sched-
ules in the Italian legal context. In this respect, the important features of the Italian case are
the type of ceilings applied (i.e. schedules of noneconomic damages) and its process of imple-
mentation. In fact, there has not been a policy intervention of the national government. On
the contrary, there has been a staggered adoption – courts decided at their discretion whether
and when to adopt these limitations – which allows us to beneﬁt from a quasi experimental
setting and to rely on a Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences approach.
Chapter 4 presents an assessment of the impact of schedules on the number of insurers
operating in the medical liability market for hospitals and on the premiums paid by public
facilities. Using Italian healthcare providers data, we exploit the scattered timing of schedules
implementation and ﬁnd that the latter increases the attractiveness of the medical liability
insurance market, measured as the number of insurers, while they do not produce signiﬁcant
eﬀects on paid premiums. We also evaluate the impact of schedules, while controlling for
the performance of the judicial system, measured as courts’ civil backlog. Our ﬁndings
show that the introduction of schedules increases the presence of insurers only in ineﬃcient
judicial districts. Courts’ ineﬃciency is attractive to insurers for average values of schedules
penetration of the market, with an increasing positive impact of ineﬃciency as the territorial
coverage of schedules increases. For the purpose of this study, we construct a comprehensive
database containing all public procurement procedures for malpractice insurance contracts
that have been run by Italian public healthcare providers during the period 2000-2010. The
result is a unique and new dataset that combines three types of information: the data on
public tenders, those on the characteristics of public healthcare providers and those on the
performance of the judicial system. A description of public procurement functioning and
legislation in the Italian context is presented as well.
Chapter 5 extends the empirical analysis on the eﬀects of scheduled damages by exam-
ining the reaction of public healthcare providers to this legal intervention. Speciﬁcally, we
investigate how public hospitals vary the composition of their activities in response to the
introduction of schedules. Given the speciﬁcities of a public healthcare system, medical li-
ability may actually aﬀect physicians working in public facilities through diﬀerent channels
and with a diﬀerent intensity compared to their privately employed colleagues. The former,
in fact, do not face just the constraints provided by medical liability, but they have to deal
also with the internal policies and objectives imposed on them by public regulators. In ad-
dition, they do not directly bear the cost of malpractice litigation and coverage, since the
healthcare facilities themselves are in charge of the acquisition of malpractice insurance for
all their medical staﬀ. Consequently, publicly employed physicians not only may be aﬀected
by malpractice pressure in a diﬀerent way, but they may also tend to react diﬀerently than
they would do in a contracted market. For instance, the aspects of medical provision that
they can aﬀect are likely not to coincide with those primarily chosen by privately employed
doctors. Our ﬁndings point out the existence of both a hospital- and ward-wide reaction to
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changes in medical liability caused by the introduction of schedules of non-pecuniary losses.
Speciﬁcally, the implementation of the reference policy tends to reduce the use of defensive
practices on the part of clinicians, but the magnitude of this impact is ultimately determined
by the eﬃciency of the court in charge of schedules implementation. So that, a poorer judi-
cial performance (i.e. higher backlog) usually attenuates the eﬀects of schedules introduction,
while, by contrast, a higher level of judicial eﬃciency (i.e. lower backlog) tends to intensify
it. As for the speciﬁc measures of healthcare delivery aﬀected, we identify a positive and
signiﬁcant relationship between the introduction of schedules and the preoperative length of
stay at both the hospital and ward level. On the contrary, a negative relation is detected
between the overall length of stay and the reference policy at the ward level. This means that
once malpractice pressure is lowered, clinicians tend to reduce patients’ length of stay, but to
increase the preoperative one. Again, the analysis is performed using a dataset that has been
constructed for the speciﬁc purposes of this study by combining information on the charac-
teristics and activity levels of Italian public hospitals and information on the performance of
the judiciary for the years 2000-2010.
Chapter 6 discusses the main ﬁndings and concludes. In particular, it oﬀers some remarks
on the eﬀectiveness of the reference policy in coping with high malpractice premiums and on
the possible diﬃculties of healthcare providers in contracting out insurance coverage against
third party liability. Finally, it also discusses the possible policy implications and risks for the
health system entailed by the fact that public hospitals do actually modify the composition
of medical provision in response to changes in malpractice pressure.
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Chapter 2
Medical Malpractice and Liability in
Italy
2.1 Introduction
In Italy, especially over the last two decades, medical malpractice has attracted much atten-
tion from both policymakers and public opinion and has contributed to raise serious concerns
about the stability and future of the national healthcare system itself.1 The main cause for
this interest lies in the sharp increase in medical malpractice claims and its negative impact
on the premiums paid by public and private healthcare providers. Both medical institutions
and individual physicians have started to complain strongly and publicly about the increas-
ing trend of insurance rates and the related diﬃculties of subscribing to a policy.2 This has
raised the problem of possible negative eﬀects on the provision of medical care and on the
conduct of physicians. However, these phenomena can be better understood when analyzed
within the more general context of the Italian healthcare system and of the liability regime
applied to health professionals, whose features are discussed throughout this chapter.
Both the incentives and the constraints to which clinicians are subject, are ultimately
determined by the environment in which they operate. Clearly, a main determinant of the
malpractice pressure faced by doctors is the liability system. An overview of the norms
regulating the patient-physician relationship tells us how the risk of litigation works, its
possible implications for doctors, and also the possible actions that can be undertaken by
victims in order to be compensated for the damages suﬀered. At the same time, additional
incentives and constraints on the medical profession are provided by the organization and
functioning of the health system itself. A public system responds to diﬀerent objectives
compared to a privately funded one. This aspect inﬂuences the functioning of healthcare
facilities and the activity of doctors, who, for instance, are provided with more protection
1OECD (2006).
2For instance, on February 12, 2013, gynecologists and obstetricians went on strike to protest against the
dramatic increase in malpractice litigation. This has been followed in July by a general strike against the
extremely high premiums required by private insurers and the signiﬁcant diﬃculties in ﬁnding malpractice
coverage.
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(e.g. malpractice coverage), but have also greater obligations (e.g. public nature of their job)
than privately employed colleagues. Therefore, in dealing with the consequences of medical
malpractice, the speciﬁc institutional framework of reference matters and an overview of its
speciﬁcities is important to understand through which channels this phenomenon works and
may exert its eﬀects. In this study, this is even more important since we are studying an
institutional context that widely diﬀers from the U.S. one (i.e. the main case study in the
related literature).
In particular, the Italian healthcare system established in 1978 provides universal medical
care coverage to the whole population and is characterized by a predominantly public nature.
Healthcare services are provided through a mix of public and private facilities. In practice,
private providers may be contracted with the health system to treat patients for free, being
reimbursed by the public healthcare provider the patient belongs to. Otherwise, they may
operate independently from it, requiring patients to directly pay for the services received. In
this case, patients mostly pay out-of-pocket, although some citizens also beneﬁt from private
supplementary insurance to cover such expenses. As a result, the purely private provision of
healthcare is quite limited to the extent that, in 2011, only 22% of healthcare expenditure
has been ﬁnanced by private sources.3
The existing organizational and management structure of the system comprises three
levels of government: central government, regional government and local health units assisted
by public and private accredited hospitals at the local level. Local health units are ﬁnanced
through a capitation formula and are in charge of the actual provision of medical care services
to the population, which are basically free of charge at the point of delivery. Diﬀerently,
the other two levels of authority are substantially responsible for the administration and
ﬁnancing of the whole system. In particular, the central government represented by the
Ministry of Health is tasked with the national planning, while each regional government
elaborates and deﬁnes its own regional plan based on the national one. The system is almost
completely publicly ﬁnanced with a national healthcare budget in which both central and
regional resources converge. This budget is set by the central government, but in practice, it
is the outcome of the bargaining between the state and regions. The ﬁnancial responsibility is
shared between these two levels of authority, but regions contribute to the national ﬁnancing
needs to diﬀerent extents depending on their ﬁscal capacity.
In an eﬀort mainly to contain costs and pursue principles of ﬁscal federalism, the Italian
healthcare system has undergone a process of progressive regionalization whereby regions
have gained increasing administrative and ﬁnancial responsibilities over time. However, this
greater regional autonomy has been promoted in a context still characterized by signiﬁcant
demographic and economic inequalities that result in a substantial north-south divide. These
diﬀerences have aﬀected also medical care services causing a cross-regional ﬂow of patients
moving from the south to the north especially to receive high-level care in tertiary hospitals.4
Decentralization and the subsequent regional autonomy have resulted in making it more
3OECD (2013). This ﬁgure includes, for examples, co-payments, the expenses for pharmaceuticals and
for medical equipments, thus the share of hospital care privately ﬁnanced is actually lower than 22%.
4Lo Scalzo et al, (2009), p. 120.
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diﬃcult to impose a hard national budget constraint and in undermining uniformity of health
care provision given the diﬀerent models of governance implemented by regions.5
In such a context, there is no speciﬁc regulation governing the doctor-patient relationship,
which is actually treated as a contractual relationship. Therefore, medical negligence is
considered as the failure to comply with a contractual obligation, rather than a breach of a
general duty of care. This approach has been sometimes identiﬁed as one of the causes of the
high number of malpractice claims in the country.6 In practice, an injured party has to allege
that the doctor violated her contractual obligation and, then, it is up to the doctor herself to
prove the opposite. Speciﬁcally, the physician needs to demonstrate that she complied with
the standard of care of the ‘bonus pater familias ’. Once the breach is assessed, the injured
party is entitled to be compensated for any loss derived by the harm experienced.
The focus of the analyses developed in the following chapters is on the Italian institutional
framework. As we will see, the public nature of the Italian healthcare system makes it easier
to describe and analyze some of the deﬁciencies and diﬃculties suﬀered with respect to medi-
cal malpractice insurance. At the same time, given its peculiar organizational structure, this
system represents a good case study to evaluate the consequences of medical malpractice not
only on the behavior of independent practitioners, but on the conduct and choices of health-
care facilities as well. Accordingly, the present chapter has the main purpose of providing an
overview of both medical professional liability and the organization and functioning of the
health system in Italy. Speciﬁcally, the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 describes
the evolution and main characteristics of the Italian Healthcare system, while Section 2.3
presents the national judicial framework with respect to medical liability. Finally, Section
2.4. concludes by discussing the medical malpractice emergency that Italy is experiencing
with respect to malpractice litigation, professional liability insurance and doctors’ behavior.
2.2 The Healthcare System
The existing Italian healthcare system is the result of a series of reforms that have aﬀected
both the organization and funding of medical care provision. These reforms have prompted
a progressive regionalization and, consequently, an increasingly limited role of the central
government in healthcare policy (Table 2.1).7
The Italian National Health Service system (NHS) was established in 19788 on the model
of the British National Health Service to replace a social insurance system ruled by principles
of selective insurance, whereby citizens received coverage from employment and sickness funds
according to their occupation.9 Before 1978, the right to health protection was determined by
being a worker (or relative of a worker) rather than being a citizen and the coverage diﬀered
according to the insurance fund the worker belonged to. At the beginning of the Seventies,
5Fiorentini et al. (2008), p. 210.
6DiMarzo (2012), p. 54.
7Doetter and Go¨tze (2011), p. 2.
8Law December 23, 1978, n. 833.
9See, Doetter and Go¨tze (2011), Mapelli (2011).
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Table 2.1: Variables deﬁnition and sources
Period Legislative Intervention Main Changes
1978 Law 833/1978 Establishment of the National Health Service
1992/1993
Legislative Decrees 502/1992
and 517/1993
Creation of the internal market following the British
example, separation between purchasing and delivering
functions, promotion of competition
1999 Legislative Decree 229/1999 A further step of the regional devolution process and pro-
motion of cooperation rather than competition between
private and public providers
2000 Legislative Decree 56/2000 Complete regionalization of ﬁnancing and replacement of
the National Health Fund with the National Equalization
Fund
2001 Constitutional Law 3/2001 Regions’ exclusive responsibilities in the organization and
provision of healthcare services
2006 Law 266/2006 Introduction of repayment plans for the regions with high
and systematic deﬁcit
2009 Law 42/2009 Introduction of the ‘standard cost’ criterion in place of
the ‘historical expense’ criterion to determine regional
funding (Fiscal federalism)
the country had almost 100 funds each of which followed its own rules and regulations. Some
had their own healthcare facilities to oﬀer direct medical services; others relied on a system
of reimbursement of patients for the services received by private doctors and facilities.10
This resulted in a highly fragmented organization of healthcare and in signiﬁcant inequalities
among the population with an approximately 7% of citizens uninsured.11 In the mid-1970s
the widespread dissatisfaction combined with the status of bankruptcy of many insurance
funds and the rapid growth of expenditure led to a rethinking of the entire healthcare system
and to the introduction of the NHS.12
Following the UK example, the establishment of the Italian NHS avowedly aimed at assur-
ing individuals uniform access to comprehensive care, funded by general taxation, regardless
of individuals’ socio-economic conditions and place of residence. As a result, there are two
main pillars of the new system: (i) all citizens are entitled to receive healthcare services;
and (ii) these services include a range of necessary treatments identiﬁed by the legislator. In
10In some cases, the insurance scheme was not even responsible for covering the actual provision of health-
care services. For an extensive and more detailed overview of the insurance schemes operating before the
establishment of the Italian National Health Service system, see Morcaldo and Salvemini (1978).
11Lo Scalzo et al. (2009), p. 19.
12See, Neri (2009).
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essence, the 1978 reform pursued a reduction of the disparities in the geographical delivery
of medical care, as well as a restraint and a rationalization of health expenditures.
The ﬁrst step towards the new healthcare system was the creation of an organizational
structure broken down into three diﬀerent levels of administration: national, regional, and
local. Whilst, the second consisted in the introduction of a mixed ﬁnancing process based
on general taxes and compulsory health insurance contributions grouped in the so-called
National Health Fund. The central government was responsible for outlining the national
planning and managing the National Health Fund.13 In turn, regions were in charge of the
local planning in accordance with the guidelines provided by the national authority and of the
allocation of the ﬁnancial resources to the local level. The local administration was the level
of government responsible for the actual provision of healthcare to the population. It was
represented by local health authorities (LHAs), that is, vertically integrated organizations
funded on a capitation basis by regions and administered by municipal governments.14 After
an initial success, which coincided in 1987 with the halving of the disparities in regional health
expenditures compared to ten years before,15 the 1978 reform revealed several limitations.
In particular, a major shortcoming was that
“virtually the entire responsibility for ﬁnancing the NHS lay with the central government,
which, however, had limited power over how the USLs – legally creatures of the regions and
run by the municipal governments – spent these funds. The central government’s response
to the disconnection between funding responsibility and spending power created a situation of
permanent ﬁnancial crisis”.16
The NHS soon turned out to be characterized by jurisdictional conﬂicts among its dif-
ferent tiers. In particular, there was not a clear separation between the responsibilities of
national and regional governments. Regional administrations commonly claimed that the
central government was systematically and deliberately under-estimating the ﬁnancial re-
sources needed to cover their healthcare expenditures. In response, regions regularly did not
comply with the budget caps imposed on them. This combined with the lack of institutional
mechanisms designed to make this layer of government accountable for overspending led to
a chronic situation, where regions were systematically in deﬁcit and the central government
had to intervene ex-post to ﬁnance them.17 Due to foreseeable bailouts, regional governments
13In particular, with respect to the management of the National Health Fund, the state was responsible
for deciding the regional allocation of the resources derived from taxation and for ﬁxing the ceilings to impose
on regional spending.
14Fiorentini et al. (2008), p. 206; France et a. (2005), p. 189.
15“whereas in 1977 regional health expenditure varied from 36 percentage points above the national average
in the Center-North and expenditure in the South fell 28 percentage points below the national average in the
South, by 1987 this variation had been successfully halved.” See, Doetter and Go¨tze (2011), p. 3. On this
point, see also Fargion (2006).
16France and Taroni (2005), p. 174.
17As observed by Francese and Romanelli (2008), another problem was the lack of coordination activity
exerted at the national level. For instance, the reform also contemplated the deﬁnition of a three-year
National Health plan conceived to encompass the main features of the national healthcare policy and their
implementation strategies. However, despite its relevance, the government approved the ﬁrst National Health
plan only in 1994.
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had the perverse incentive to exceed budget caps also to signal – in view of the next budget
negotiation – to the central government that their ﬁnancial needs were actually greater than
those previously estimated. On the other hand, the state’s under-ﬁnancing was a strategic
behavior in order to push regions to contain costs.18
At the beginning of the Nineties, a series of events occurred simultaneously: the national
budget almost out of control, the crisis of the Italian Lira due to the currency devaluation
against the German Mark, a rising unemployment rate and a series of corruption scandals
of politicians, called for a major reform of the NHS, which took place at the turn of 1992
and 1993.19 In particular, this new legislative intervention further increased the authority of
regions and reconsidered the role of LHAs in the light of managerial principles. The state
retained the exclusive power to decide the ‘essential levels of care’ (LEAs). At the same
time, regional governments had the power to widen this beneﬁt package for their residents
and became accountable for the provision of these services and for repaying, with their own
resources, any deﬁcit caused by expenditures not related to LEAs.
The legislator looked again at the British experience of the creation of an internal market
by recognizing the managerial independence of major hospitals and local health authorities
and by making the ﬁrst attempts at splitting purchasing and provision functions. In this
phase, the main change consisted in an increasing delegation of power and responsibilities to
regions.
The choice of entrusting local governments with the administration of LHAs was originally
meant to foster citizens participation to the NHS, but it resulted in an ineﬃcient use of public
resources and, in some cases, LHAs became the mere expression of local political interests.20
In response to this situation, LHAs were transformed into local health units (LHUs), that is,
public enterprises no longer managed by local governments, but rather by a chief executive
oﬃcer appointed by the regional administration. Whilst, major hospitals were removed from
the control of LHUs and turned into autonomous trust.
Consequently, LHUs were signiﬁcantly subtracted from the inﬂuence and political control
of local interests and became the subject accountable for the provision of healthcare in their
geographical area. In order to satisfy the needs of their population, these organizations could
count on their own staﬀ and facilities or could resort to independent hospitals, as well as
to other providers specialized in ambulatory care. This new conﬁguration would enhanced
competition among providers, which would have to compete for contracts.21 However, the
actual degree of separation between purchase and provision was again decided by regions.
This, combined with the greater autonomy granted to this level of administration by the
reform, led to relevant interregional diﬀerences. Regions ended up diﬀering in the structure
and funding of medical services to the extent that diﬀerent regional models started to appear
in various areas of the country.22
18In this respect, Bordignon and Turati (2009) observe that “Public health expenditure in Italy is (partly)
the result of a strategic game being played by regional and central governments alike.”
19Legislative Decree December 30,1992, n. 502 and Legislative Decree December 07, 1993, n. 517.
20See, France et al. (2005), p. 189.
21France et al. (2005), p. 207.
22Jommi et al. (2001).
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Despite the major eﬀect of increasing the presence of private providers at the regional
level,23 the implementation of the 1992/93 legislative intervention raised concerns about the
diﬀerent models of governance adopted by regions and the perceived fragmentation in the
functioning and structure of the market. The level of separation between purchaser and
provider and the subsequent competition experienced in the UK was never achieved in the
Italian context. Indeed, Italy has substantially pursued the introduction of a more conscious
behavior of healthcare providers for cost containment. Given the dissatisfaction with the
outcomes of the 1992/93 reform, the competition-based model of governance was soon revised
and softened by the last structural reform of the Italian NHS.24
In 1999, the organization of the NHS was further reshaped in the light of the concept
of ‘managed planning’ (so-called ‘programmazione negoziata’).25 In order to limit the in-
terregional inequalities emerged, the legislator decided to favor the uniformity of the NHS
by promoting cooperation rather than competition between private and public providers.
Speciﬁcally, the purchaser/provider split was still envisaged, but the reform foresaw the
implementation of a two-stage negotiation system (region-local health authorities and local
health authorities-providers). Such a system was aimed at identifying volumes of services and
funding budgets to better control costs and contain the provision of unnecessary services.26
Anyway, this reform was never fully accomplished, because early 2000 coincided with a
strengthening of the process of ﬁscal federalism initiated in 1997 that led to a strong regional-
ization of ﬁnancing in the healthcare sector.27 In particular, the legislator recognized regional
ﬁnancial autonomy by turning health contributions and some minor taxes into regional taxes.
As a result, the main source of regional funds became a regional tax on production combined
with additional transfers derived from general national taxation. All these taxes were set
aside in the so-called National Equalization Fund to replace the National Health Fund.28
A few years later, in 2001, a constitutional amendment further stressed the role of regions
by recognizing their exclusive responsibilities in the organization and provision of healthcare
services.29 At the same time, the amendment stated the right of Italian residents to uniform
essential levels of care that have to be free at the point of delivery and are deﬁned by the
central government.
Another important step from the ﬁnancing perspective was included in Financial Law
of 200630 through which the national government considered the necessity to support those
regional governments in systematic and high deﬁcit to also control the north-south divide.
In particular, repayments plans (so-called ‘Piani di rientro’) were elaborated for the regions
23See, Neri (2009), and Doetter and Go¨tze (2011).
24Legislative Decree, June 19, 1999, n. 229.
25Mapelli (2012), p. 185.
26Mapelli (2012), p. 185. For a more detailed discussion of the two-stage negotiation system, see Fiorentini
and Ugolini (2000).
27The process of ﬁscal federalism was initiated by the Legislative Decree 446/1997. As noted by Francese
and Romanelli (2008), this legislative intervention was the ﬁrst attempt to combine expenditure and ﬁnancing
responsibilities. See also, Mapelli (2012) and Atella (2011).
28Legislative Decree, February 18, 2000, n. 56.
29Constitutional Law n. 3, 18 October 2001.
30Law 266/2005.
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with such a high deﬁcit that could not make a credible commitment to heal their own ﬁnancial
situation. These plans started to be applied in 2007 and they still represent the principal
tool to enforce budget constraints on the more problematic regions.31 More recently, in
May 2009,32 regional ﬁnancial autonomy was further reinforced with the precise intent to
grant regions equal spending powers to those enjoyed in social policy. The major novelty
introduced was the so-called ‘standard cost’ criterion to quantify the costs that regions had
to bear in order to provide healthcare to their residents.33 The challenge of this reform lay
in the identiﬁcation of the methods to determine the standard costs. In fact, the law only
referred to the standard costs associated with the essential levels of performances that are
“determined by State Law in full cooperation with Regions and Local Authorities and have to
be provided “eﬃciently and adequately to all Italian State territory”.34
Overall, all these reforms have led to a health system ruled by diﬀerent layers of govern-
ment whose interaction actually determines the public health policy of the country. Each
level of administration has its speciﬁc role, nonetheless the separation of their tasks is not
always so clear and their relationships are sometimes tense. The structure of the system to-
day is characterized by a common framework that coexists with increasing diﬀerences among
regions in terms of the organization of medical provision, health expenditures and ﬁnancing.
2.2.1 Organizational Structure
The long-lasting process of reforms led to a NHS characterized by a structure broken down
into three diﬀerent levels of administration: national, regional and local. The central govern-
ment is responsible for setting the essential levels of care corresponding to the health beneﬁt
package to which residents are entitled. In particular, these services are identiﬁed as a posi-
tive and a negative list. The positive list includes all services that must be uniformly oﬀered
in all regions classiﬁed in macro categories of care: (i) public health services; (ii) hospital
care, and (iii) community care,35 while the negative one speciﬁes the categories of services
31For instance, according Fondazione Farmafactoring (2012), repayment plans have been a successful
instrument of costs containment. During the period 2007-2010, the average annual growth rate of healthcare
expenditure was 2.4%, whereas this rate stood at 6.6% for the period 2001-2006.
32Law n. 42, 5 May 2009.
33Before the introduction of the ‘standard cost’ criterion, regions’ funding was determined on the basis of
historical spending.
34Law 42/2009, art. 8, par. 1, letter b. Consequently, the determination of the standard costs cannot occur
without the intervention of the central government that has ﬁrst to specify the essential levels of performances.
On this issue, see Scuto (2010) and Villani (2010). For an overview of the evolution of the ﬁnancing methods
of the Italian NHS see Reviglio (2000), Caroppo and Turati (2007) and Mappelli (2011). A further attempt to
restrain public expenditures took place in 2012 when the Italian government initiated a process of spending
review in response to the ongoing economic crisis. For healthcare, this meant the Legislative Decree 95/2012,
which pursues a signiﬁcant lowering of public expenditures through the reduction of the number of beds,
the decrease of territorial pharmaceutical expenditures and the containment of both the services purchased
from private providers and the expenses for medical devices. In particular, the maximum number of beds
per thousand inhabitants has been set to 3.7 and this limit should have entailed 7,000 fewer beds by 2013.
35Torbica and Fattore (2005), p. 47.
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that do not fall under public coverage.36 Similarly to what happens for medical care services,
the NHS also divides drugs into a positive list, identifying all medicines the NHS pays for,
and a negative list, indicating those drugs that are fully at the expenses of patients.37
Responsible for the provision of LEAs are regional governments. This tier of government
also has the discretionary power to deliver healthcare services not included in the positive
list, but it has the subsequent obligation to ﬁnance these additional beneﬁts with its own
sources of revenues. Regions organize the delivery of these services through the local level,
which is constituted by a system of public and private healthcare structures and providers.
Speciﬁcally, it is possible to distinguish four types of local players: (i) local health units
(LHUs);38 (ii) independent hospitals (IHs)39 and teaching hospitals (THs);40 (iii) national
institutes for scientiﬁc research (RHs);41 and (iv) private accredited providers.
LHUs are public vertically integrated enterprises organized on a population-basis and
“primarily concerned with protecting and promoting public health and [are] responsible for
achieving the health objectives and targets established by national and regional planning.”42
These organizations operate on a geographical basis and patients’ enrollment to the health
plans managed by them is done according to the place of residence of patients. Nevertheless,
patients can freely decide whether to receive medical treatments in the LHU they are enrolled
with or in another LHU. In the latter case, the LHU treating a patient is reimbursed by the
LHU the patient belongs to. In this way, LHUs act as payers and suppliers of services at the
same time.43 Even though LHUs have their own legal autonomy, they depend on regions.
In particular, regional governments are responsible for deciding the size and structure of
LHUs; appointing and dismissing their chief executive oﬃcer; monitoring their conduct and
ﬁnancing them on a capitation basis and special programs.
IHs are semi-independent hospitals with the status of public enterprises that substantially
resembles that of the British Trust hospitals. Legally established in 1995, these health centers
are responsible for providing highly specialized tertiary hospital care. Their governance is
similar to that of LHUs. Speciﬁcally, they are run by managers, who deﬁne the mission
and objectives of the structure through a three-year strategic plan, that, in turn, has to
be in line with regional recommendations. A sub-category of IHs is represented by the
University/Teaching Hospitals (THs), which besides providing medical services also oﬀer
36As well described in France et al. (2005), there are three categories of services contained in the negative
list. The ﬁrst group includes those services excluded due to proven clinical ineﬀectiveness or because they
are not considered to be of primary responsibility of the NHS (e.g. plastic surgery when it does not concern
malformation or injuries). The second group contains those diagnostic and ambulatory services that are
covered only under speciﬁc medical conditions of patients (e.g. dental orthodontics). Finally, the third
group lists diﬀerent types of hospitalizations, deﬁned in terms of diagnosis-related groups (DRGs), that are
considered inappropriate and that should be replaced by other treatments such as, for instance, ambulatory
care.
37These positive and negative lists constitute the so-called National Pharmaceutical Formulary.
38In Italian, Aziende Sanitarie Locali (ASL)
39In Italian, Aziende Ospedaliere (AO).
40In Italian, Aziende Ospedaliere Universitarie (AOU).
41In Italian, Istituti di Ricovero e Cura a Carattere Scientiﬁco (IRCCS).
42European Observatory on Health Care System (2001), p. 60.
43See, Maio and Mazoli (2002), p. 303.
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teaching and training activities and may have a commitment to research.44
RHs are research-oriented hospitals especially active in the ﬁeld of biomedicine. They
“represent a national network where basic and translational biomedical research is undertaken
in synergy with the delivery of high qualitative health care.”45 The status of a research
hospital is granted by the Ministry of Health, which is responsible for monitoring their
research activities and participates in their governance. In fact, the Ministry of Health
in collaboration with the region, where the hospital is based, is tasked with the planning,
ﬁnancing and monitoring of these organizations. In particular, the Ministry nominates their
Scientiﬁc Director46 and gives the basic ﬁnancing for scientiﬁc research, whereas regional
governments fund medical care provision to patients. Individuals are entitled to receive
hospital care on a free-of-charge basis and suppliers are reimbursed by the LHU to which a
patient belongs through a mix of prospective payments. Whereas patients are assigned to
a LHU on the grounds of their place of residence, they have full discretion in the choice of
their provider of hospital services. Consequently, for hospital care treatments, individuals
can seek care in a facility that is not managed by their LHU and that is not even located in
their region.47
Finally, private accredited providers are private health organizations oﬀering ambula-
tory services, hospital care and/or diagnostic services that have passed an authorization and
accreditation process run by regional health departments. Regional governments are respon-
sible for the accreditation procedures that are conceived to ensure the quality of the medical
care supplied. In particular, private providers are required to possess the technological, orga-
nizational and structural prerequisites set by regions. The discretionary power of regions in
deciding these prerequisites aims at recognizing regional independence and at permitting to
take into due consideration local speciﬁc characteristics. Once accredited, private providers
are paid by regional governments through a DRG based scheme. Some regions leave to LHUs
the task of negotiating with private providers the type of services to be delivered and the
due compensations (e.g. Lombardy), while others prefer to be in charge of these negotiations
(e.g. Abruzzo).
Despite this common framework, the NHS shows signiﬁcant interregional diﬀerences in
terms of organization of the local level that are a result of the regions’ autonomy. Regional
governments have modiﬁed several times the structure of their local level, but the major
changes were undertaken in the mid-nineties following the 1992/1993 reform. As a conse-
quence, the number and average size of LHUs and IHs vary widely among regions and there
is a high heterogeneity in the number of hospitals directly managed by LHUs and in the
44THs are connected to universities, whose presence is considered in the governance of the structures
themselves. In fact, universities are involved in the appointment of the hospitals’ manager and in the
deﬁnition of both the strategic plan and internal regulation of the facilities. Regions ﬁnance the delivery of
medical care by THs on a free-for-service basis.
45Lo Scalzo et al. (2009), p. 77.
46Conversely, the General Director of RH is appointed by the Board of Trustees.
47Fabbri e Robone (2010). The authors identify the main drivers in choosing the admitting hospital in
the distance from home, hospital specialization, waiting lists and perceived quality.
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presence of health structures other than LHUs and IHs.48
Over time, there has been a steady and generalized reduction in the number of LHUs
from 659 in 1992 to 197 in 2000. In 2012, they amounted to 145 with an average population
of 415,000 inhabitants.49 A LHU directly manages on average 2.9 hospitals with an average
number of beds per facility of 159. As for the number of IHs, in 2012 the NHS could count on
61 of these structures. In particular, Lombardy opted for the complete split of all hospitals
from LHUs, while three regional governments (i.e. Abruzzo, Molise, Valle dAosta) and the
two autonomous provinces (i.e. Trento and Bolzano) preferred not to constitute any IH. In
between these two opposite strategies, there are the remaining regions with a wide spectrum
of possible conﬁgurations ranging from very few IHs as in Veneto to a multitude of IHs as
in Sicily. On average, an IH directly administrates 2.2 hospitals with an average number of
beds per facility of 298.50 More homogeneous is the situation with respect to the number
of THs as there were 27 public THs in 2012, whereas the RHs amounted to 18 distributed
among 13 regions (Table 2.2).
The existing interregional diﬀerences are not limited to the sole organizational aspect,
but they involve also the type of governance exerted at the local level. In recent years and in
the light of the progressive introduction of elements of ﬁscal federalism, regions have focused
their intervention on the implementation of several institutional changes aimed at better
management and a greater cost containment.51
These changes have also concerned the degree of control of regional governments over the
bargaining strategies of their LHUs in purchasing services from private and public providers.
As described by Fiorentini et al. (2008), several regions in southern and central Italy did
not intervene at all and preferred to simply cover the actual spending of their providers.
Diﬀerently, the majority of regions adopted the so-called ‘local health authorities-centered
model’, whereby LHUs received regional transfers on a capitation basis and concluded agree-
ments with accredited public and private providers. A smaller number of regions in the
North and Center opted instead for the so-called ‘region-centered model’ according to which
48Ferre` and Ricci (2011), p. 29.
49For an overview of the changes that took place over time in the structure of the local level in each
region, see Ferre` and Ricci (2011). The authors also report that the region with the biggest LHU in term of
population is Marche; on the contrary, the LHUs in Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Umbria and Sardinia have
an average population that does not exceed 250,000 individuals.
50In absolute terms, in 2012 these were 629 dependent hospitals, 10% of which was managed by IHs..
51In particular, more and more often regions have created supra-LHUs entities or levels of administration
to centralize some speciﬁc administrative function (e.g. logistic). For example, Tuscany has constituted
three supra-LHUs entities each of which is responsible for three out of the nine LHUs in the region and on
their behalf manages several administrative activities such as the procurement function. Conversely, three
regions (Marche, Molise and Valle d’Aosta) and the autonomous province of Trento centralized everything by
unifying all their LHUs in a single regional one. More in general, Ferre` and Ricci (2011) identify four main
models, whereby regions create a supra-LHUs entities or level of administration. First, regions develop an
e-procurement platform and a central purchasing station whose services LHUs can optionally or mandatory
access. Second, LHUs constitute one or more consortia to jointly manage speciﬁc technical-administrative
activities. Third, regions establish legally independent entities that are responsible for the provision of
a wide range of services (such as, for example, risk management, procurement or purchasing) to LHUs.
Fourth, regions decide to unify their LHUs in a single regional one.
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Table 2.2: Distribution of Italian Public Healthcare Structures by Region and Type (Year
2012)
Region LHUs IHs THs RHs
Abruzzo 4 0 0 0
Basilicata 2 1 0 1
Calabria 5 4 0 1
Campania 7 6 3 1
Emilia Romagna 11 1 4 1
Friuli Venezia Giulia 6 1 2 2
Lazio 12 3 3 3
Liguria 5 0 0 2
Lombardy 15 29 0 1
Marche 1 2 0 1
Molise 1 0 0 0
AP Bolzen 1 0 0 0
AP Trento 1 0 0 0
Piedmont 13 5 3 0
Puglia 6 0 2 2
Sardinia 8 1 2 1
Sicily 9 5 3 1
Tuscany 12 0 4 0
Umbria 4 2 0 0
Valle d’Aosta 1 0 0 0
Veneto 21 1 1 1
Total 145 61 27 18
Notes: LHUs=Local Health Units; IHs=Independent Hospitals;
THs=Teaching Hospitals; RHs=Institutes for Scientiﬁc Research.
AP=Autonomous Province. Source: Italian Ministry of Health
regions and local health enterprises played the role of purchaser and providers respectively
and the independence of the latter was more limited. The only region actually implementing
a ‘purchaser-provider split model’ was Lombardy, which called oﬀ the control of LHUs from
all hospitals with the result that LHUs “acted mainly as third-party payers in a system where
public-private competition and patient freedom of choice were encouraged.”52
To some extent, it is possible to claim today that the diﬀerent choices made in response to
the diﬀerent steps of the reform process in the Italian NHS have materialized in 21 diﬀerent
52Fiorentini et al. (2008), p. 207.
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organizational and governance models53 that represent at the same time a strength and
a weakness for the national system. This heterogeneity can be beneﬁcial because regions
may meet better the speciﬁc needs and preferences of their population, but also because the
solutions implemented by some regions may be taken as reference by others. On the contrary,
it can be problematic, as it makes it more diﬃcult to manage and monitor the healthcare
system as a whole.
2.2.2 Medical Personnel
A striking ﬁgure characterizing the Italian case is that the country has more doctors per
capita than most other OECD countries. In 2011, the ratio of practicing physicians per 1000
residents was 4.1, above both the OECD average of 3.2 and the European average of 3.4. On
the contrary, the country is characterized by an under-supply of nursing personnel reporting,
in 2011, a number of nurses equal to 6.3 per 1000 residents, less than the OECD average of
8.7.54 According to the latest ﬁgures available for the year 2010, the Italian NHS employs
overall 110,732 physicians and 334,918 nurses.
The provision of primary care services is entrusted to general practitioners (also called
family doctors), paediatricians and on-call doctors (the so-called Guardia Medica) for after-
hours healthcare. General practitioners and paediatricians have also a ‘gatekeepers’ function
being responsible for referring patients to secondary and tertiary care. They work as inde-
pendent professionals under contract with the NHS and are paid mainly on a capitation basis
according to the number of patients enrolled in their list with an allowed maximum of 1,500
patients for general practitioners and 800 for paediatricians. To receive care, Italian residents
are required to enroll with one of them. Patients are free to choose any doctors they prefer
among those belonging to their LHU of residence and can decide to change physicians at
any time. Besides capitated-payments, that are uniform across the country and regulated
by speciﬁc national contracts, these health professionals receive also extra remunerations for
(i) taking part in special programs; (ii) attaining organizational or expenditure objectives,
and (iii) oﬀering additional services (e.g. vaccinations, certiﬁcations or home-care visits).
Furthermore, general practitioners and paediatricians can work in team by setting up vol-
untary associative practices.55 In 2010, general practitioners amounted to 45,878 (one for
every 1,143 residents), whereas pediatricians were 7,718 (one for every 1,026 children under
53As noted by Mapelli (2012), p.219, this heterogeneity have been favored also by the peculiarities of
regions in terms of historical backgrounds, economic development, territorial dimension and local culture.
54According to Bertinato et al. (2011), the country suﬀers a structural shortage of over 70,000 nurses.
This has led to a strong presence of foreign nurses in Italy, who made up between 9.4% and 11% of the nursing
personnel in 2008. Diﬀerently, the country is characterized by a much lower portion of foreign doctors with
estimates varying between 1% and 4%.
55Three are the main forms of primary care associations. First, according to ‘associative practices’, from 3
to 10 general practitioners may decide to adopt clinical and diagnostic guidelines and participate in workshops,
while continuing to work in separate oﬃces. Second, ‘network group practice’ requires the further step of
having a common information system and network in order to share patients’ electronic records. Third,
‘group practice’ brings together in a same ambulatory 3 to 8 general practitioners, who are also obliged to
have a common patient electronic health record system. See, for example, Lo Scalzo et al. (2009).
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14 years). As for the on-call doctors, these were 12,104 (20 for every 1000 residents) grouped
in 2,925 Guardia Medica stations.
The vast majority of the NHS employed physicians (around 80%) operate in the hospital
sector, providing inpatient services and specialist ambulatory care. These services are free
or at nominal charges at the point of use and hospital doctors are paid by salary. A portion
(i.e. 20%) of this salary has been transformed in a function of grade and performance by a
reform in 1999.56 All physicians hired by the NHS have the status of civil servants. However,
hospital physicians are also allowed to practice privately (i.e. dual practice). Finally, spe-
cialist inpatient and outpatient services are also provided by a small number of independent
physicians working under contract with the NHS and paid by fee schedules set at the regional
level.57
2.2.3 Healthcare Expenditure and Financing
The Italian NHS is the third largest healthcare system at the European level after only
Germany and France. In 2011, total expenditures stood at nearly 113 billion euros equal to
7.1% of GDP and to a 1.4% increase compared to 2010. The average per capita expenditure
was 1.862 euros at the national level with large interregional variations. Calabria recorded
the lowest expenditure with 1.704 euros, while Valle dAosta, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Liguria
and Molise and the autonomous province of Bolzano registered an expenditure exceeding
2.000 euros.58 Regions present also signiﬁcant diﬀerences in terms of deﬁcit experienced. In
particular, in 2010, two regions (Lazio and Campania) were responsible for the 66.2% of the
national deﬁcit. The main source of health funding is represented by public funding that, in
2011, covered 77.8% of health spending, above the average of 72.2% in OECD countries.
Regions devote 70% of their budget to healthcare and are responsible for 90% of public
expenditure in health services.59 Nevertheless, the funding of the NHS is a shared task be-
tween the central government and regional administrations. National and regional resources
are combined to form the budget of the NHS that represents the national ﬁnancing necessary
to assure the provision of the LEAs in the country. Every year, the budget obtained by both
national and regional sources is then divided between the 19 regions and the 2 autonomous
provinces, which in turn split the funds received among their LHUs. The ﬁnancial need
of each region is quantiﬁed according to a formula, whereby an average value per inhabi-
tant is multiplied by the resident population and weighted by age-speciﬁc utilization rates
of medical care. The ﬁgure obtained is then summed up with interregional patients ﬂow
measures and the resulting amount represents the resources to be allocated to each regional
administration.60
As for the origin of funding, regional ﬁnancing comes mainly from the IRAP (i.e. Imposta
56See, France et al. (2005), p. 195.
57Maio and Manzoli (2002), p. 304.
58For a comprehensive and detailed description of healthcare expenditure in Italy in 2011, see Ministry of
Economy and Finance (2012). For an overview of their evolution over time, see Armeni (2011).
59Doetter and Go¨tze (2011), p. 7.
60See, Mapelli (2012) and Lo Scalzo et al. (2009).
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regionale sulle attivita` produttive), the regional tax on production applied on the value added
of companies (corporations, partnerships and self-employed workers) and on the salaries of
civil servants.61 An additional source of regional nature is the so-called addizionale IRPEF,
a piggyback tax imposed on top of the national personal income tax (i.e. IRPEF - Imposta
sul reddito delle persone ﬁsiche).62 In 2010, these two regional taxes yielded 36,874 billion
euros and reported a 6% decrease compared to the previous year leading to stricter budget
constraints.63
Regions have also at their disposal revenues from other taxes such as the vehicles tax and
have the discretion to devote additional portions of their budget resources to healthcare.64
In turn, the state contributes to the NHS funding through a share of both the national VAT
and petroleum excise tax. The precise share of these taxes to be devoted to healthcare is
decided annually by the central government itself with the objective of providing adequate
funds for the supply of the LEAs by all regions.65 In 2010, the central transfers derived from
the VAT and the oil tax amounted to 53,498 billion euros recording an 8.7% increase with
respect to 2009.66
However, the ﬁnal quantiﬁcation of the NHS budget is the result of a negotiation between
regions and the central government that takes into account also the macroeconomic situation
of the country, the status of public ﬁnances and the requirements coming from the European
Union.67 Originally, the choice of setting the budget ex-ante was made in the belief that
such a strategy would have avoided the high debts experienced with the insurance schemes
system, where healthcare expenditure was known only at the end of the year. First, the
mismatch between ﬁnancial responsibility and spending power introduced by the 1978 reform
and later the systematic tendency to underestimate the ﬁnancial needs of the system and
to overvalue the savings achievable through containment measures, led to the continuous
creation of deﬁcits.68 In recent years, the central government has tried to limit these deﬁcits
by underwriting annual state-region agreements (so-called ‘Pacts for Health’). In particular,
the State has progressively conditioned the access to additional resources to the conclusion
of these agreements, which were meant to improve regional governance of healthcare and to
discipline regions’ ﬁnancing and expenditure conduct.
In addition, since 2007, regions with higher deﬁcits are subject to repayment plans,
whereby, among other things, they are deprived of their autonomy in deciding the rate
of both the piggyback income tax and the tax in production that is compulsorily set at the
61The rate imposed on the value added of companies and on the salaries of civil servants amounts to
3.9% and 8.5% respectively. Regional governments have the possibility to vary the rate by 0.92%. They
can increase these rates by this percentage when they face healthcare deﬁcits. Conversely, they can decrease
them by the same percentage to attract ﬁrms’ investments.
62The rate of this regional tax is set at 1.23% and can be increased by 0.5%. Those regions that suﬀer
from high budget deﬁcits have the obligation to impose a 2.03% rate.
63Armeni (2011), p.122.
64Mapelli (2012).
65France et al. (2005) and Fiorentini et al. (2008).
66Armeni (2011), p.122.
67Mapelli (2012).
68See, Mapelli (2012), Lo Scalzo (2009), and France and Taroni (2005).
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highest possible level.69 In this way, regions are discouraged from free riding on the contri-
butions received from patients coming from other regions, as extra ﬁnancial needs must be
met also through a higher ﬁscal eﬀect at the local level.70
In the end, the picture that we obtained is that of a system under ﬁnancial stress and
characterized by a strong planning component, with problems of governance given by the
complexity of the objectives pursued and a top-down approach. Hence, Italy oﬀers the
possibility to study the phenomenon of medical malpractice within a context that clearly
diﬀers from the one usually studied by the related literature (i.e. the U.S.). In particular,
in Italy, the national public health policy translates into diﬀerent regional systems that end
up reﬂecting the typical north-south divide of the country. Moreover, the public nature
of the system strongly aﬀects the choices of both clinicians and healthcare facilities. Public
hospitals cannot refrain from oﬀering the entire set of LEAs and, as a result, their production
capacity is planned by the central and regional government, while publicly employed doctors
are subject to both the directions of public health authorities and of the facilities they work
for. Therefore, the diﬀerences among the two systems are not limited to their objectives
and sources of funding, but extend to both their organizational aspects and functioning with
possible relevant consequences on the phenomenon of medical malpractice itself.
69Currently, there are eight regions subject to repayment plans: Abruzzo, Calabria, Campania, Lazio,
Molise, Piedmont, Puglia and Sicily. Sardinia interrupted its repayment plan, while Liguria is the sole region
to have successfully achieved the objectives set in its plan.
70Fiorentini et al. (2008), p. 210.
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Figure 2.1: The Italian National Healthcare System
Notes:LHUs=Local Health Units; IHs=Independent Hospitals; THs=Teaching Hospitals; RHs=Institutes for Scientiﬁc Re-
search.
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2.3 Medical Malpractice Liability
In Italy, there is no speciﬁc statute law for the doctor-patient relationship, which turns out
to be regulated mainly by the jurisprudence developed by the Court of Cassation.71 In fact,
the responsibility of physicians (public or private hospital employees or independent practi-
tioners) is interpreted as a contractual liability and the duties of doctors towards patients
are formally governed by principles of contract law.72
In particular, doctors are both civilly and criminally liable with respect to medical mal-
practice cases. Therefore, physicians will respond, in every case of alleged malpractice in civil
courts for the damages suﬀered by patients, and eventually in criminal courts for negligent
personal injuries or manslaughter. Speciﬁcally, a physician may be prosecuted in a criminal
court when (i) it is possible to identify a serious error in her conduct due to the failure
to comply with the precautionary rules laid down by laws and regulations or dictated by
the common sense of prudence,73 and (ii) there is a casual relationship between the medical
error and the injuries suﬀered by the patient. In this case, the physician is accused of the
crime of negligent personal injuries (lesioni personali colpose), that under Article 43 of the
national penal code is described as “an event that, even if it happened against the inten-
tion, occurred due to negligence, imprudence, unskillfulness or failure to comply with laws,
regulations, orders and disciplines.”74
As for the civil liability, physicians can be brought to a civil court for any illicit profes-
sional conduct when a causal link is identiﬁable between such a conduct and the event that
causes the injuries experienced by the plaintiﬀ. Doctors must observe reasonable diligence
with respect to the characteristics of the activities performed. This means that clinicians
are not obliged to assure under any circumstance a positive outcome, rather that they al-
ways have to guarantee that their conduct follows the normal standard of adequate medical
preparation and meticulous attention. If a physician fails in providing this diligence, she is
considered liable for negligence or imprudence without any distinction between gross or slight
fault.75 The fault is considered gross if the physician violates the minimum skills required by
medical profession, whereas it is recognized as slight if a doctor harms the patient because of
an omission of care or her inadequate preparation during a surgical treatment or a medical
therapy. This distinction comes into play only with respect to technical situations charac-
71See, Zeno-Zencovich (2007).
72Arts. 1218, 1176, and 2236 of the Civil Code. In the last decades, the applicability of tort versus
contractual law to regulate the patient-doctor relationship has been debated, because the choice between
the two was not always easy when it came to medical malpractice. As observed by Miriello (2011), this
decision was complicated also by the possibility to distinguish ﬁve main types of patient-physician relationship
according to the type of doctors considered (private doctors, doctors employed by private provides, university
doctors, doctors working for public facilities as employees or on the ground of agreements). Anyway, according
to Di Marzo (2012, p. 54): “The treatment of medical malpractice cases as one of contract (as opposed to one
of tort) appears to be a policy adopted in order to provide the claimant the possibility of recovering damages
even in problematic cases, such as when the nature of the situation makes it diﬃcult (or impossible) for the
claimant to prove fault and causation by the defendant.”
73Cannavo` et al. (2011), p. 73.
74Traina (2009). p. 436.
75Traina (2009).
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terized by extreme diﬃculty, where a doctor is liable to civil action for gross fault in case of
imprudence, negligence or unskillfulness; and for slight fault only in case of imprudence or
negligence.
In particular, negligence occurs when a physician does not adopt all the necessary precau-
tions; thus, there is an omission of care. Diﬀerently, imprudence implies an active behavior
of the doctor, who performs medical treatments without all the precautions that are con-
sidered necessary by common experience. As a result, the physician deliberately ignores all
the possible negative consequences and dangers that can happen with a reasonable likeli-
hood. On the contrary, if a doctor diverges from those technical rules, which the majority
of her colleagues would have observed in the same situation, she is guilty of unskillfulness.
Consequently, physicians in Italy may be liable for waiving the common standard of care
with respect to professional knowledge, adequate preparation and scrupulous attention. The
Court of Cassation identiﬁes this common standard of care based on the Roman concept of
the bonus pater familias, that is, the concept of the ‘good father of a family’. In medicine,
this concept refers to the diligence that a prudent doctor would have adopted under the same
circumstances.76
Injured patients can sue not only the physician, but also the hospital. In fact, a healthcare
facility is recognized to be liable, when the act or omission that damaged the patient is
attributable to an activity of its doctors or employees. As pointed out by Traina (2009),
the Court of Cassation has interpreted both the responsibility of the healthcare structure
and the doctor as contractual liability, because “the acceptance of the patient in the hospital
for admission or for a clinical control, involves the conclusion of a contract”,77 so that it
creates a ‘social contact’ between patient and doctor, that is characterized by a contractual
nature.78 The recognition of the contractual nature of the physician-patient relationship has
an important implication also in terms of the burden of proof, which lies on the defendant.
However, in the past, the burden of proof required in medical negligence claims diﬀered
on the grounds of the nature of the speciﬁc medical activity under examination. In fact,
the Court of Cassation recognized a double nature to the physician-patient relationship:
doctors faced an obligation of means79 when they performed complex and unusual medical
76Grossen and Guillod (1983).
77On this point, Scarso and Foglia (2011, p. 341) identify two possible interpretations: “The patient
admitted to a hospital or a clinic: (i) enters into a contract with the medical institution, and is treated by
an internal physician who is aﬃliated with the medical institution; (ii) concludes a contract with a physician
practicing their professional activity within a medical institution.”
78Court of Cassation n. 589/1999 and n. 577/2008. The social contact occurs when a doctor accepts the
case of a patient. This is considered suﬃcient to produce obligations for the parties involved on the legal
grounds of Article 1173 of the civil code and the resulting physician-patient relationship acquires the nature
of a de facto contractual relationship. For a general discussion of the social contact doctrine, see Faillace
(2004).
79On the basis of an obligation of means, the obligor is obliged to undertake all possible measures and
eﬀorts to achieve the objective desired by the counterpart, but she does not have the obligation to actually
achieve it. Consequently, the obligor cannot be found responsible for not achieving the required outcome if
she can prove that she has applied proper diligence.
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procedures and an obligation of outcome80 with respect to routine medical procedures.81 As
a result, in routine cases, victims were required to prove that the treatment received could
be classiﬁed as a routine one and that there was a causal link between this treatment and the
injuries suﬀered. Once the plaintiﬀ successfully met her burden of proof, in order to not be
found liable, the clinician had to prove that the damages were due to an unforeseeable and
unavoidable factor that was unrelated to her behavior. By contrast, in the hypothesis of a
complex case, the clinician had to prove that the treatment performed could be considered as
a complex one, while the victim had to provide evidence of the negligent conduct of the doctor
and of the causal relation between the treatment received and the damage experienced.
This approach changed in the early 2000’s when the Court of Cassation stated that this
distinction between routine and complex treatments does not determine the assignment of
the burden of proof between parties,82 rather it shall “be applied when the judge evaluates
the degree of diligence required in a speciﬁc case and the extent of the corresponding fault.”83
Consequently, if the litigation concerns a medical treatment considered as a routine activity
for the doctor, then the defendant herself has to prove that the negative result of such a
treatment was not due to negligence, imprudence or unskillfulness. On the contrary, if the
medical activity performed is particularly complicated or uncommon, the physician has to
prove that she applied proper diligence.
Being a contract in nature, the physician-patient relationship requires the consensus of
patients to receive any given medical treatment.84 Moreover, according to Article 32 of the
Italian Constitution “no one can be compelled to undergo any certain medical treatment except
as a speciﬁc provision of the law.” Therefore, before performing any medical professional
service, a doctor needs to receive the voluntary consent of patients, who have to be fully
informed. The informed consent doctrine is a direct expression of the fundamental principle
of the inviolability of personal liberty and reﬂects the patient’s right to accept or refuse any
treatment after having received all necessary information about the medical procedure and
its possible consequences. If a physician does not fully inform a patient, she is liable for
guilty omission.85 A doctor must provide her professional assistance, even if a patient cannot
express her acceptance of the treatment, only in case of emergency and in case of high psychic
80An obligation of outcome implies that the obligor has the duty to achieve the counterpart-desired
outcome. When she fails in ensuring this objective, she is not held liable only if she proves that the failure
was caused by unforeseeable and inevitable circumstances independent from her will.
81Court of Cassation n.4394/1985.
82For a detailed discussion of the changes in the assignment of the burden of proof in medical malpractice
cases, see Di Marzo (2012). The author stresses that the Court of Cassation decided to abandon the use of
the distinction between routine and complex medical procedures to assign the burden of proof between the
parties with decision n. 10297/2004. In particular, in this decision, the Court states that “regardless of the
type of treatment or procedure, the patient who brings an action [for damages] needs to prove the existence of
a contract (or a social contact) with the physician and allege the breach of duty by the physician. The burden
then shifts to the physician, who is required to prove that he fulﬁlled the duty [in a manner] conforming to
the requisite standard of diligence and that an external event, unforeseeable and unavoidable, actually caused
the damage.”
83Court of Cassation n. 10297/2004.
84Art. 1325 of the Italian civil code.
85Court of Cassation, n. 2335/2001.
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discomfort.86
2.3.1 Civil Action or Criminal Prosecution?
To obtain compensation for the damages suﬀered, an injured patient can freely choose to opt
for a civil action or present a compensation request in a criminal procedure.87 In Italy, 4-5%
of malpractice cases lead to a prosecution in a criminal court88 and in 52% of the cases, the
denounced crime concerns manslaughter.89
A doctor can also be obliged by a criminal court to compensate the damages caused by
her conduct to the injured patient. However, to make this possible the victim has to bring
the civil action in the criminal proceeding. Under Article 75 of the Italian penal code, the
plaintiﬀ can always decide to transfer the compensation request from the civil to the criminal
court if the civil action has still to achieve a judgment on the merit and the prescription to
bring the civil action in the criminal proceeding is not expired.90 To be entitled to bring a
civil action in the criminal procedure, the plaintiﬀ has to be the one damaged by the conduct
or omission of the physician and there has to be a casual link between the behavior of the
doctor and the damages experienced by the plaintiﬀ.
In addition, the submission of the compensation request in a criminal court is possible
only if the subject of the prosecution coincides with the one of the civil action. Otherwise, the
civil and criminal procedures remain separate and continue to take place in their respective
courts. However, once a civil action has been brought in a criminal proceeding, it can even
be transferred back to the civil court. Speciﬁcally, if the judge in the criminal court does not
pronounce herself about the compensation request, the injured party has the right to move
back to the civil court.91
The legislator sought to regulate the exercise of the civil action in criminal courts. In
particular, if a plaintiﬀ decides to transfer the compensation request back to the civil court,
the civil action is suspended until the emission of the criminal sentence. Moreover, the
criminal sentence aﬀects the judgment of the civil court.92 This transfer of the civil action
back to the civil court is possible until the penal sentence is reached, and automatically
results in the revocation of the damages request in front of the criminal court. On the
contrary, an injured party acting in the civil court can beneﬁt from the favorable outcome of
the criminal trial, while avoiding the adverse consequences. In fact, a sentence of acquittal
in the criminal court does not aﬀect the civil action. Therefore, the civil judge may reach
86Cannavo` et al. (2011).
87For a detailed description of both the civil and criminal procedure, see Jourdan et al. (2000). Recently,
the Legislative Decree 28/2010 has introduced mandatory mediation procedures in the Italian legal system.
As a result, starting from March 2011, if an injured party wants to ﬁle a claim against a doctor or a healthcare
provider, she must ﬁrst resort to mediation. Only in the case of failure of the mediation procedure, the plaintiﬀ
can initiated a trial. See, De Palo and Keller (2012) and Gulino et al. (2010).
88Marsh (2011) and Rasini Vigano´ (2011).
89Rasini Vigano´ (2011).
90Art. 484 of the penal code.
91De Luca et a. (2011).
92Artt. 651 and 652 of the penal code.
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an opposite conclusion compared to that of a criminal court. The judge may conclude that
the defendant is guilty and her conduct represents an illicit event convicting the defendant
to compensate the victim.93
If an injured party seeks mainly or solely compensation, thus she does not pursue also the
recognition of the tort suﬀered and the subsequent punishment of the tortfeasor, the choice
between initiating a civil action and a criminal proceeding may be inﬂuenced by a number of
factors such as time and costs. Speciﬁcally, the plaintiﬀ should consider the shorter statute of
limitations of criminal procedures. In fact, while the claim for civil liability is subject to the
common ten years prescription foreseen for contracts, the statute of limitations with respect
to a criminal prosecution is shortened to six years. A further element that should be taken
into account refers to the fact that before bringing a civil action in a criminal proceeding,
the plaintiﬀ must wait for the end of the investigations of the public prosecutor in the case of
negligent personal injuries or for the pretrial hearing in the case of manslaughter. As for the
costs, criminal proceedings are characterized by higher expenses in terms of attorneys and
consultants. However, these are not the sole diﬀerences between civil and criminal disputes.
In fact, whereas the decision to ﬁle a civil action is entirely remitted to the initiative of
injured parties, a criminal prosecution can be initiated by patients only under the hypotheses
of negligent personal injuries.
In fact, in Italy, according to the principle of legality, a criminal indictment can usually
be moved only by a public prosecutor when there are reasons to believe that a crime has
been committed.94 As a consequence, with respect to medical malpractice cases, a criminal
persecution can be initiated by (i) a public prosecutor or the judicial police;95 (ii) those
subjects that, for sake of oﬃce, have the legal obligation to report the crime;96 and (iii)
the injured party in the case of negligent personal injuries. The victim can bring a penal
action against a doctor within three months from the date when she has had full knowledge
of the existence of the physician’s penal responsibility for the injuries suﬀered.97 Finally,
the plaintiﬀ should also consider whether the information and evidence collected could be
suﬃcient to achieve a judgment. At this stage, an important contribution can be oﬀered
by forensic medical consultants and specialized physicians practicing in the same ﬁeld as
the defendant. On the one hand, they could be able to conﬁrm or deny that the case under
examination may constitute a case of medical malpractice, and, on the other hand, they could
provide further insights in order to decide the type of legal action that should be initiated.
93As to the amount of damages compensated, in principle, the decisions reached by civil and criminal
courts are expected to be relatively close at least when schedules of noneconomic damages are implemented.
In fact, once that this policy has been adopted, it ﬁnds application with respect to both civil and criminal
cases.
94Grembi and Garoupa (2012).
95Art. 330 of the penal code
96Artt. 331 and 334 of the penal code.
97De Luca et al. (2011).
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2.3.2 The European Experience
European countries are characterized by very diﬀerent judicial systems that adopt diﬀerent
approaches also with respect to medical malpractice. However, it is possible to identify some
common trends, as well as to highlight important divergences.98
Regardless of the Common or Civil Law nature of their juridical systems, the vast majority
of these countries do not have a speciﬁc regulation governing the physician-patient relation-
ship.99 Therefore, doctors’ misconduct and the subsequent injuries caused to patients could
lead to consequences under civil, criminal and administrative provisions depending on the
speciﬁc conditions and the country. For instance, in Spain, administrative law comes into
play when malpractice cases occur in public hospitals, while tort law is applied when a patient
suﬀers damages in private facilities.100 Similarly, medical liability falls under private and ad-
ministrative law depending on the public or private nature of healthcare providers also in the
Netherlands and in France.101 Diﬀerently, under the Polish system, medical liability can have
a contractual or a tortious nature depending on the status of the healthcare provider and on
the type of healthcare services received by the patient.102 However, a physician working for
a hospital under an employment contract is protected by the Labor Code, thus she cannot
be sued for the patient’s harm, not even if the injury is a direct consequence of her fault.
Therefore, the victim can ﬁle a claim only against the hospital employing the physician,
which has the obligation to fully compensate the damage according to the Civil Code.103 An
analogue approach is adopted in the UK, which does not recognize a contractual nature to
the patient-doctor relationship under the National Health System and doctors can be held
liable for their alleged unlawful conduct in civil courts. On the contrary, in Germany, injured
parties seeking compensation have always to choose between tort or contract law. In fact, as
in Italy, the physician-patient relationship is considered a contractual relationship regardless
98The aim of this section is to oﬀer an overview of the European juridical systems in the ﬁeld of medical
liability without a quality evaluation of the diﬀerent systems themselves.
99A rare exception to this situation is represented by Lithuania, where there is an ad hoc regulation for
medical liability. See, for instance, Ducinskiene et al.(2006) and Frati and Gulino (2013).
100See, Castellano Arroyo and De A`ngel Ya`gu¨ez (2013).
101Serra and Carrara (2005).
102In particular, contractual liability may rise only with respect to a private physician operating in her
oﬃce or in a private health facility and in any case outside the national health insurance scheme. However, in
such a case, an injured party can decide to seek compensation on grounds of tort law, rather than contractual
provisions. This is possible, because the doctor has breached the general duty of care which she is obliged
to respect regardless of the type of relationship with the patient. In practice, injured parties usually opt for
the tort regime due to more favorable conditions such as a more convenient statue of limitations and the
possibility to be compensated for pain and suﬀering. See, Baczyk-Rozwadowska (2011).
103In turn, the hospital has the right of recourse to the physician. However, the hospital can seek a
full recourse only when (i) the doctor intentionally caused the harm; (ii) the doctor performed the alleged
unlawful practice outside the course of the treatment; and (iii) the hospital does not have a proper coverage or
is insolvent. In all other cases, the recourse is limited to a maximum equal to three times the monthly salary
of the employed doctor. See, Baczyk-Rozwadowska (2011), p. 1225. In practice, healthcare institutions rarely
resort to recourse actions. In addition, a healthcare facility may be found liable also due to the so-called
organizational-fault, so that the facility is responsible for the injuries caused by the improper organization
or functioning of the structure itself.
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of the private or public nature of the healthcare provider.104
Despite these diﬀerences, all European countries generally recognize fault as a crucial
principle in the assessment of medical responsibility. Generally, the behavior of doctors
subject to potential liability consists in an act or in an omission, but in both cases the fault
of the physician is the necessary condition for ﬁnding the doctor liable. Therefore, patients’
claims usually require the fault of the doctor either in tort, in contract or under administrative
provisions. The result is that the existence of the liability of physicians depends on two main
elements: (i) the standard of care adopted and the consequent concept of fault, and (ii) the
burden of proof and the related investigation of the causation between doctors’ misconduct
and patients’ damages.
The fault of doctors is assessed by investigating their behavior while performing a speciﬁc
treatment and by verifying whether, in doing so, they complied with the required standard
of care. Speciﬁcally, health professionals must generally act with the skill and care of the
average physician operating in their ﬁeld of specialization. This is precisely the standard of
care adopted in Italy, where it is known as the bonus pater familias criterion, but it is also
applied, for instance, in France,105 Spain106 and Germany.107 Still, a higher degree of care
is sometimes required as in the Scandinavian countries (i.e. Sweden, Finland, Denmark and
Norway) and Poland. In particular, Scandinavian countries follow the experienced specialist
standard.108 As a consequence, the damages experienced by a patient shall be compensated if,
in the given situation, an experienced specialist, meant as the best physician in the reference
ﬁeld, would have adopted a diﬀerent conduct averting the injury.109 The Polish standard of
care is as strict as the Scandinavian one and coincides with the highest due diligence that
a professional can apply given the current medical knowledge and taking into account the
medical specialization in question. The U.K. has opted for a sort of intermediate solution.
Speciﬁcally, to be considered liable, doctors must have adopted a level of care below the
104Similarly to the Italian context, the patient-doctor relationship is treated as a service contract, which
does not entail the obligation to achieve a speciﬁc outcome, rather the duty of a careful conduct. In addition,
patients do not simply enter into a contract with the physician, but also with the hospital employing the
physician.
105In France, to prove the negligence of the defendant, the plaintiﬀ has to demonstrate that the doctor
adopted a level of care below that of reasonable diligence. Strict liability still ﬁnds application in the French
context, but only in relation to damages caused by health products and nosocomial infections. For a discussion
of these cases, see G’Sell-Macrez (2011).
106In Spain, doctors are required to meet the standard of care under the lex artis ad hoc rule. According
to this criterion, the standard of care expected from physicians for healthcare treatments (lex artis) shall
be assessed taking into account a skilled medical professional, but at the same time, the peculiarities of the
speciﬁc case (ad hoc). See Delgado and Pe`rez Garc`ıa (2005).
107In particular, the German system requires the exercise of reasonable care under both contract and tort
law. Reasonable care that coincides with the diligence of “a respectable and conscientious medical professional
of average expertise in the relevant ﬁeld” (Bundesgerichtshof, June 13, 1960, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
600, 1961). This also implies that if a physician performs a task for which she does not have suﬃcient skills
or competence, she will usually be held responsible.
108There is only one exception: the Norwegian system does not apply the experienced specialist standard,
but rather it foresees strict liability for damages derived by medical treatments.
109This does not mean that the patient is also entitled to the optimal treatment in absolute term, therefore
the facilities and resources available in the speciﬁc case under examination must be taken into account.
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standard of the reasonably skilled and experienced physician. However, when a breach of
professional duty can be potentially identiﬁed, this standard of care is translated into the
Bolam test or the standard of comparable practice. According to this interpretation of the
standard of care, the alleged negligent conduct of the defendant is contrasted with that of a
body of medical professionals.110 Anyway, it is clear that the stricter the standard of care
applied, the more exposed are clinicians to medical malpractice, and to the likelihood of being
sued. The decision to adopt the concept of fault entails an important trade-oﬀ between the
desired degree of patients’ protection and the necessity to avoid clinicians ending up facing
an excessive professional risk. However, to fully appreciate the actual ‘weighs’ assigned to
each of these objectives by the diﬀerent medical liability systems it is necessary also to look
at the deﬁnition of the burden of proof and at the concept of causation between personal
injuries and doctors’ breach of the duty of care.
Among the diﬀerent European systems, there is a general consensus that a crucial element
for medical liability and a prerequisite for compensation is the causal link between the injury
experienced by a patient and the behavior of the physician, but the speciﬁc methods to
determine the existence of causation diﬀer to some degree among countries.111 The English
‘but for’ test, according to which a patient’s injuries would not have been experienced but
for the physician’s breach of duty, is similar to rules adopted in many others Civil Law
countries such as Germany112 and France.113 In all these cases, the main purpose is to ﬁnd
a suﬃciently stringent link between the conduct of clinicians and the injuries of victims.
In the Scandinavian countries, the requirement of causation is more diﬃcult to deﬁne and
there seems not to be an agreed and clear test or procedure for its assessment.114 We can
speak about a general approach consisting in a two-stage process. The ﬁrst phase coincides
with the factual-causation inquiry aimed at assessing if plaintiﬀ’s damages have been actually
caused by the conduct of the defendant. The second phase consists in the ‘adequate-causation
inquiry ’ to determine if doctor’s behavior is an adequate cause of patient’s injuries. The basic
idea of this second step is not to include in the scope of liability conducts whose consequences
can be considered too unforeseeable or remote.115
As for the burden of proof, civil trials traditionally require the plaintiﬀ to demonstrate
110A later case, known as the Bolitho case, allows courts to accept that negligence has been proved even
though medical experts suggest otherwise. See, Bryden and Storey (2011), p. 125). Precisely, in the Bolitho
case, the judge argues that “It is not enough for a defendant to call a number of doctors to say that what he
had done or not done was in accord with accepted clinical practice. It is necessary for the judge to consider that
evidence and [to] decide whether that clinical practice puts that patient unnecessarily at risk.” Nevertheless,
Bolitho is not universally adopted.
111Magnus and Micklitz (2004).
112The German approach is that of the ‘condicio sine qua non’ formula under which a physician is liable
only if her fault cannot be ‘eliminated in thought’ without eliminating also the injuries of the victim (Stauch
2011, p. 86). As in the ‘but for’ test the crucial point is to assess if doctor’s behavior is a necessary condition
for the damages suﬀered by a patient.
113In France, there is not the application of a unique principle. However, courts generally follow the ‘but
for’ condition. See G’Sell-Macrez (2011).
114For a discussion of the diﬀerent approaches and ways to assess the causation link, see Ulfbek et al.
(2011).
115For a discussion of factual causation in the Scandinavian legal systems, see Schultz (2001).
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the fault of the defendant, the existence of damage and the causal link between the damage
and the defendant’s misbehavior. However, with respect to medical malpractice, an overview
of the European experience reveals that these strict requirements are often relaxed in the
attempt to balance the diﬀerent positions enjoyed by patients and doctors.116 Speciﬁcally, a
common tendency is the ascertainment of the causal link based on the balance of probability.
This means that a probability greater than 50% is suﬃcient to demonstrate the existence of
the causal relationship during a civil proceeding.117 For instance, this has been translated
in the French context by implementing the concept of adequate causation. According to
this approach, courts should aim at assessing whether the doctor’s conduct ‘in the normal
run of things’ contributed in a particular way to harm a patient. Even the ‘but for’ test
is sometimes modiﬁed to facilitate the causation assessment for victims. In particular, the
UK system foresees the use of the principle of ‘res ipsa loquitur ’ (i.e. ‘the thing speaks for
itself’) when a phenomenon cannot be explained by any other reasonable reason. Therefore,
according to this principle, it is possible to infer the causal link from the very nature of the
accident, even if there is no direct evidence as to the behavior of the defendant.118 In this
speciﬁc case, the idea is to alleviate the burden placed on patients and represented by the task
of proving all necessary elements of liability according to the ‘but for test’. Another example
is provided by Poland, where under contractual provisions, there is the statutory presumption
of the defendant’s fault. Conversely, tort provisions do not foresee such a presumption, but
they allow the plaintiﬀ to comply with the burden of proof exploiting indirect evidence (i.e.
factual presumption). Consequently, courts may assess fault if there is no evidence proving
the contrary.
A ﬁnal aspect to be analyzed is the award of damages as European countries adopt
diﬀerent approaches also in this respect. In fact, even though injured parties are always
entitled to be fully compensated for all damages suﬀered (i.e. for all the titles of damages
associated with personal injuries)119, it is possible to identify two diﬀerent compensation
models in Europe:
“(1) those systems anchored to a classic model of fault veriﬁcation (with a burden of proof
that seems to be always heavier for the physician) and (2) those systems that may be inspired
by the spreading concept of enterprise risk in the health ﬁeld and that use models established
116Frati and Gulino (2013).
117On the contrary, penal proceedings still require a degree of certainty close to 100% in proving the causal
link, according to the ‘beyond any reasonable doubt’ criterion. Frati and Gulino (2013) argue that, on the
basis of this diﬀerence, it is possible to “generally assume that the injured subjects are willing to choose the
civil course rather than the penal one, with regard to complex and important cases as well.”
118In addition, the UK system also accepts the concept of cumulative causation, which comes into play
when a multiplicity of factors together led to the harm of the patient. In particular, it states that since the
doctor’s breach of duty as one of these factors contributed to the ﬁnal damage, the doctor himself can be
considered liable (Bonnington Castings v. Wardlaw, 1956, A.C. 613). In addition, the plaintiﬀ can also be
entitled to compensation, if she can prove that the alleged negligence conduct of the defendant concurred
to the risk of damage (McGhee v. National Coal Board, [1972] 3 All E.R. 1008, 1011, [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1.).
However, when any one of a distinct number of elements could have determined the damage suﬀered by the
claimant, then it cannot be argued that the negligence of the defendant contributed to the risk of damage.
119The concept of personal injuries and the diﬀerent titles of damages foreseen in case of personal injuries
are discussed in the following chapter.
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on the idea of damage avoidability, with less focus on the fault concept.”120
The majority of the European juridical systems, including Italy, applies the ﬁrst compen-
sation model (so-called Fault-based system) while examples of the second model (so called
No-Fault system) are France and the Scandinavian countries.121 In practice, the actual dif-
ference between these systems is much less clear, since France and the Scandinavian countries
cannot be considered pure No-Fault systems.122
Speciﬁcally, in France, the Patient Right Act of March 4, 2002, created the National Fund
for Compensation of Medical Accidents, the so-called ONIAM (‘Oﬃce National d’Indemnisation
des Accidents Midicaux ’), which is responsible for compensating damages occurred in lack of
fault on the basis of the principle of national solidarity.123 In order to be able to apply to
the ONIAM, two additional conditions need to be met. On the one hand, the injury has to
be caused during a treatment, diagnosis or activity of prevention and it has to be dispropor-
tionate with respect to patients’ previous health conditions and their likely evolution. On
the other hand, the injury has to be serious, meaning in practice that it has to imply a dis-
ability rate greater than 25%.124 Compensation based on national solidarity may be claimed
also when doctors have no insurance (e.g. insurance policy is expired, or insurance limits
are met) or the oﬀer made by the insurance company is not suﬃcient, as well as when the
patient cannot be fully compensated through liability.125 The ONIAM experience in France
is the only true no-fault model existing in Europe.
In fact, the Scandinavian model is actually a hybrid system in which tort law provi-
sions are alternative to compensation schemes (or patient insurance schemes).126 Hence, in
all Scandinavian countries with the exception of Denmark,127 patients can decide to claim
compensation under tort law, the patient insurance scheme or even under their own private
insurance. The idea behind these compensation mechanisms is that individuals should al-
ways receive a compensation for the personal injuries suﬀered and these awards “should be
covered by insurance paid for by the party responsible for activities that were thought to be
particularly risky (and thus not paid (directly) by the taxpayer).”128 In practice, under these
compensation schemes, hospitals are obliged to be insured against third party liability under
the Patient Insurance Act,129 which rules when and how an injured patient is entitled to be
compensated for the harm suﬀered in a medical malpractice case. Speciﬁcally, although the
120Frati and Gulino (2013), p. 88.
121For a discussion and comparison of these compensations model, see Douglas (2009).
122France can be considered a true No-Fault system only in relation to injuries covered by the national
solidarity fund.
123See, Baccino (2013).
124In case of a temporary injury, in addition to the 25% disability rate, the health impairment also needs
to last 6 months over a one year period. For an overview of the speciﬁc types of injuries that can lead to a
claim in front of the ONIAM, see Helleringer (2011).
125G’Sell-Macrez (2011), p-. 1096.
126Ulfbek et al. (2011).
127The Danish legal system precludes the possibility of a civil action if a patient has the right to be
compensated under the national Patient Injuries Act.
128Ulfbek et al. (2011), p. 112.
129Sweden was the ﬁrst Nordic country to adopt a patient injuries act in 1975 and the relative compensation
scheme.
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assessment of fault is not required, injured parties still need to ascertain that the injury was
caused by the doctor on the balance of probability and that an experienced specialist would
have avoided the injury itself. On the contrary, if a victim resorts to a civil proceeding,
she is responsible for proving the existence of a damage, the causation between the doctors’
misconduct and the injury, as well as the fault of the physicians. Consequently, given the
less favorable position enjoyed in a legal dispute by injured parties, very few compensation
requests end up in front of a court.130
Interestingly, alternative mechanisms of resolution of claims are gaining prominence also
in Fault-based systems. In this respect, the experience of Germany, France and England
is particularly signiﬁcant.131 Speciﬁcally, in Germany injured parties can resort to medical
arbitration boards. At present, there are 12 boards operating in the country. They oﬀer to
patients a free of charge proceeding in which a panel between three-to-ﬁve experts produces
a report to assess if the doctor adopted a faulty conduct causing the patient’s injuries.
The board’s decision has no binding eﬀects on the parties involved and the choice itself
to resort to this mechanism is voluntary, thus patients maintain their right to initiate a
legal action. In France, besides ﬁling a claim, plaintiﬀs have the possibility to apply to
conciliation commissions, which are regional organizations established in 2002 and alternative
to courts.132 They act as conciliators helping the victim and the doctor or the doctor’s insurer
to reach an agreement.133 Mediation plays a key role also in England, where, according to
Essinger (2008), 96% of damages claims are resolved outside courts. In practice, the English
system foresees a speciﬁc authority for the management of public malpractice cases, which
is the National Health Service Litigation Authority (NHSLA). This body aims precisely
at facilitating the dialogue between patients and health institutions in order to favor the
conclusion of an agreement and the award of damages compensation.134
This brief overview of the diﬀerent systems of medical liability in Europe reveals strong
similarities among the vast majority of countries at least with respect to the fundamental
elements. Due to the absence of speciﬁc legislation governing the relation between doctors
and their patients, the misbehavior of clinicians may be ruled by civil, criminal and admin-
istrative provisions depending on the country. Nonetheless, the following common features
have emerged: (i) fault as a necessary condition for ﬁnding a doctor liable, (ii) the necessity of
causation between the injury and the conduct of physicians, (iii) the placing of the burden of
proof on patients, (iv) the alleviation, to some extent, of such a burden to facilitate patients’
130According to Frati and Gulino (2013), “the percentage of the extra-judicial claims settled in the Scandi-
navian countries amounts to 99% (Swedish Patient Insurance Association).”
131An additional example can be provided by Austria and its conciliation bodies, see Koch (2011).
132Each commission consists of 20 individuals representing patients, medical professionals, hospital prac-
titioners, ONIAM, insurance companies and hospitals with a magistrate as chairman. They accept claims
related to medical incidents which occurred after September 4, 2001. If the incidents is of some importance,
then it has to have occurred after December 5, 2001.
133At present, around 60% of claims are settled in a conciliation commission. However, the number of court
proceedings did not decrease since commissions’ decisions are usually contested in courts. In addition, courts
end up sanctioning the defendant in 66% of the cases, while conciliation commissions ﬁnd the defendant liable
in 33% of the time.
134For a more detailed description of the English system, see Vanezis (2013).
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recoveries. On the side of the compensation system, Fault-based systems are more commonly
adopted than No-Fault systems. Yet, in the great majority of the European countries, the
proof of physicians’ fault becomes essential also for victims to be entitled to compensation.
In line with the European experience, Italy has a fault-based negligence system, which
applies the concept of the bonus pater familias as the standard of care. However, in the case
of Italy, the lack of a speciﬁc statute law for medical liability has led to the interpretation
of the patient-doctor relationship as a contractual liability. So that, when physicians agree –
even tacitly – to treat a patient, the parties conclude a contract and the burden of proof falls
upon the defendant. In addition, the act of an employed physician is identiﬁed with that of
the healthcare facility, she works for. Hence, besides clinicians, hospitals themselves can be
held liable as well.
2.4 Medical Malpractice Crisis
Italy has been experiencing a medical malpractice crisis for several years now. Back in 2002,
according to a CINEAS report, it was estimated that 320,000 out of 8 million of annual
patients of Italian healthcare facilities would have suﬀered damages because of treatments
and diagnosis received during hospitalization. These injuries would have been fatal for a
number of patients ranging between 14,000 and 50,000.135
Recent ﬁgures released by the Italian Association of Insurance Companies (ANIA) es-
timate the national medical liability insurance business at 500 million euros in 2010, 58%
represented by institutional policies and 42% by individual policies. In addition, they show
a 252% increase in the total number of malpractice claims that rose from 9,567 in 1994 to
33,682 in 2010 (Figure 2.2).136 This further ﬁgure coincides with an annual average increase
in the number of claims higher than 12%.
A similar increase, equal to 236%, has also been recorded with respect to the claims
ﬁled against hospitals for the same period, which implies an yearly average increase in the
number of claims equal to 10%. In more recent years, after a 21% jump in 2009, the number
of malpractice suits involving a healthcare organization has remained substantially stable in
2010 standing at 21,353.
In general, the specialties recording the higher numbers of malpractice claims are ortho-
pedics, emergency room, general surgery, obstetrics and ophthalmology. In more than 50%
of the cases, patients ﬁle the claim in the same year, in which the incident occurred, and
90% of all claims are ﬁled within ﬁve years.137 As for the main types of medical accidents
135Consorzio universitario per l’ingegneria nelle assicurazioni (CINEAS) (2002).
136Associazione Nazionale fra le Imprese Assicuratrici (2011). The statistics provided by ANIA do not
include the premiums of European insurers operating in the Italian market. This study is based on a sample
of companies that accounted for 32% of the premium income of the entire general third-party liability business
in 2010.
137Perna et al. (2010). The authors use a dataset containing all claims ﬁled against the healthcare facilities
located in Lombardy and Piedmont. The information about the Lombard medical institutions regard the
period 1999-2009, while for Piedmont the observation period is 2005-2007. Even if the database does not
cover the entire country, the ﬁndings are in line with the few available information at the national level.
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Figure 2.2: Number of Claims Filed (1994-2010)
Notes: Healthcare providers= All public healthcare providers operating in
Italy (i.e. Local Health Units, Independent Hospitals, Research Hospitals and
Teaching Hospitals).
reported, the most frequent one is surgical errors followed by therapeutic errors, diagnostics
errors and infections.138
The average cost of the malpractice suits ﬁled in 2010 was 27,689 euros. However, ANIA
stresses the tendency of insurers to underestimate the cost of claims due to the complexity
of the assessment of physical impairments and the lack of adequate information immediately
after the occurrence of the event. Over time, the information provided by the settled claims
allow insurers to better estimate the average cost of claims of the same generation as those
closed. Consequently, the average cost of the claims registered in a same year tends to have
an up-ward trend over time. “For claims ﬁled in 1994, for example, after eight years, in
2002, insurers estimated the average cost at Euro 16,400, but two years later, after ten years,
the estimate had doubled to what now appears to be the ‘ﬁnal’ average cost of claims of that
generation (about Euro 28,000).”139
ANIA also provides some interesting data on the annual ratio between the number of
closed claims and that of the still pending compensation requests: only 3% of the legal
disputes involving public facilities were still waiting for the ﬁnal decision in 1994, while this
ﬁgure increases to 90.2% in 2010 (Figure 2.3).
138Marsh (2013).
139ANIA (2012), p. 131.
63
Medical Malpractice and Liability in Italy 47
Figure 2.3: Annual Ratio Between Closed and Still Pending Claims (1994-2010)
2.4.1 Medical Malpractice Insurance
Over time, Italian public healthcare providers have increasingly complained about the diﬃcul-
ties in getting appropriate coverage.140 Although malpractice insurance is not compulsory for
healthcare facilities themselves,141 they are contractually obliged to cover their medical staﬀ
against third-party liability.142 Speciﬁcally, medical malpractice insurance policies cover the
healthcare provider’s medical personnel for damages experienced by patients while receiving
professional healthcare treatments in the medical care institution or one of its facilities.143
In Italy, the liability risk is transferred on the insurance market where private companies
(national and international) oﬀer coverage to medical institutions with an annual premium
that is computed as an adjustable percentage of the annual gross payroll of the public en-
tity.144 Insurance premiums are generally calculated regardless of any statistics referring to
other activities of the public entity such as, for instance, the average duration of hospital-
140According to CINEAS (2002), a medical insurance policy for a hospital in a city of 50,000 people would
stand around 750,000, up to 1-2 million for larger facilities.
141Liability insurance became mandatory for physicians only in 2012. The Decree Law 1/2012, converted
into Law 27/2012, has imposed on all professionals (including physicians) the obligation to insure themselves
by August 13 2012.
142See Art. 28, Presidential Decree 761/1979, December 20.
143Medical professional liability insurance may also cover the legal expenses bore by the physicians and/or
the healthcare institution who are subject to a lawsuit. In addition, this type of insurance may foresee
protection against the events aﬀecting the safety and health of employers. Finally, it may also cover the
damages suﬀered by patients that are caused by events not directly connected with medical activities (e.g.
falls).
144Amaral Garcia and Grembi (2012), p. 7. For an overview on how private insurers assess insurance
premiums, especially during public procurement procedures, see Perna et al. (2010).
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ization or the number of beds. In addition, the assessment of premiums are shown to be
substantially independent from experience rating.
In 2010, the premiums paid by healthcare facilities rose by 1.5% compared to the previous
year. The rise in malpractice insurance rates is a constant phenomenon of the last decades,
that does not show any sign of abating (Figure 2.4). So that, the cost sustained by healthcare
institutions for professional liability reported an average annual growth of 6.2% over the
eleven-year period 2000-2010.145 A more recent study promoted by the Italian Parliament
shows similar results. Speciﬁcally, between 2006 and 2011, insurance premiums increased by
23% equal to a 4.6% annual growth, while the average annual premium paid by healthcare
providers nationwide rose by 35% from 2 million euro in 2006 to 2.7 million euro in 2011.146
Figure 2.4: Medical Malpractice Aggregate Insurance Premiums (1994-2010)
Notes: Healthcare providers= All public healthcare providers operating in
Italy (i.e. Local Health Units, Independent Hospitals, Research Hospitals and
Teaching Hospitals. On the vertical axis: millions of euro.
This study also points out that the rise in premiums is increasingly associated with the
withdrawal of insurers from the market. Several insurance companies preferred to abandon
the medical professional liability business. Speciﬁcally, according to the completed ques-
tionnaires received by the Italian Parliament, the malpractice insurance market in Italy has
become quite restricted with only 12 insurance companies operating in it.147 In addition,
145Over the same eleven-year period, the premiums paid by individual practitioners registered an average
yearly increase equal to 10.5%. As a result, without distinguishing between healthcare institutions and
individual physicians, the annual growth of the overall premiums in the malpractice insurance line amounted
to 7.8%. See, ANIA (2012).
146Camera dei Deputati (2012). The study is based on a questionnaire survey carried out nationwide that
could count on the responses of 169 medical institutions. In particular, none of the healthcare facilities located
in Veneto, Sardinia and in the autonomous province of Bolzano provided an answer to the questionnaire.
147In particular, these insurance companies are: AM Trust Europe, XL Insurance, QBE Insurance, City
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46% of the interviewed healthcare facilities had acquired their reference coverage from the
same company in 2011-2012. If we look at the reason for the non-renewal of an insurance
policy, in 9% of the cases the cause is the insurer’s exit from the market, while for 48% of
the cases the insurance company complained about the negative trend of the policy itself.
Another interesting fact that emerges from this study is that often the explanation behind
the ending of a business relationship between a hospital and an insurer is the bankruptcy of
the latter (i.e. 29.6% of the reported cases).
As a matter of fact, for the Italian healthcare system, medical malpractice and medical
liability insurance represent a problematic issue. In fact being public facilities, hospitals may
have lower incentives to adequately monitor medical errors than private entities. Further-
more, they are not allowed to freely go into the insurance market in order to ﬁnd the most
convenient coverage. As with every other public entity, they are obliged to resort to public
procurement in order to conclude contracts for the provision of goods, services and works.
Therefore, they have to open a call for bids, in which private companies may decide not to
take part and that limits their bargaining power in the light of transparency and fairness
principles.
Buzzacchi and Gracis (2008) provide an overview of insurance coverage for public health-
care providers from 2003 to 2006 stressing the diﬃculties encountered by healthcare providers
in ﬁnding this type of coverage: only 55 out the 308 analyzed calls for tenders resulted in an
adjudication.148 At the same time, the general problem of obtaining coverage is accompanied
by a modiﬁcation of the features of these insurance policies that reduce insurers’ risk-taking.
Over time, insurance companies have tended to change contract clauses reducing the risks
they bear, while policyholders turn out to be insured only partially or in an incomplete way.149
In particular, there has been a clear transition from occurrence-based policies to claims-made
ones.150 This has implied a progressive shift of risks from private insurance companies to
healthcare providers that has negatively aﬀected the risk exposure medical institutions have
to cope with.
The risk exposure of healthcare providers has also been increased by the growing common
practice of including excesses in insurance contracts.151 For instance, according to Perna
et al. (2010), nowadays more than one third of all medical malpractice insurance policies
subscribed to by Italian facilities foresees excesses. Similar ﬁndings have been obtained by the
Insurance, Lloyd’s of London, Generali Assicurazioni, Cattolica Assicurazioni, Carige Assicurazioni, INA
Assitalia, Fondiaria SAI, HDI Gerling, and Faro Assicurazioni.
148In 40 cases, there was no adjudication; in 13 cases, the public entity opened a new call for tenders in a
year, while the outcome of the remaining 200 calls is unknown as there is no available information.
149Perna et al. (2010), p. 155.
150In particular, under claims-made policies the moment in time when the event took place does not matter,
but it becomes crucial for the insured to strictly follow the reporting procedures foreseen in the insurance
contract. Failure to comply with these procedures can constitute grounds for the insurance company to deny
coverage. In addition, after the expiration of the coverage period, this type of policy leaves the policyholder
unprotected if the insured does not underwrite a new insurance. See, Tahouni and Kahn (2009).
151An excess corresponds to the ﬁxed part of a damage for which a policyholder remains responsible. It
can be expressed as a ﬁxed amount of money or as a percentage on the total value of the damage to be
compensated. It can also be speciﬁed in per incident terms and/or in yearly aggregated terms.
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Ministry of Health in its study of 2006 on the insurance conditions of malpractice coverage.
According to this report, 65% of insured health providers have underwritten policies that
include excesses.152 Perna et al. (2010) also provide the example of the Lombard medical
institutions, whose total value of yearly aggregated excesses stands at almost 49 billion euros
for the period 1999-2009. Initially, the inclusion of excesses in the policies had two objectives:
the containment of insurance costs and making the medical institutions more responsible.
However, over time, it has become a necessary condition for the conclusion of an insurance
contract and a way for insurers to contain their risk exposure at the expenses of policyholders.
In order to help their healthcare bodies to cope with the distresses of the malpractice
insurance market, some regional governments intervened, introducing self-insurance. Back in
2004, Piedmont decided to implement, for the ﬁrst time in the country, a form of self-insurance
at the regional level for all damages ranging between 1,500 and 500,000 euros, while acquiring
a private coverage only for the compensations exceeding 500,000 euros.153 In practice, the
regional government established a special fund for the management of malpractice risk, which
initially amounted to 45 million euros for the period 2005-2007. After one year from its
introduction, this policy of self-insurance led to a savings of 9 million euros at the regional
level and only 60% of the fund had actually been spent. This positive result was substantially
conﬁrmed in the following years to the extent that the region still resorts to self-insurance.
Later, the example of Piedmont was followed by Friuli Venezia Giulia in 2006 and Veneto in
2009.154 More recently, in 2010, both Basilicata and Toscana decided to rely completely on
self-insurance, whereas Emilia Romagna opted for the adoption of this insurance mechanism
for six of its healthcare providers (i.e. the TH Sant’Orsola, the IH of Reggio Emilia and the
LHUs of Cesena, Forl`ı, Ravenna, Rimini) starting from January 1, 2013.155 On the one hand,
this solution has the undoubted advantage for insurance companies of avoiding dealing with
the numerous micro-claims received by the medical institutions of a region. On the other
hand, it entails for the region itself the relevant problem of setting aside a portion of its
budget as self-insurance. Hence, self-insurance has the beneﬁt of containing the costs, but
at the same time it constitutes a challenge for both regional governments and their medical
institutions that need to improve their ability to monitor claims and medical errors and to
manage malpractice risk and insurance.
152Ministry of Health (2006), p. 20.
153Regional Law 9/2004.
154Regional Law 12/2009. Despite the regional Law is dated 2009, the actual implementation of this
self-insurance strategy in Veneto started in January 2013, because the guidelines for claims extra-judicial
settlement were released only in late 2011. Even though there is no oﬃcial data, the region expects an
annual saving of 40 million euros.
155In particular, these 6 healthcare providers of Emilia Romagna are totaly self-insured with respect to
claims up to 100,000 euros, which constitute the 90% of the overall 1,500 yearly malpractice cases. A mixed
coverage applies to claims between 100,000 and 1,5 million euros, while those exceeding 1,5 million euros
are covered by a regional policy stipulated with a private insurer. The regional government has justiﬁed
its decision complaining a sharp increase of malpractice premiums especially between 2006 and 2011 to the
extent that, during those 5 years, insurance companies received 259 million euros while the compensations
paid to victims amounted to 40 million euros.
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2.4.2 Defensive Medicine
Coming under an increasing malpractice pressure and a decreasing capacity for ﬁnding protec-
tion against malpractice claims, physicians seem to have adopted a more defensive position.
On the one hand, they have constituted associations aimed at reducing the tendency to ﬁle
frivolous claims.156 On the other hand, they have turned to defensive practices as a safeguard
against possible malpractice liability.
In particular, two comprehensive nationwide surveys of physicians were conducted in Italy
between 2008 and 2010, while a third in 2011 focused only on emergency care. The most
recent one has been administered by the Association of surgeons and dentists in Rome and
covered all the specialties with the sole exception of dentistry.157 This survey interviewed
2,783 physicians actively practicing between 2009 and 2010 in the private or public sector158
showing that 78.2% of physicians believe that nowadays the risk of becoming the target of
a lawsuit is greater than in the past. 68.9% of doctors judge that there is a 30% chance to
be involved in a malpractice claim. As a result, 65.4% are inﬂuenced in their daily clinical
practice by the malpractice pressure perceived.
Speciﬁcally, the majority of physicians resort to defensive practices due to the pressure
exerted by public opinion (65.8%) or the litigation past experience of colleagues (48.4%).
Doctors are also concerned about the possible negative consequences for their career (27.8%)
or the possibility of reputational damages caused by the media (17.8%). Defensive medicine
is also used to avoid the possible sanctions imposed by healthcare structures or medical
associations (43.1%). In particular, 53% of respondents admitted to prescribing additional
unnecessary drugs that, on average, correspond approximately to 13% of the total medicines
prescribed per physician. The ﬁgure increases to 73% if we consider specialized practitioners
and, on average, the medicines prescribed per physician with defensive purposes are equal to
21% of the total prescribed drugs.
Similar results are recorded with respect to the use of laboratory tests. 71% of doctors
use them as a defense against future potential claims with the result that on average 21%
of the tests required by each doctor are simply an expression of defensive medicine.159 As a
consequence, 10.5% of the total expenditure borne by the Italian national healthcare system
would be generated by medical defensive practices and this percentage can be further broken
down between drugs prescription (1.9%), medical visits (1.7%), laboratory tests (0.7%), other
tests (0.8%) and hospitalization (4.6%). In this regard, the study has calculated that the costs
of defensive medicine exceed 10 billion euros, which is a little less than the total investment
156In particular, two associations have been created in Italy: (i) the association of the physicians wrongly
accused of malpractice (Associazione per i medici accusati di malpractice ingiustamente AMAMI), and (ii)
the association for the protection of doctors wrongly accused (Associazione ricerca italiana tutela medici
ingiustamente accusati ARITMIA).
157See, Ordine Provinciale di Roma dei Medici-Chirurghi e degli Odontoiatri (2010).
158The sample used in the survey is representative of all Italian practicing doctors up to 70 years old with
the exception of dentists.
159In particular, instrumental tests are used as a defensive tool by 75.6% of physicians, while 49.9% of
doctors stated that they also resorted to hospitalization to reduce their malpractice exposure. This means
that 22.6% and 11% of instrumental tests and hospital admissions respectively could be avoided.
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in research and development in the country.
The second survey was performed in 2008 by the research center on criminal law and
criminal policy ‘Federico Stella’.160 It involved 307 physicians, showing that 61.3% of the re-
spondents have prescribed additional unnecessary diagnostic tests, while 26.2% have excluded
high-risk patients from some medical treatments and 58.6% have asked for an additional un-
necessary medical consultation. Moreover, 77.9% of interviewed doctors admitted a defensive
behavior at least once during the previous month and younger physicians (92.3%) seem to
resort to defensive practices more often than their older colleagues (67.4%). The same survey
was replicated between October 2008 and January 2009 by interviewing 60 anesthetists and
64 surgeons.161 The most interesting ﬁnding is that anesthetists are more inclined to practice
defensive medicine than surgeons (88.3% against 76.1%). On the contrary, for both the sub-
sets of interviewed clinicians, the most common form of defensive behavior is the addition to
patients’ records of unnecessary notes/comments, while the primary motivation that induces
the defensive practices of physicians is the fear of malpractice litigation.162
Similar ﬁndings have been obtained by a third survey conducted in 2011 to assess the
extent of defensive conducts speciﬁcally within the Italian Emergency Departments. Out of
the 1.392 physicians, who took part to this study, 90.5% declared that they had adopted at
least one defensive practice during the previous working month. In particular, 77.7% had pre-
scribed unnecessary laboratory tests; 67.3% asked for a superﬂuous additional consultation;
and 72.8% had included unnecessary notes/comments in medical records. The frequency
of the adoption of defensive behaviors does not vary with respect to the characteristics of
healthcare professionals. According to this study, the only factor that does play a role is
the age of physicians. In fact, the percentage of those who admitted to practice defensive
medicine increases up to 94.5% compared to the youngest subjects (26-36 age group), while
it decreases to 84.4% for the oldest (60-70 age group). Additionally, 69% of the respondents
identify the cause of their defensive conduct as the fear of being involved in malpractice
litigation, while 50.4% want to avoid, in particular, requests for compensation. Finally, the
adoption of defensive practices also turns out to be aﬀected by physicians previous experi-
ence: in 50% of the cases, doctors are inﬂuenced by the past experience of their colleagues
with malpractice litigation and in 34.2% of the cases by their own past experience.
As pointed out by Barresi et al. (2012), these surveys would suggest some general ten-
dencies. First, there would be a widespread and pervasive use of defensive medical practices
in Italy. Second, young physicians would seem to be more prone to adopt defensive behavior
than their older colleagues, while socio-demographic characteristics other than age seem to
have no impact. Thirdly, physicians would be induced to perform defensive practices mainly
by the fear of being sued for medical malpractice and receiving damages requests.163
160Centro Studi Federico Stella sulla Giustizia Penale e la Politica Criminale (2010).
161Catino and Celotti (2009).
162See, Catino (2011).
163Another main concern of doctors refers to the possible negative reputational consequences. See, for
instance, Sage (2004).
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2.5 Conclusive Remarks
Italy has established its national healthcare system in 1978 with the aim of providing uniform
and comprehensive medical care to all its residents regardless of the socio-economic condi-
tions and residence of the individuals. The existing structure of the Italian NHS is the result
of a series of reforms that took place in the last three decades and that have progressively
fostered the autonomy of regional governments. Nowadays, therefore, there are three layers
of administration. The central government is responsible for contributing to the funding of
the NHS itself and for determining the national health plan, which, among others, deﬁnes
the LEAs to be assured to the population and, more in general, the objectives and policy
guidelines the NHS has to pursue. Regions further contribute to the funding of healthcare ex-
penditures. Regional governments also enjoy a large discretionary power in order to translate
national guidelines in a regional plan, while medical services are actually delivered through
the local level, that is, through local health units assisted by public and private accredited
hospitals. Despite a common framework and due to the greater autonomy recognized to
regional governments over time, the NHS shows increasing diﬀerences among regions with
respect to the organization of healthcare provision, health expenditures and ﬁnancing.
With regard to the medical liability, the country is characterized by the absence of a
speciﬁc statute law and the physician-patient relationship turns out to be interpreted as a
contractual liability. As a consequence, when a clinician accepts -even tacitly - to treat a
patient, a contract is concluded between the parties and the defendant will have to bear
the burden of proof. In any case, a physician to be found liable need to have acted with
negligence, that is, to have undertaken a degree of diligence below that of the bonus pater
familias. Furthermore, injured victims can sue the doctor as well as the healthcare facility
the clinician works for, because healthcare organizations are considered responsible for the
actions of their employees.
In recent years, Italy, as well as other European and non-European countries, has been
undergoing a medical malpractice crisis characterized by a steady increase in the number
of malpractice claims. This has materialized in a rise of insurance rates applied to both
clinicians and healthcare organizations and in the withdrawal of some private insurers from
the insurance market for medical professional liability. In response to such a situation,
Italian clinicians have formed diﬀerent associations to discourage frivolous suits and attract
attention on the high malpractice pressure they are subject to. At the same time, recent
surveys indicate an increasing tendency of clinicians to adopt defensive behaviors to reduce
their litigation risk.
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Chapter 3
Limiting Noneconomic Damages As a
Response to Malpractice Crisis
3.1 Introduction
Medical professional liability insurance yields signiﬁcant social beneﬁts as it fosters the supply
of medical services and access to them. Nonetheless, over time both healthcare professionals
and healthcare institutions have encountered increasing diﬃculties in ﬁnding appropriate
coverage. Such a supply crisis is only partially explained by the traditional problems of the
insurance industry.1 In particular, the underwriting cycle of property and casualty insurance2
has played a role, but additional and more relevant determinants of the malpractice crisis
have to be sought in the speciﬁc risk insured and in the related peculiarities of the reference
market. In this respect, the main driving factors of the sharp rise in insurance rates and
of the consequential lack of coverage are generally recognized as the increase in both the
frequency of malpractice suits and the average value of damages awards granted to victims.
These two elements associated with the speciﬁc characteristics of the medical malpractice
market tend to make this line of insurance unattractive for private insurers.
In response to the problems of availability and aﬀordability of medical liability policies,
governments have discussed and enacted various reforms primarily related to tort litigation.3
These legislative changes have taken diﬀerent forms,4 for instance, the shortening of the
1See, OECD (2006) and Mello (2006b).
2The underwriting cycle is the cyclical tendency of insurance markets to undergo periods of hard and
soft markets. During the former, insurance companies make their underwriting standards more stringent and
increase premiums. Conversely, during the latter, high investments’ returns are combined with quite limited
claim costs and insurance companies may lower both their underwriting standards and premiums to keep
attracting policyholders. For more details on the dynamics of the malpractice insurance market, see Neale
et al. (2009).
3Governments are particularly concerned about the negative implications of a generalized lack of malprac-
tice coverage and of unaﬀordable premiums in terms of both the cost of healthcare delivery and the behavior
of doctors (i.e. defensive practices and reduction of medical services). See, Sloan (1985), Zuckerman et al.
(1986), Danzon et. al (1990), Barker (1992), Kessler and McClellan (1996), and Viscusi and Born (2005).
4For a comprehensive discussion and overview of the diﬀerent tort reforms implemented over time, see,
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statute of limitations,5 the modiﬁcation of the collateral source rule,6 or the modiﬁcation of
joint-and-several liability.7 However, among these legislative interventions, a policy regarded
as one of the most eﬀective to contain medical malpractice expenditures and one that still
plays a prominent role in the debate on medical malpractice is limiting noneconomic damages.
The distress suﬀered by the reference market has raised signiﬁcant concerns related to
the assessment of damages awards in malpractice claims.8 In particular, the noneconomic
component of victims’ recoveries has been the most disputed issue and has attracted a lot
of attention from scholars and legislators. Non-monetary losses have proven to be a very
diﬃcult subject for judges and juries given their controversial non-monetary nature and the
lack of a clear and common framework for their assessment.9 This situation has resulted in a
signiﬁcant variability of noneconomic compensations and in the potentially unfair treatment
of injured parties, who have received diﬀerent awards for supposedly similar health impair-
ments. Besides erratic compensations, available data on noneconomic damages recoveries –
mainly derived from the U.S. experience – also show that these compensations are charac-
terized by a positively skewed distribution with a thick tail of very large awards at the high
end.10 These outliers represent a further source of uncertainty for insurance companies since
they are generally more diﬃcult to predict.
These trends are particularly worrisome, because noneconomic damages represent a pre-
dominant proportion of personal injury damages accounting for more than 50% (up to 70%)
in malpractice cases.11 Consequently, the erratic compensation of this title of damages consti-
tutes one of the major challenges for insurers to face. Being unable to estimate their possible
economic losses with reasonable certainty, insurance companies end up raising malpractice
insurance premiums.12 In extreme cases, where the uncertainty and variability of compen-
sations are particularly high, insurance companies may withdraw from the whole segment
of malpractice liability or from speciﬁc geographical areas. They may also avoid covering
for example, Sloan (1985), Barker (1992), The Congress of the United States (2004), and Mello and Kachalia
(2010).
5Typically, the consequences of medical errors can materialize even after several years. Injuries occurrence
and the initiation of a legal action are usually not simultaneous with the consequent emergence of the long
tail for malpractice claims that makes insurers risk exposure more unpredictable. Consequently, a response
to this problem has been found in shortening the statute of limitations that is the legal time period within
which a patient might ﬁle a malpractice claim.
6The collateral source rule prohibits during trials to take into account the possible recoveries that a
plaintiﬀ has already obtained from source others than the defendant. The legislative interventions in relation
to this rule aim at avoiding a double compensation and are of three main types: (i) allowing the introduction
of evidence of compensation during the litigation; (ii) imposing the mandatory reduction of the collateral
source from the awards; and (iii) making this oﬀset possible but not compulsory.
7Reform joint-and-several liability consists in restricting or eliminating the rule, whereby an injured party
can recover all the damages from any of the respondents, even though more than one party was responsible
for the injuries.
8See, Studdert et al. (2011).
9See, Bovbjerg et al. (1989), Sugarman (2006), and Studdert et. al (2005).
10See, Studdert and Mello (2005), and Danzon (1984).
11See, Avraham (2006), Studdert and Mello (2005), Bovbjerg et al. (1989), and Viscusi (1988).
12See, Danzon (1988).
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speciﬁc healthcare providers and/or oﬀering speciﬁc types of policies.13
However, aside from the objective diﬃculties implied by the assessment of malpractice
compensations, damages awards have received much attention from policymakers also for
another reason. Compensations are often perceived by the public as the main determinant of
high malpractice insurance rates due to huge damages granted in ostensibly trivial injuries.14
In addition, this is accompanied by the further common belief that these excessive overall
awards are substantially driven by their noneconomic component.15 For instance, this per-
ception is well reﬂected in the campaign for capping non-pecuniary losses carried out by the
Bush Administration:
“Anybody who goes into court and wins their case ought to get full economic damages.
At the same time, we must prevent excessive awards that drive up costs, encourage frivolous
lawsuits, and promote drawn-out legal proceedings. And that is why we need a reasonable
federal limit on noneconomic damages awarded in medical liability lawsuits.”16
In order to limit the adverse eﬀects of the variability and unpredictability of the awards for
pain and suﬀering, many countries have tried to rationalize this title of damages through the
adoption of diﬀerent types of caps. For example, as of June 2005, more than half of the U.S.
states have introduced such limitations in their compensation systems and in others, there is
a longstanding discussion on the possibility to impose ceilings on non-pecuniary losses and on
how to structure them. The State of Washington created in 2005 a multidisciplinary task force
on noneconomic damages to study and develop a plan for the adoption of an advisory schedule
of noneconomic damages with speciﬁc reference to medical malpractice.17 More recently, in
2010 the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC)18 has conducted a study to
evaluate several options for medical malpractice tort reform including the implementation
of damages caps. The speciﬁc purpose of such a policy intervention would be to improve
the U.S. medical liability system and its eﬀects on national healthcare.19 Outside the United
States, some countries have opted for the introduction of simple limits on the possible payouts
as in Canada, while others such as Italy and France have preferred more complex solutions,
13As noted by Avraham (2006), “The uncertainty will make insurers charge potential tortfeasors ‘ambiguity
premiums’ above the regular actuarial expected losses and the administrative costs load. This might cause ﬁrms
to forgo activities in which they would otherwise engage if they could obtain lower-priced insurance.” See,
also Kunreuther and Hogarth (1992), Studdert et al. (2011), Studdert and Mello (2005), Geistfel (1995), and
Bovbjerg et al. (1989).
14See, Studdert and Mello (2005). Very high compensations, however, represent a secondary issue for
insurers compared to the variability and uncertainty of awards. In fact, the recoveries decided by juries
are actually often reduced. This may be done, for example, by the judge ratifying the proceeding if the
compensation appears not to be appropriate with respect to the evidence provided. Awards can also be
reduced during the appeal if this takes place, or by high-low agreements or post-trial agreements between
the parties. In this regard, see Vidmar (2009) and Hyman et al. (2007).
15See, OECD (2006), Studdert et al. (2006), and Kelly and Mello (2005).
16Bush (2002), available at: ¡http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020725-
1.html¿ (visited May 23, 2005).
17See, Studdert and Mello (2005).
18MedPAC is an independent Congressional Agency with the primary task of advising the U.S. Congress
on issues related to the Medicare program. For more information: http://www.medpac.gov.
19See, Mello and Kachalia (2010).
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which take into account the speciﬁc degree of severity of the injuries experienced by victims.20
The basic idea at the heart of limiting damages on non-pecuniary losses is that the
provision of guidance to judges and juries in assessing this title of damages would limit both
the variability and unpredictability of compensations for pain and suﬀering. This would,
in turn, make it easier for insurance companies to predict their recoveries. If insurers face
fewer diﬃculties in estimating their exposure, they would lower insurance rates and ensure
the availability of malpractice coverage.21
The present chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 illustrates the notion of noneco-
nomic damages and the diﬃculties encountered in their assessment; Section 3.3 identiﬁes
the main theoretical pros and cons of limiting noneconomic damages awards; Section 3.4
brieﬂy describes the functioning, advantages and disadvantages of the diﬀerent methods to
cap noneconomic losses. Section 3.5 analyses the evolution of the concept of noneconomic
damages in Italy and the diﬀerent mechanisms adopted to limit them; Section 3.6 illustrates
the likely outcomes of capping noneconomic damages by reviewing the evidence provided by
past research, and conclusions follow in Section 3.7.
3.2 Personal Injuries and Noneconomic Damages
Damages for personal injuries imply three conceptually distinct titles of damages. First,
economic damages compensate the injured for the direct ﬁnancial losses due to the impair-
ment of her psychical and physical health, including healthcare costs and lost wages. Second,
noneconomic damages cover all the harms suﬀered by the victim that do not imply direct
economic consequences. Therefore, this title of damages may be compensated regardless of
its impact on the victim’s ability to work and it is used for awarding compensations for pain,
suﬀering, emotional distress, disﬁgurement, loss of companionship, anxiety and fear result-
ing from the physical injuries suﬀered by victims. Third, punitive damages serve a twofold
purpose: to punish the wrongdoer for her misconduct and callous disregard for the rights
and interests of the injured party, and to discourage others from engaging in similar wrongful
actions.
The evaluation of economic damages is generally not particularly problematic, because it
is based on more objective and less questionable criteria than those used for the quantiﬁcation
of both punitive and noneconomic damages. Therefore, although plaintiﬀs’ recoveries for
economic losses can be large, they are generally less disputable. On the contrary, a much-
debated question is the assessment of the other two titles of damages. However, whilst
punitive damages ﬁnd common application in business and contract litigation, they are very
rarely awarded in medical malpractice claims and more in general in personal injuries claims.22
20For an overview of the diﬀerent solutions adopted by the European countries, see in particular Rogers
(2001), and Bona and Mead (2003). While for a description and comparison of the mechanisms adopted in
Europe and in the United States, see Comande` (2005).
21See, Sloan (1985).
22For an overview of the adoption and evolution of punitive damages in the United States, England and
in some other major jurisdictions, including in European law, see Koziol and Wilcox (2009).
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As a result, noneconomic losses are the most controversial issue in malpractice cases and their
assessment turns out to be particularly diﬃcult due to the non-monetary nature of this title of
damages. Thereby, in stressing the importance of policies able to lower the level and variance
of compensations, the literature identiﬁes caps on noneconomic damages as the most eﬀective
to do so.23
As pointed out by Karapanou and Visscher (2010), the awards granted for pain and suf-
fering should primarily compensate the harm experienced by the victim.24 For this reason, it
should not simply cover all the immaterial losses suﬀered, but it should be also adjusted ac-
cording to the severity of the impairment of the physical and psychical health, the magnitude
of the pain, as well as the emotional distress and the reduction of enjoyment of life directly
resulting from the speciﬁc injury in question. These criteria are commonly recognized as
the proper basis for the assessment of noneconomic damages. However, legal jurisdictions
often diﬀer in the way they apply them in malpractice litigation and consequently also in
the magnitude of recoveries victims receive for pain and suﬀering. Moreover, the valuations
of non-pecuniary losses diﬀer widely not only among jurisdictions, but even and more dis-
turbingly within jurisdictions.25 In particular, as shown by several empirical studies, awards
for pain and suﬀering tend to increase with the severity of the injury suﬀered, assuring some
degree of vertical equity, but they fail to assure horizontal equity.26 In fact, equivalent im-
pairments often receive diﬀerent compensations leading to the iniquitous treatment of injured
parties.27
This variability in the assessment of noneconomic losses within a jurisdiction can nega-
tively aﬀect the justice system itself, undermining the credibility and increasing the unpre-
dictability of compensation schemes. The consequence is to “increase the cost of liability
insurance; undermine deterrence; allow case-to-case inequities to ﬂourish; and weaken the
credibility of injury compensation in the eyes of the media, the public, and policymakers.”28
When damages compensations received by plaintiﬀs highly diﬀer, insurance premiums tend
to increase, because insurance companies encounter greater diﬃculties in predicting damages
23See, Avraham and Bustos (2010), and Kessler (2011).
24Besides the compensation for the harm suﬀered by the victim, the literature generally identiﬁes other two
separate goals of non-pecuniary losses: satisfaction and deterrence. Satisfaction refers to recognition of the
injustice suﬀered by the victim, see Karapanou and Visscher (2010), and Bovbjerg et al. (1989). Diﬀerently,
deterrence aims at discouraging people from engaging in the same acts that have caused the immaterial
losses, see Studdert and Mello (2005), and Karapanou and Visscher (2010). However, the compensation of
the victim is recognized as the primary aim of non-pecuniary damages. In fact, satisfaction is accepted as
a separate goal only by some countries (e.g. Spain, Belgium and Greek), whereas for deterrence, “European
legal literature seldom mentions it as a separate goal, but in the law and economics literature it is paramount.”
See, Karapanou and Visscher (2010), p.54.
25See, G. Comande` (2005), Studdert et al. (2011), and Rogers (2001).
26Horizontal equity refers to the award of similar compensations for similar injuries, while vertical equity
implies the assignment of higher awards for more severe injuries.
27See, for instance, Bovbjerg et al. (1989), and Studdert et al. (2004). In this respect, Flatscher-Tho¨ni
et al. (2013) empirically investigate the impact of two diﬀerent approaches adopted by Austrian courts to
assess non-monetary losses, on the compensations received by victims for this title of damages.
28Studdert and Mello (2005), p. 26.
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awards and their loss exposure becomes more uncertain.29 In the hypothesis of particularly
high uncertainty, insurers may even prefer to abandon the reference market or decide to limit
their supply.30
The lack of a coherent approach for the evaluation of damages for pain and suﬀering
and erratic compensations may also undermine the deterrence eﬀect of the tort system itself.
Deterrence relies on the capacity of potential defendants to decide the level of precaution to
adopt. This choice should be the result of rational cost-beneﬁt evaluations based on three el-
ements. First, the costs of precaution necessary to reduce the probability of injuries. Second,
the liability costs that defendants would bear in the absence of such safety measures. Third,
the size of the potential sanction associated with the injurious behavior. The unpredictability
of awards and the uncertainty of insurance costs make these evaluations more complicated.
If potential defendants cannot determine costs with a reasonable degree of conﬁdence, then
the comparison of the diﬀerent possible levels of care to undertake is unfeasible and this may
lead to over- or under-deterrence.31 With respect to medical malpractice, over-deterrence
results in defensive medicine phenomena, whereas under-deterrence leads to the adoption of
a lower level of precaution and resources than are socially desirable.32
3.3 Pros and Cons of Capping Noneconomic Damages
The rationale behind caps on noneconomic damages is to mitigate the great variability in
the compensations granted to injured parties and attenuate the perception of a high degree
of arbitrariness in the assessment of damages for pain and suﬀering.
These goals are pursued substantially by restricting the discretion of both juries and
judges, which are provided with some sort of guidance to decide the level of compensations
to award to victims. This discretionary power is not necessarily bad in itself as it makes it
possible to actually adjust the recoveries of injured parties to the speciﬁc circumstances of
each single case considered. Furthermore, the discretion of juries and judges also makes it
possible to avoid an excessive degree of uniformity of the case law and a too rigid treatment
of victims. Nonetheless, overly wide discretionary power is deemed to be the main cause of
29See, Danzon (1991) and Danzon (1988). In this respect, Studdert et al. (2011) precisely observe, “Every
malpractice insurance premium dollar includes an amount that represents the insurer’s uncertainty about its
exposure. The greater the uncertainty is, the larger that amount will be.” See, Studdert et al. (2011), p. 60.
30See, Bovbjerg et al. (1989), Kunreuther and Hogarth (1992), Geistfeld (1995), Studdert and Mello
(2005), and Studdert et al. (2011). A well-known example of an insurer’s withdrawal from the malpractice
insurance market is the exit of St Paul, one of the leading medical liability insurers. This company abandoned
the U.S. and European markets at the end of 2001 with particularly negative consequences in terms of
coverage availability in countries such Ireland, France and the U.S. The American market also experienced
the withdrawal of Phico and Frontier Insurance Group, whereas the Medical Inter-Insurance Exchange decided
to keep operating only in New Jersey. See, OECD (2006), pp. 16-17.
31“In the medical malpractice context, this means that healthcare may suﬀer from the cost associated with
defensive medicine or the suboptimal level of patient safety that results when providers are not motivated to
take steps to prevent adverse events”. See, Studdert and Mello (2005), p. 27. On the possible consequences
in term of over- or under-deterrence, see also Geistfeld (1995), Avraham (2006), and Studdert et al. (2011).
32On the phenomenon of defensive medicine, see Chapter 1.
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both the great variability and unpredictability of the awards for pain and suﬀering. Hence, it
exacerbates the diﬃculties encountered by insurers in dealing with the malpractice insurance
market. The decision of limiting noneconomic damages entails a trade-oﬀ between a higher
level of uniformity and predictability of compensations and a lower degree of ﬂexibility in
assessing non-monetary damages. Yet, the extent to which these eﬀects occur or might occur
in reality depends on the actual type and features of the caps adopted.
In particular, the limitation of non-pecuniary losses should primarily succeed in reducing
the number of the largest awards and, therefore, decreasing the variance of compensations.
Compensations of non-pecuniary losses clearly show a positively skewed distribution with the
vast majority of victims’ recoveries placed at the lower end and a relatively limited number of
very high awards at the upper end of the scale.33 This long tail of very large awards represents
a problematic issue for both insurers and healthcare providers. In fact, insurance companies
face the diﬃculty of predicting and paying particularly large compensations that are a cause
of ﬁnancial stress, while healthcare organizations may not be able to deal with them if
they are self-insured. From this perspective, limiting noneconomic damages is expected to
contain and, to some extent, reduce the overall compensatory damages plaintiﬀs can obtain.
Ultimately, by containing payouts and increasing the predictability of awards because of the
reduced variance of compensations, caps are expected to positively impact on insurance costs
and premiums paid.
In addition, caps may aﬀect the decision of injured parties to ﬁle a claim. Speciﬁcally,
ceilings on noneconomic damages may discourage injured parties to engage in trials, but
they may also facilitate settlements outside the courts by restricting the range of potential
recoveries. By limiting victims’ recoveries, caps may also lower the degree of malpractice
pressure perceived by clinicians, potentially leading to less deterrence and, consequently, to
more negligent medical accidents.
Limiting noneconomic losses also signiﬁcantly aﬀects both the horizontal and vertical eq-
uity of damages. In particular, regardless of the type of caps applied, these ceilings may have
the great advantage of promoting horizontal equity of compensations at least for the highest
severity injuries. In fact, they should make the awards for the most severe impairments fall at
or near the ceiling itself, increasing the degree of homogeneity of this type of awards. On the
contrary, the way in which caps can inﬂuence the vertical equity of compensations depends
on the actual type of limitation that is implemented. As a general principle, vertical equity
is desired in order to avoid an inequitable treatment of victims. Therefore, caps should be
elaborated with the objective of promoting the assignment of reasonably diﬀerent awards for
injuries that involve very diﬀerent degrees of disability.
Notwithstanding, as pointed out by several scholars,34 limiting noneconomic damages
can have unintended negative eﬀects due to the diﬃculties entailed by their implementation.
Consequently, although they are primarily advocated to lower overall compensations, they
may actually not reach such a result. This is the case when judges and juries look at them,
rather than to an award of zero, as the starting point to determine, through consecutive
33See, Bovbjerg et al. (1989), Studdert et al. (2004), and Studdert and Mello (2005).
34See, for example, Durrance (2009) and Sharkey (2005).
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adjustments, the ﬁnal recovery. Caps may also fail to reduce total damages compensations
due to another unintended eﬀect known as the crossover eﬀect.35 In presence of ceilings
on non-pecuniary losses, some portions of these losses can be incorporated in the economic
damages that are not aﬀected by any limitation. This phenomenon can ﬁnd two possible
explanations. First, even assuming that attorneys always pursue the maximum overall com-
pensatory award regardless of the implementation of noneconomic damages caps, it can be
that they reconsider the amount of the economic and noneconomic components of these
awards when they deal with such ceilings. Second, especially when juries are appointed to
determine the total damages awards, jurors may have a basic idea of the amount of money
a victim should receive and a less strict vision of the diﬀerent categories of damages than
the one provided by the law. Therefore, juries may easily increase the economic component
of the overall compensation to reach the ﬁgure they have in mind, neutralizing the eﬀect of
caps.
In any case, the nature of the actual consequences derived from the rationalization of
noneconomic damages is determined by the type of ceilings implemented and their features.
Moreover, the magnitude of all these eﬀects furtherly depends on the level at which these
limits are set, and on how much such a level diﬀers from the appropriate compensation for
high-severity injuries perceived by the public opinion.36
3.4 Key Features of Caps Design
Caps on noneconomic damages can take diﬀerent forms that vary in terms of both basic
structure and speciﬁc characteristics. First, they may have either compulsory or advisory
nature. In the former case, judges and juries are obliged to respect them even when their
application would seem unfair. On the contrary, in the latter case, these limits provide a sort
of benchmark compensation. Thereby, juries and judges may waive them in order to adjust
the award to the speciﬁc characteristics of the case concerned.
Caps can also be implemented diﬀerently with respect to both claims and litigants. Specif-
ically, they may ﬁnd a generalized application to all non-monetary losses, as well as a speciﬁc
application to only some kinds of claims such as, for instance, medical malpractice claims or
– even more narrowly – wrongful death claims. In addition, their application can refer to
the amount of money that an injured party may obtain, or to total amount for which each
defendant may be found responsible.37
Finally, as to their structure, caps on pain and suﬀering can have three main diﬀerent
forms: they can be ﬂat caps, tiered caps or schedules. The complexity of these diﬀerent
mechanisms to limit damages, their possible beneﬁts in terms of both horizontal and vertical
equity of compensations, as well as of greater predictability of awards, increase moving from
35See, Sharkey (2005).
36See, Mello and Kachalia (2010).
37As for the case of caps applicable to each defendant, Mello and Kachalia (2010) also highlight that
this “choice reﬂects a particular notion of equity, though it may result in inequitable awards in cases where
multiple defendants have diﬀerent shares of fault or causing the plaintiﬀ’s injury.”
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ﬂat caps to schedules.
3.4.1 Flat Caps
A ﬂat cap foresees the simple imposition of an upper bound to the amount of money that
can be awarded for pain and suﬀering. For instance, one of the oldest and most well-known
example of ﬂat caps on non-pecuniary losses is California’s cap, introduced in 1975 in the
State of California through the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) and set
at $250,000.
Such an upper limit ﬁnds application with respect to any type of injury regardless of
the severity of the impairment involved. Juries and judges cannot award to injured parties
compensations that exceed the value of the cap. This generalized applicability makes ﬂat
caps an instrument of great simplicity in term of implementation.
In addition, this kind of ceiling has the advantage of reducing, if not eliminating the long
tail of the compensation distribution (the actual eﬀect depends on the value at which this
limitation is set). In relation to the most severe health impairments, juries and judges are
obliged to award recoveries that are below or, at the most, equal to the upper limit decreasing
the number of very large unpredictable compensations. The lower the amount at which these
ceilings are ﬁxed, the more stringent is the potential control over cost that can be exerted.
Still, the legislator has to be careful in not setting this ceiling at a level too low, penalizing
the victims of the more serious cases. Consequently, the major diﬃculty for this mechanism
to rationalize noneconomic losses lies precisely in the choice of the actual value at which to
set the upper bound for compensations.38
If recoveries for high severity injuries fall at the level of the ﬂat ceiling, this also means
that the heterogeneity among this type of compensations decreases. Flat caps lead to the
award of similar compensations for injuries with similar degrees of severity in relation to the
most serious cases. Therefore, they certainly entail beneﬁts in term of horizontal equity, but
these beneﬁts are limited to the case of particularly severe injuries. Conversely, the possible
results in terms of vertical equity are poor even with respect to high severity injuries. In very
serious cases, juries and judges are willing to grant very high compensations. Nonetheless,
since compensations cannot in any case exceed the set upper limit, there is less room for
adjusting these awards to the speciﬁc circumstances of the case concerned. Therefore, under
the hypothesis of a ﬂat cap, it is likely that the recoveries awarded will coincide with the
cap itself or will be very close to it. This means that injuries with a severity level that is
high, but that cannot be considered equal, are likely to receive ﬁnal compensations, which
are identical or diﬀer only slightly.
Moreover, even though ﬂat caps are eﬀective in avoiding excessive recoveries, they turn
out to perform poorly in reducing the variability of payouts since they leave unchanged the
discretionary power of juries and judges with respect to the compensations below the ceiling
itself. Flat caps simply limit the awards that can be granted without providing any additional
38With respect to the mentioned example of the California cap, most U.S. states have considered this
ceiling too stringent, preferring amounts between $250,000 and $500,000.
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guidance to assess the appropriateness of these awards. Whilst this mechanism is eﬀective
in coping with very large damages, it does not aﬀect the compensations that fall below the
level of the imposed ceiling. Hence, these compensations might still be deemed as excessive
in relation to the injury suﬀered by victims. At the same time, ﬂat caps also fail to address
the issue of inappropriately low awards since they set only upper bounds to compensations.39
Consequently, “any awards below the cap are subject to the same claims of arbitrariness and
unfairness that plague the current system.”40
3.4.2 Tiered Caps
Noneconomic damages can be rationalized also through tiered caps. In this case, we do not
have the introduction of a single limit on the awards victims can receive, but rather the
implementation of diﬀerent ceilings for diﬀerent kinds of injuries. Tiered caps can be seen as
a system of ﬂat caps, whereby injuries are divided into diﬀerent basic categories according
to severity and a ﬂat cap is then assigned to each of these groups.41
Compared to ﬂat ceilings, this instrument is more diﬃcult to implement. The legislator
has ﬁrst to identify the diﬀerent types of injuries and, second, to determine a diﬀerent upper
limit for the compensations that can be awarded in relation to each of these groups. An
example of tiered caps can again be found in the American context, where the State of Ohio
set a general ceiling at $350,000, which is raised to $500,000 in case of permanent disability.42
Likewise in the hypothesis of ﬂat ceilings, there are gains in terms of horizontal equity
compared to the case in which there is no cap at all. The compensations for the most serious
injuries again must fall below, or at the most be equal, to the level of the ceiling imposed on
them. Yet, the problems of large outliers and of the subsequent over-evaluation are mitigated
with a positive impact on the variance of compensations. In addition, tiered caps replicate
these outcomes with respect to all the diﬀerent groups of injuries they foresee, yielding higher
beneﬁts in terms of horizontal equity than ﬂat caps.
Tiered caps are also more eﬀective than ﬂat ones in promoting vertical equity. The limits
imposed on compensations vary according to the severity of the impairment involved. There-
fore, they still make it possible to award higher amounts to more severe injuries, entailing
a greater modulation of compensations. For instance, two extreme cases, such as the total
paralysis of the injured party and the death of the victim, are likely to receive similar, if not
identical, compensations in the hypothesis of a ﬂat cap. In both these cases, in fact, it is
reasonable to expect juries and judges to be willing to award very high compensations, which
will be close or even coincide with the ﬂat ceiling. By contrast, the result would be diﬀerent
with tiered caps if, as in the case of the state of Maryland, there is a general cap of $650,000
for noneconomic personal injuries that is raised to $812,500 in case of death.43 In fact, this
means that the ﬁnal compensations would not result in the same amount of money and not
39Studdert et. al (2011).
40Geistfeld (1995), p. 790.
41Tiered caps usually divided injuries into two or three groups. See, Studdert et al. (2011).
42See, Studdert and Mello (2005).
43See, Studdert and Mello (2005).
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even necessarily in very similar sums. On the contrary, the victim suﬀering of total inability
would receive an award that is likely to be close to $650,000, while the death of the injured
party can be compensated with a greater amount (up to $812,000). As a result, awards can
be better diﬀerentiated even among the more serious injuries.
Again, however, the discretionary power of juries and judges and the correlated problem
of the variability of compensations is maintained within each of these injuries groups. Tiered
caps, as the ﬂat ones, fail in oﬀering further guidance to estimate the appropriateness of
compensations within each tier and they end up not addressing the issues of the under-
compensation and the over-compensation of damages for the injuries that fall within each
tier.44
3.4.3 Schedules
Noneconomic damages schedules are a more advanced version of tiered caps and substantially
consist in tables or matrices of damages. As tiered ceilings, they make it possible to adjust
the recoveries for non-monetary damages according to the severity of the health impairment
experienced by victims.45 Yet, they require a greater eﬀort and a higher level of detail in
grouping the diﬀerent kinds of injuries. Moreover, the compensations they provide correspond
to the actual amount that has to be awarded (i.e. compulsory schedules) or serve as guideline
in the assessment of damages (i.e. advisory schedules).
Their design is more complex than that of caps and requires: (i) the categorization of
health impairments in a tiering system, whereby the diﬀerent groups of medical injuries are
ranked according to their severity; (ii) the translation of the diﬀerences in term of severity
among tiers through relative value weighs;46 and (iii) the determination of a monetary value
or a monetary value range for the compensations of non-pecuniary losses in relation to each
severity class.
In particular, designing a schedule for non-pecuniary losses poses two main diﬃculties.
The ﬁrst problem consists in the creation of the injury severity classes, thus the choice of the
severity measure to employ. As highlighted by Mello and Kachalia (2010), several methods
can be used to group injuries each of which has its pros and cons.47 For instance, one option
is the adoption of the nine points scale developed by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC),48 that ranks medical malpractice injuries according to the associated
44Studdert et al. (2011).
45The basic intuition behind the choice of linking the recoveries to injuries severity is that a more se-
vere health impairment should entail higher non-pecuniary damages, even though compensations would not
necessarily grow following a linear path. See, Bovbjerg at al., (1989).
46The idea is to assign to each tier a numerical weigh reﬂecting the severity of the related group of injuries.
So that, these weighs increase passing from one tier to the following one. In particular, the purpose of these
weighs is to permit “comparison of injuries in diﬀerent cells [of a schedule], which is useful for probing the
validity of the scale.” (i.e. the severity metric used to group injuries and rank the tiers). See, Studdert et al.
(2011), p. 67.
47For a discussion about the validity of the diﬀerent methods, see Studdert and Mello (2005).
48The National Association of Insurance Commissioner is a clearinghouse for regulator in the U.S. For
further information: http://www.naic.org.
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level of disability. This scale foresees nine levels of disability, ranging from one for emotional
disability only, to nine for death, and provides for each of them an illustrative sample of
injuries. A second possibility is to appoint a group of experts to scale injuries as happens
in the Swedish and Danish compensation systems. A third method implies the application
of one of the diﬀerent health utilities indexes that have been developed over time as, for
example, the quality-adjusted life years (QALYs).49
The second major problem is the assignment of both value weighs and monetary values
to each severity tier. In particular, the monetary value assigned to each injury group should
represent an appropriate and fair compensation for non-pecuniary damages for the injuries
within each class. There is a number of approaches that can be used to set these values and
each of them has its own advantages and disadvantages, thus the diﬃculty lies in choosing
one value that will be considered socially and politically legitimate.50 A ﬁrst option is to
determine these values on the grounds of the compensations awarded in previous, similar
claims. A second option is to leave the task to a committee or commission consisting of
members of the diﬀerent stakeholders’ groups. Such a commission/committee could analyze
the available data on plaintiﬀs’ recoveries and malpractice cost and examine the compensation
schemes adopted in other states or countries. This type of commission/committee could also
be replaced by a group of experts in the ﬁelds of law, medicine and decision science. Thanks
to their expertise, these experts could be able to better analyze the existing empirical research
on the impact of diﬀerent injuries on victims’ life.
The diﬃculties encountered in the determination of the monetary values include also the
choice of whether to opt for a single monetary value, multiples values or a range of values for
each group of injuries. A more limited number of values assures a higher level of uniformity
and predictability of compensations. However, a greater ﬂexibility, thus a greater capacity
of adjusting awards to the speciﬁc circumstances of the case concerned is possible only by
increasing the number of values. Value ranges are more eﬀective in protecting juries and
judges discretionary power in evaluating damages. If the preferred option is to assign only
one value to each tier of injuries severity, then another possible solution to determine these
values is the application of a multiplier of the compensation received for the economic loss
or medical expenses.51
Besides the basic tiering structure solely based on the degree of disability experienced
by victims, a schedule can be characterized by a more sophisticated frame, that takes into
consideration some speciﬁc features of victims themselves. In practice, the inclusion of these
further types of information requires an additional cell within each severity group turning the
schedule from a table into a matrix of damages. The most frequent additional dimension is
victims’ age. This choice is justiﬁed by the consideration that younger victims will suﬀer the
physical permanent impairment and its consequences for a longer period than older victims
49See, Geistfeld (1995) and Karapanou (2013).
50For an overview of the advantages and disadvantages of the diﬀerent approaches to determine the
monetary values of each tier of a damages schedule, see Studdert et al. (2005b).
51See Bovbjerg et al. (1989). Anyway, in order to choose the multiplier to apply, it will be necessary to
resort to one of the other methods that can be used to set the monetary values.
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would, while their recovery of such injuries is expected to be faster.52
Despite their complexity, several countries have adopted damages schedules. For instance,
this peculiar type of caps is used in the civil legal system in Belgium, France, Netherlands,
Hong Kong and United Kingdom. They ﬁnd application also in the damages compensation
schemes for traﬃc accidents in Finland or for medical injuries in Sweden and Denmark.53 The
appeal of damages schedules lies in their capacity to promote both horizontal and vertical
equity, while reducing the variance and unpredictability of compensations. Their tiering
structure serves to group into a same class injuries considered similar with respect to the
severity measure employed. As a result, injuries within a same group will receive the same
or a similar compensation for noneconomic damages, enhancing horizontal equity. Moreover,
each group is characterized by a higher severity level compared to the group that precedes.
Hence, the level of noneconomic losses assigned to each tier will increase as the severity level
of the related injuries category intensiﬁes, promoting vertical equity. Consequently, damages
schedules have the great advantage of ensuring similar compensations for similar injuries,
while assuring the assignment of higher awards to more severe injuries.
Damages schedules also constitute a better and more comprehensive response than ﬂat or
tiered caps to the problems of the variance and unpredictability of noneconomic losses.54 Flat
and tiered caps mainly deal with the problem of the long tail of damages’ distribution repre-
sented by very large compensations. Reducing the number and magnitude of these extreme
outliers, they succeed in dealing with over-valuation. Nevertheless, the broad discretionary
power of juries and judges in assessing the recoveries within the range remains unchanged
and the subsequent problem of the variability of the compensations below the ceiling remains
unaﬀected. Conversely, damages schedules provide a quantiﬁcation of the amount of money
to be awarded on the grounds of objective common criteria (e.g. severity degree and injured
party’s age). In this way, they eliminate the extreme outliers while restraining both the
discretion of juries and judges and the variability of compensations.55 In fact, even when
they are not compulsory, schedules provide a benchmark compensation at which juries and
judges should look while assessing damages.
3.5 Notion and Compensation of Noneconomic Dam-
ages under Italian Law
The Italian compensation system is based on a dual model, which distinguishes between
economic and noneconomic damages. In particular, the compensation of the latter category
of damages is stated under article 2059 of the Italian civil code, while the deﬁnition of non-
52See, Geistﬂed (1995), and Bovbjerg et al. (1989).
53See, Comande` (2005), Studdert and Mello (2005), Sugarman (2006), Mello and Kachalia (2010).
54Shapiro and Rodriguez (2009).
55As suggested by Bovbjerg et al. (1989), the choice between a basic tiering structure and a matrix version
of schedules “depends primarily on how much one thinks non-economic damages should be individualized, how
much one trusts juries to exercise discretion, and the importance one attaches to achieving similar results in
similar cases.”
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monetary damages has to be found in the case law.
According to the Italian jurisprudence, noneconomic damages for personal injuries include
three main diﬀerent types of non-monetary losses. First, damage to health (so-called danno
biologico) is intended to compensate the impairment of the victim’s physical and/or psychical
health regardless of the lost earning opportunities for the injured herself, and it covers, among
others, disﬁgurement and loss of companionship. Second, damage for moral suﬀering (so-
called danno morale) is awarded for the emotional distress, pain, suﬀering, anxiety and fear
suﬀered as the result of the physical injuries. Third, existential damage (so-called danno
esistenziale) covers the situations in which victims are forced to renounce carrying out non-
pecuniary activities due to experienced injuries. It diﬀers from damage for moral suﬀering,
because it does not refer to pain and suﬀering, but rather to the impossibility to perform
speciﬁc activities. At the same time, it is also diﬀerent from damage to health, because it
does not require the impairment of the victim’s physical integrity in order to be awarded.56
These diﬀerent types of noneconomic losses do not constitute independent titles of dam-
ages. They can be employed solely for descriptive purposes and, in any case, the title of
noneconomic damages is unique in its substance. Therefore, courts have to be careful not to
compensate twice the same harm derived from a personal injury by giving it diﬀerent names.57
Over time, damages to health have proven to be the most important title of damages since
normally victims always receive a compensation for such damages in personal injuries cases.
However, the idea of compensating noneconomic damages is quite recent in the Italian
legal system and has been the result of a complex process. The concept of noneconomic losses
was debated in the legal literature for the ﬁrst time in 1962, even though non-patrimonial
damages to persons had already attracted the attention of many practitioners.58 In the be-
ginning, personal injuries damages were entirely identiﬁed with the economic loss suﬀered by
victims because of the deterioration of their ability to work.59 According to this interpreta-
tion, the Court of Florence in its decision of 5 January 1967 regarding the compensation for
personal injuries of a 70 year old pensioner stated that “people without any value can exist,
as in the case of those who, because, of old age, illness or any other reason, are absolutely
not ﬁtted to any earning producing activity.”60 In the following decade, this title of damages
gained more and more importance. Speciﬁcally, the signiﬁcant increase in the number of
victims of car accidents61 and more in general of injuries not related to any criminal act
started to modify judges’ perception of fairness in compensation. This led to question the
traditional interpretation, whereby non-patrimonial damages were recognized only when a
criminal act was committed. As a result, starting from the eighties, the national jurispru-
dence on damages for personal injuries has undergone profound changes that culminated in
56See, Chindemi (2011), and Carnevale and Scarano (2010).
57Italian Supreme Court n. 18461/2011 and n. 5230/2012. With respect to noneconomic losses for
personal injuries, the Italian tort law system does not foresee the award of punitive damages. For more
details, see A. Scarso (2009).
58See Bunsnelli and Comande´ (2001).
59Gentile (1962), p. 669.
60Tribunale di Firenze, 5 January 1967, in Archivio della responsabilita` civile, 1969, 130.
61See Busnelli (1989).
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the redeﬁnition of noneconomic losses.
To introduce the right to compensation outside the realm of criminal cases, courts relied
on the constitutional right to health (Article 32 of the Italian Constitution). However, the
attempts to introduce the right to compensation outside the realm of criminal cases generated
a jungle of diﬀerent approaches and criteria, which varied widely both across and within
courts.62 At the beginning of the eighties (1981-1984), the Court of Cassation intervened in
the debate as the court of last appeal for both criminal and civil jurisdictions, supporting the
constitutional approach to personal injury damages proposed by the lower Courts of Genoa
and Pisa. According to this approach, the Italian Constitution recognizes and protects health
as a fundamental right to which everyone is entitled. Consequently, any harm derived from
the violation of this right must ﬁnd compensation even when the ability to work is not
impaired.63 Moreover, by accepting the possibility of compensating damages even if they do
not have a patrimonial content, the Court no longer linked this compensation to the existence
of a crime.64
Once the right to compensation of noneconomic damages was made, the big issue was how
to calculate the compensation itself, given that this was not related to a strictly economic
criterion. In fact, notwithstanding their importance, the quantiﬁcation of damages for pain
and suﬀering was left to the case law. Unsurprisingly, given the lack of safe and reliable
criteria to determine this title of damages, the evaluations of the diﬀerent courts and even of
the diﬀerent sections of a same court have varied widely.
This divergence in the determination of noneconomic losses has led to the emergence
of the need for an assessment that must be equitable. At the same time, this evaluation
must also be coherent with the kind of health impairment involved and, thus, with the
loss involved.65 This has fostered the research for a quantifying method that “had a double
means of assessing damages, which would primarily base uniformity on a medical evaluation
of the psychophysical disability and on the possibility of extrapolating homogeneous monetary
guidelines from prior awards.”66 The Constitutional Court publicly invoked:
“a criterion that fulﬁlls, on the one hand, the need of basic monetary uniformity (the
same impairment cannot be evaluated in a too diﬀerent way from one individual to another)
and, on the other hand, the need of elasticity and ﬂexibility to adjust awards to actual eﬀects
of the ascertained disablement on activities of daily life.”67
Trying to achieve the uniformity and measurableness called upon by the Court of Cas-
sation and the Constitutional Court, lower courts started to elaborate their own equitable
criteria and solutions. They aimed at containing the variance of victims’ recoveries – at least
within a jurisdiction – by providing guidance to their judges in the determination of immate-
rial losses in personal injuries cases. In particular, the Italian tribunals started on a voluntary
62Reasons for these diﬀerences mainly rely on ideology and political believes. See, Consiglio Superiore
della Magistratura (1989).
63Court of Cassation, 6 June 1981, n. 3675 and Court of Cassation, 6 April 1983, n. 2396.
64See Busnelli and Comande` (2001).
65The Italian Supreme Court clearly expressed this need in its sentence of 13 January 1993, n. 357.
66Comande` (2005), p. 289.
67Constitutional Court, 14 July 1986, n.184. On the matters, see also See Busnelli and Comande` (2001).
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basis to adopt and develop their own damages schedules, using the experience of other Eu-
ropean countries, mainly France. Medical experts were put in charge of the deﬁnition of the
percentage points of disability to assign to the possible diﬀerent injuries.68 Furthermore, in
order to guarantee consistency within courts’ decisions, monetary values were deﬁned accord-
ing to the previous cases.69 Hence, the introduction of schedules was expected to increase the
degree of certainty in assessing compensations, but not to decrease deterrence with respect
to the past.
In 1986, the 184 Constitutional Court decision ruled the constitutionality of the use
of schedules to settle compensations in case of noneconomic damages. Nevertheless, the
adoption of these schedules was voluntary to the extent that some courts still prefer to leave
these types of evaluation to judges’ discretion, refusing to apply any kind of damages cap.
In particular, courts opted for scheduled damages on the base of the decision of their judges:
judges belonging to a same court should vote for the implementation of schedules. When
adopted, schedules apply to injuries of every nature, from car to work accidents, as well as
medical malpractice.
This voluntary and uncoordinated process has led to the creation and application of
diﬀerent schedules, which still may determine systematically diverging awards among the
Italian tribunals. The Legislator tried to face this persisting problem by imposing a uniform
schedule of noneconomic damages for the ﬁrst nine percentage points of disability (the so-
called micropermanenti).70 However, this has been only a partial solution since courts have
remained responsible for the determination of the damages for the most serious cases (i.e.
for all the other percentage points of disability).
3.5.1 The Evolution of Noneconomic Damages Caps in Italy
In Italy, noneconomic damages schedules have been preferred to other forms of caps.71 Specif-
ically, besides the purely equitable evaluation, three main diﬀerent mechanisms of calculation
have emerged among the diﬀerent methods used by courts over time to assess noneconomic
losses: (i) the method of three times the annual social pension (so-called Genovese method),
(ii) the Pisan method of the evaluation by point or Pisan schedule; and (iii) the Milan method
of point tables or Milan schedule.
In particular, the court of Genoa has been the ﬁrst to base the compensations for non-
pecuniary damages on objective criteria. This court moved from the consideration that the
variations in the awards received by the victims could be justiﬁable only by taking into con-
sideration the duration and characteristics of the health impairment suﬀered. Consequently,
68Comande` (2005).
69Sella (2005).
70See, Law 57/2001.
71In the case of Italy, the mechanisms elaborated to rationalize noneconomic damages are a more artic-
ulated version of the traditional damages schedules. As explained in details in the present section, they
consider each percentage of injury severity individually, rather than tiers of disability percentages. Moreover,
they provide a formula based on the severity of injuries and the age of victims to quantifying damages.
Thereby, they are an extreme form of schedules, but hereinafter for simplicity, we refer to them as schedules.
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the sole factors that could aﬀect the assessment of the awards for noneconomic losses are the
victim’s age and gender. In fact, the age aﬀects the potential length of the health impairment,
while the gender may inﬂuence age expectancy.72 On the grounds of these considerations, the
court of Genoa decided to calculate noneconomic damages solely on the basis of the severity
of the harm suﬀered by victims and of the age and gender of injured parties. As reference
monetary parameter, the Court adopted the national average income per capita. Later, this
was replaced by three times the annual social pension.73 As a result, the compensations to be
awarded were computed as three times the annual social pension multiplied by the disability
percentage and by an age-related coeﬃcient. However, this method has been abandoned in
1993 because, as stated by the Court of Cassation,74 noneconomic damages, that are deﬁned
as impairments of physical health, cannot be determined on the grounds of a criterion that
refers to the real or alleged income of plaintiﬀs. Noneconomic damages must be compensated
regardless of an impairment of the earning ability. In addition, a further drawback of this
method was the excessive rigidity: the assessment of non-monetary losses was the result of
the mechanical application of this criterion without any possibility to adjust the award to
the speciﬁc circumstances of the single case under scrutiny.
The court of Pisa tried to oﬀer a diﬀerent method to assess compensations of noneco-
nomic damages, that could represent an intermediate solution between the excessively elastic
mechanism of the purely equitable evaluation and the extremely rigid method of the court of
Genoa. Judges in Pisa looked at the French experience of calcul au point and elaborated the
criterion of the evaluation by points. Speciﬁcally, they moved from the consideration that the
medical-legal assessment of the permanent disability is made on the basis of the medical evi-
dence provided by expert medical witnesses and translated into percentage points. Therefore,
they decided to deﬁne a monetary value corresponding to each disability percentage point.75
This monetary value was computed as the average of the previous compensations awarded
in cases of minor disability (between 1 and 10 percentage points).76 The ﬁnal compensation
was determined by multiplying the invalidity percentage by this monetary point value, then
the ﬁgure obtained could be increased by up to 50% on the grounds of objective factors such
as, for instance, the victim’s age, the need for further medical treatments, or the nature of
the injuries (aesthetical, neurological or functional).
72See, Sella (2005).
73The parameter of the annual social pension was chosen by looking at the routine procedure followed
for the compulsory motor vehicles insurance (Law 39/1976). This procedure set the criteria to compute
the income for the assessment of the damages for the loss of proﬁt, as well as for temporary and permanent
disability. In particular, with regard to the impossibility of estimating the personal income of a victim, judges
should have considered as a conventional value an income at least equal to three times the social pension.
74Court of Cassation, 13 January 1993, n. 357. See also, Court of Cassation, 16 November 2000, n.
14874; Court of Cassation, 8 January 1999, n. 101; Court of Cassation, 30 October 1998, n. 10897; Court of
Cassation, 24 June 24 1997, n. 5635; and Court of Cassation, 14 May 1997, n. 4236
75Speciﬁcally, the deﬁnition of the disability percentage points has been left to medical experts (Comande`
(2005).
76The court of Pisa decided to base the determination of this monetary point value on the ﬁrst ten
percentage points of disability, because in almost all the cases the injuries related to these points of disability
do not actually aﬀect the earning ability of victims. Therefore, it was reasonable to believe that the related
awards reﬂected the sole damage to health. See, Visentini (2009).
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The case law has recognized the validity of the Pisan schedule.77 In particular, the
Constitutional Court with the sentence 184/1986 has identiﬁed two major advantages in the
application of the Pisan method. On the one hand, the determination of compensations is
based on predetermined monetary values, assuring an equal initial treatment for all injured
parties. On the other hand, judges can adjust awards to the speciﬁc case, even though their
initial evaluations are based on predetermined and standardized criteria. In this way, judges
can comply with the fundamental principal according to which courts are obliged to take
into due consideration the individual circumstances of each single case. Therefore, even if
judges can determine the compensation based on reference values, they retain the possibility
to adjust the award to the actual severity of the impairment suﬀered by victims.
Table 3.1: Example of a Milan Schedule
Age
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Age Index
Point 1.000 0.995 0.990 0.985 0.980 0.975 0.970
value
Disability
10% 2,598 25,979 25,849 25,720 25,590 25,460 25,330 25,200
11% 2,739 30,129 29,978 29,828 29,677 29,527 229,376 29,225
12% 2,881 34,573 34,400 34,227 34,055 33,882 33,709 33,536
13% 3,026 39,337 39,141 38,944 38,747 38,551 38,354 38,157
14% 3.172 44,405 44,183 43,961 43,739 43,517 43,295 43,073
15% 3,320 49,807 49,558 49,309 49,060 48,811 48,562 48,313
16% 3,470 55,522 55,244 54,966 54,689 54,411 54,134 53,856
17% 3,622 61,583 61,275 60,967 60,659 60,351 60,044 59,736
18% 3,776 67,967 67,627 67,287 66,947 66,608 66,268 65,928
19% 3,932 74,711 74,338 73,964 73,590 73,217 72,843 72,470
20% 4,089 81,787 81,378 80,969 80,560 80,151 79,742 79,333
Notes: Values are expressed in 2011 euros and taken from the reference table adopted by the Court of Milan in 2011. In the
case of a 10% disability suﬀered by a 3 years old victim, the reference compensation amounts to 25,720 euros. This ﬁgure
is obtained by multiplying the monetary percentage point value (2,598 euros) by ten by the age index (0.990).
Following the example of the court of Pisa, other Italian courts started to develop their
own local schedule.78 Among them, the court of Milan is the one that has gained the greater
consensus by proposing a further mechanism of calculation. Speciﬁcally, the Milan calculating
77Constitutional Court, 11 April 1997, n.3170; and Constitutional Court, 14 July 1986, n. 184. Even the
Court of Cassation favorably received the Pisan evaluation by points in its decision, 13 April 1995, n. 4255.
78Negro (2011a).
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method diﬀers from the evaluation by point of the court of Pisa, because the monetary value
is no longer constant, but it varies according to the severity of the harm suﬀered and the
age of the injured party. In practice, this mechanism foresees the simultaneous application
of two criteria: (i) a progressive criterion for the determination of the monetary point values
assigned to the disability percentages; and (ii) a regressive criterion with respect to the age
of the injured party. According to the ﬁrst criterion, the monetary value varies unevenly
and more rapidly with the increasing severity of injuries, so that the greater is the harm
suﬀered by a victim (i.e. the percentage point of disability), the higher is the monetary
value. Diﬀerently, the regressive criterion reﬂects the fact that, considering the average
possible lifetime of a person, a victim, who has been harmed at a younger age, would bear
the consequences of the physical impairment for a longer period than an older victim would
(Table 3.1).79 Thereby, the Milan calculating method turned out to be even more ﬂexible
than the method of the Court of Pisa. The monetary point values are no longer determined
as the average of previous similar compensations, rather as a function of these awards.80
The Court of Cassation did not only recognize the validity of the Milan schedule as it
did with respect to that of Pisa, but it has also pointed out the great eﬀectiveness of the
Milan method in avoiding unequal treatment of victims and increasing the predictability of
sentences.81 As a result, the Milan table, developed for the ﬁrst time in 1995, was soon
taken as main reference by other courts to the extent that nowadays it has become the most
widely used mechanism for the assessment of noneconomic damages by the Italian courts.82
Moreover, the Milan schedule is likely to be adopted by the entire national judicial system
since the Italian Supreme Court, in its recent sentence 12408/2011, has publicly recognized
the Milan calculating method as the basic criterion to assess non-pecuniary damages to
health.83
79See, De Paola G. and L. Avigliano (2009).
80Speciﬁcally, as well explained by Rossetti (2009), it is necessary to ﬁrst determine an initial monetary
value. This value is computed as the average of the previous awards granted by the court adopting the
schedule. In this way, if during the time frame chosen as the reference period the court has awarded: 150
euros for a 5% disability, 400 euros for a 25% disability and 3,000 euros for a 50% disability, the initial
monetary value is given by the ratio between the sum of these awards and the sum of the related points of
disability (i.e. 3,550/80). Hence, it would be equal to 44.375. Once the initial monetary valued is set, this has
to vary following a geometric growth function taken from forensic medicine according to which the suﬀering
derived from personal injuries increases geometrically with increasing degree of disability. As a result, an
injured party who has suﬀered a 30% disability, should have experienced pain and suﬀering more than double
compared to a victim who suﬀered a 15% disability.
81Court of Cassation, 25 May 2000, n. 748.
82In any case, it should not be forgotten that regardless of the assessment method chosen by courts, judges
are not bound to the application of such a mechanism. They can decide to follow other criteria, but this
discretionary power implies the strict obligation to justify their choice. Furthermore, in doing so, judges have
always to remember that the overall goal is to standardize as much as possible the assessment of this title of
damages to the average of the previous cases (Court of Cassation, 24 May 2001, n.7048; Court of Cassation,
8 May 2001, n. 6396; Court of Cassation, 6 November 2000, n. 14440; Court of Cassation, 11 August 2000,
n. 10725; and Court of Cassation, 19 May 1999, n. 4852).
83See, Negro (2011b).
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3.6 Expected Eﬀects and Background Literature
The aim of this Section is to summarize the available evidence about the likely outcomes of
limiting noneconomic damages while discussing some of the most relevant empirical studies
on the matter.
There is an extensive literature devoted to the assessment of the impact of capping noneco-
nomic damages, on a number of diﬀerent outcomes. In particular, the empirical research has
focused on the implications in terms of lawsuit frequency, claim severity, defensive medicine,
insurance premiums and insurance proﬁtability. However, the ﬁndings obtained have not
always pointed in the same direction due to the complexity of the issue investigated, the
design of the analysis performed or the speciﬁc characteristic of the data employed.
In addition, empirical studies on the likely eﬀects of limiting noneconomic losses have
been mainly devoted to the analysis of the introduction of caps (i.e. ﬂat or tiered caps).
Traditionally, the main case study is the U.S. experience that so far has only considered
and implemented ﬂat or tiered caps, even though an extensive body of literature has invoked
the introduction of noneconomic damages schedules precisely in relation to malpractice litiga-
tion.84 As a result, the potential consequences of scheduling noneconomic losses are primarily
attained on a theoretical basis by looking at the evidence provided with respect to caps and
at the potential similarities with them.
3.6.1 Claim Severity
One of the main target of interest has been the relationship between ceilings on noneconomic
compensations and the magnitude of medical malpractice awards received by plaintiﬀs. There
is a strong evidence supporting the conclusion that capping non-pecuniary losses signiﬁcantly
inﬂuences claims’ payouts. Most of the studies waive in favor of a negative impact of noneco-
nomic damages caps on victims’ recoveries that on average experience a decline in the range
of 20 to 30%.85 For instance, a 1986 study by Danzon, that investigates medical malpractice
claims between 1975 and 1984, concludes that the imposition of limits on damages makes
plaintiﬀs’ recovery drop by 23%.86 Sloan et al. (1989) oﬀer additional evidence. The authors
evaluate the impact of tort reforms on medical malpractice payments, the probability that
a trial would result in a payment, and the speed with which litigation was closed. Based
on pooled cross-sectional data on closed claims between 1975 and 1978, and in 1984, and on
an individual-level analysis, the authors conclude that capping noneconomic damages lowers
compensations by 31%, while overall damages ceilings reduce awards by 38%.
Similarly, Yoon (2001) investigates the impact of the implementation and repeal of caps
on damages in Alabama between 1987 and 1999 on victims’ recoveries in medical malprac-
84See, for instance, Shapiro and Rodriguez (2009), Comande` (2005), Mello and Kachalia (2010), Studdert
et al. (2011), Studdert et al. (2005), Avraham (2006), Sugarman (2006).
85See Table 3.2 in the Appendix for an overview of the empirical studies on the impact of caps on claim
severity.
86Danzon (1986) does not diﬀer between caps on noneconomic losses and caps on total compensatory
losses, omitting to investigate the diﬀerent impacts.
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tice litigation. The author uses a Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences approach to compare the awards
victims obtained in individual claims against physicians covered by a single large insurer
operating in Alabama to those of a control group. This control group includes all the medi-
cal malpractice trials in which plaintiﬀs have sued physicians insured by the same insurance
company in the neighboring states of Tennessee, Arkansas, and Mississippi, where there were
no damages ceilings. The analysis shows that the enactment of caps leads to a decrease
of the awards granted to plaintiﬀs by roughly $20,000, while the nulliﬁcation of such limits
results in almost a doubling of these compensations. More recently, based on claim-level
data on malpractice cases for the period 1988-2004, Hyman et al. (2009) simulate the impact
of Texas’ 2003 cap on non-monetary losses on jury verdicts and post-verdict payouts. The
Texas’ ceiling results in a 73% and 27% reduction in allowed noneconomic damages and pay-
outs respectively and in aﬀecting diﬀerently diﬀerent groups of plaintiﬀs, with greater eﬀects
on unemployed, deceased and elderly victims.87
In contrast to other studies, Shakey (2005) examines the eﬀect of capping noneconomic
damages and suggests that limiting non-pecuniary losses has no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects
on the ﬁnal amount of the overall compensation. Speciﬁcally, using data on court judgments
collected by the National Center for State Courts for the years 1992, 1996 and 2001, the
author investigates the unintended eﬀects that may weaken the expected impacts of caps on
pain and suﬀering. Sharkey explains this result by pointing out the existence of a possible
crossover eﬀect that may mitigate the impact of caps. Speciﬁcally, the imposition of ceilings
on noneconomic damages would drive victims’ attorneys to reconsider the economic and
noneconomic components of the total amount requested as compensation, thus they would
ask for larger economic damages keeping the total damages recovery unchanged. At the
same time, juries would be willing to award higher pecuniary losses, because they may have
in mind a ﬁgure of the amount of money the victim should obtain. In addition, juries may
often have a less strict view of the distinction between economic and noneconomic damages
than the one oﬀered by the law.
As to the speciﬁc relationship between noneconomic damages schedules and claims’ pay-
outs, past research is more limited and the main contribution in this respect comes from
experimental economics. Saks et al. (1997) suggest that the introduction of noneconomic
damages schedules increases the consistency of personal injury awards and that this type of
damages limitation is a more eﬀective tool to solve the problem of the undesired variability
of compensations than ﬂat or tiered caps.
3.6.2 Claim Frequency
A number of studies have speciﬁcally investigated the implications of limiting noneconomic
damages on the frequency of lawsuits, but with mixed results. Browne and Puelz (1999)
87Hyman et al. (2009) also investigate the eﬀect of the Texas’ 2003 cap on settlements, ﬁnding that
payouts decrease by 18%. Previously, Avraham (2007) also suggested a negative relation between capping
damages for pain and suﬀering and settlement payouts. Using medical malpractice data from the National
Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) for the period 1991-1998, the author shows that this tort reform reduces
average value of awards by 15-20%.
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explore the eﬀects of tort reforms on claim frequency and claim severity with respect to
both economic and noneconomic damages in case of automobile incidents. The authors show
that caps on noneconomic damages lead to a reduction in the average value of the awards
and, at the same time, to a decline in the average likelihood of ﬁling a claim. Avraham
(2007) has later conﬁrmed the results of Browne and Puelz with speciﬁc reference to medical
malpractice litigation. Applying a Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences approach, the author conducts
an individual-level analysis88 by studying more than 100,000 case outcomes from 50 states
in the period 1991-1998 and suggests the existence of a negative relationship between caps
on noneconomic damages and both the average awards and the number of claims per 1,000
physicians. Yet, these ﬁndings move away from those of other four inﬂuential studies.89
Speciﬁcally, Danzon (1984, 1986) and Donohue III and Ho (2007) exclude the impact of
noneconomic damages caps on claim frequency, while Durance even suggests the existence of
a positive relationship. In particular, Durance (2009) uses a dataset consisting of all medical
malpractice claims with a positive payout that are contained in the NPDB to assess the eﬀect
of non-monetary losses on both the frequency and severity of claims. By applying ordinary
least squares (OLS) estimation and by introducing an instrumental variable reﬂecting the
state political composition, the author accounts for the potential endogeneity of ceilings on
non-pecuniary losses and reaches the conclusions that this type of caps may not lower the
frequency of lawsuits.90
In wider terms, the mixed ﬁndings oﬀered by empirical research reﬂect a fundamental
theoretical ambiguity that holds also in relation to damages schedules. Indeed, limiting
noneconomic losses compensations may have conﬂicting consequences on doctors and injured
parties. Lower damages may weaken the malpractice pressure perceived by physicians. In
response to this perception, doctors may reduce their actual level of precaution potentially
increasing malpractice litigation. At the same time, the decrease in the potential amount of
money obtainable in a claim due to caps or schedules may reduce the chance that patients
would decide to ﬁle a claim, especially in a contingent-fee system.91 Consequently, neither
the theory nor the empirical evidence enable us to draw an unambiguous conclusion about
how limiting noneconomic damages inﬂuences claim frequency.
3.6.3 Insurance Premiums
The relationship between caps and malpractice insurance rates has been the subject of an
extensive analysis. Even though the ﬁndings obtained do not always coincide, the overall
88In particular, the advantage of using individual-level data lies in the fact that “precise matching of
individual cases to applicable law is more accurately accomplished using individual-level data for those cases
that were resolved after a reform was struck down. Therefore, the eﬀect of a reform on case outcomes can be
accurately estimated.” See, Avraham (2007), p. 208.
89Danzon (1984), Danzon (1986), Donohue and Ho (2007), and Durance (2009).
90See Table 3.3 in the Appendix for additional results.
91Donohue III and Ho (2007), p. 71. In addition, precisely with respect to their ﬁndings, Donohue III and
Ho suggest “Null ﬁndings on claim rates are consistent both with (1) no eﬀects on physicians and no eﬀects
on litigants, or (2) cross-cutting eﬀects of equal magnitude (large or small) on both. Isolating physician and
litigant eﬀects in light of these dual eﬀects remains a major challenge in the medical malpractice literature.”
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evidence weighs in favor of the conclusion that limiting pain and suﬀering awards lowers
medical liability premiums.92 Zuckerman et al. (1990), for instance, analyze state-level data
on doctors’ premiums, claims and awards provided by a Health Care Financing Adminis-
tration Survey of Insurers for the period 1974-1986 to assess the eﬀects of diﬀerent tort
reforms on premiums. This analysis uses a state ﬁxed-eﬀects model with lagged premiums
and a time trend control accounting for variations among states and over time. As a re-
sult, the authors ﬁnd that imposing ceilings on the liability of physicians leads to a decrease
in premiums for general surgeons, general practitioners, and obstetricians and gynecologists
on average by 14% in the short-run, whereas this reduction exceeds 40% in the long-run.
Notwithstanding, Zuckerman et al. (1990) are not able to identify and disentangle the eﬀects
that caps on non-monetary losses and caps on doctors’ liability have on premiums. More-
over, the data used displays important limitations due to the use of information on average
premium rates per doctor. In addition, the speciﬁc period under study may not be long
enough to appreciate the impact of tort reforms enacted in the mid-Eighties. More recently,
Danzon et al. (2004) ﬁnd that ceilings on non-pecuniary losses of $500,000 or less lead to
a signiﬁcant decline in premium by 5.7%, while if noneconomic damages caps are set to a
higher level or overall damages caps are implemented, there is no eﬀect. In their state-level
investigation of premium changes, the authors estimate a state and year ﬁxed eﬀects-model
using ordinary least squares and introduce three indicator variables for three diﬀerent types
of caps: (i) noneconomic damages caps equal to or smaller than $500,000; (ii) caps greater
than $500,000; and (iii) a limit on total compensatory damages. Kilgore et al. (2006) use a
full state and year ﬁxed-eﬀects model to control for unobserved elements that may inﬂuence
malpractice premiums in diﬀerent states and times and may be uncorrelated to variations
in tort law. Speciﬁcally, the authors apply a multivariate regression approach to explore the
eﬀects of diﬀerent tort law reforms, including caps, on the insurance premiums for physician
professional liability from 1991 to 2004. The study demonstrates that on average, the states
limiting noneconomic losses report lower malpractice premiums for internal medicine, general
surgery and obstetrics/gynecology by 17.3%, 20.7% and 25.5%, respectively.93
Two subsequent studies by Viscusi and Born provide further evidence supporting the
association of noneconomic damages caps with lower insurance premiums. These studies also
look at the implications of damages caps on the more general insurance proﬁtability and they
suggest that the enactment of these policy interventions also leads to a decline in insurers’
losses by reducing the compensations awarded to medical malpractice victims. Speciﬁcally,
92See Table 4.13 in the Appendix for an overview of the previous empirical research studying the relation
between capping damages for pain and suﬀering and insurance premiums. For a detailed and comprehen-
sive discussion of the empirical methodologies employed by these studies to assess the relationship between
damages caps and medical malpractice insurance premiums, see Zeiler and Hardcastle (2012).
93In their analysis, Kilgore et al. (2006) specify damages caps in two diﬀerent ways: i) through a variable
expressing the imposition of a ceiling on damages in each state and year and a continuous measure of the
level at which these ceilings are set; and ii) through dichotomous indicator variables for the presence of a
cap smaller than, or equal to, $250,000; a cap between $250,000 and $500,000; a cap between $500,000 and
$750,000, and a cap exceeding $750,000. The authors perform some simulations, ﬁnding that a $100,000
reduction of caps results in a 4% drop of premiums and the adoption of a $250,000 cap by all states would
result in a saving of 8% on the current premiums.
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Viscusi and Born (1995) use National Association of Insurance Commissioner (NAIC) data
to study the impact of caps on malpractice premium income and incurred losses over the
1985-1991 period. By employing a state and year ﬁxed-eﬀects model, the authors ﬁnd that,
in the states implementing caps, the aggregate premiums of each insurance company decrease
by 12.4%. More recently, Viscusi and Born (2005) rely on the same dataset and integrate it
with more speciﬁc and detailed information about the tort liability reforms enacted by the
states. The authors perform a quantile regression analysis of insurers’ losses and, similarly to
their previous ﬁndings, conclude that limiting noneconomic damages lowers insurers’ losses
and premium income by 17% and 6% respectively.
More recently, Grace and Leverty (2012) conﬁrm the negative relation between caps on
non-pecuniary damages and malpractice insurance premiums. However, the authors point out
that previous empirical studies signiﬁcantly misestimate the magnitude of the impact of caps,
because they fail in distinguishing between permanent and temporary ceilings. Speciﬁcally,
Grace and Leverty (2012) perform an ordinary least squares estimation with state and year
ﬁxed-eﬀects on premiums data from NAIC and tort reforms information from the Database
of State Tort Law Reforms (DSTLR). The ﬁndings obtained report a 7.6% reduction in
malpractice premiums when temporary and permanent caps are not discerned. Diﬀerently,
this reduction amounts to 13% considering only permanent ceilings on non-monetary losses,
while there is no statistically signiﬁcant results in relation to sole temporary caps.
Noneconomic damages schedules are expected to have eﬀects similar to those of caps.
Speciﬁcally, scheduling noneconomic losses should decrease the variability in compensations.
Furthermore, this reduction is likely to be greater than in the case of caps, because schedules
provide more detailed information on the potential payouts for diﬀerent kinds of health im-
pairments. Consequently, the greater predictability of victims’ awards would enable insurers
to better predict their risk exposure and, subsequently, to lower insurance rates.94
3.6.4 Insurance Proﬁtability
Past research on the impact of noneconomic damages caps on the performance of the mal-
practice insurance market has mainly focused on short-term eﬀects represented by the impact
of caps on insurers’ losses and loss ratio95, detecting a negative relationship between caps and
these outcome variables.96 For instance, Barker (1992) applies a cross-sectional analysis using
annual loss ratio data by state for the 1977-1986 period suggesting that capping damages
reduces underwriting risk97 and enhances insurance proﬁtability. According to the author,
caps determine a reduction in the severity of claims which results in an improvement of the
94See, Blumstein (2005), Studdert and Mello (2005), Mello and Kachalia (2010).
95Loss ratio is deﬁned as the ratio of incurred losses to earned premiums (Barker (1992), p. 145).
96Another strand of the literature uses insurers’ closed claims data to assess the impact of noneconomic
damages caps on market performance. See, for instance, Danzon (1984, 1986), Zuckerman et al. (1990), Yoon
(2001). In particular, these studies provide evidence that caps decrease the mean payments in malpractice
litigation and suggest that this reduction should then manifest in a decrease of insurers’ losses.
97Underwriting risk reﬂects the probability that the actual losses of an insurance company diﬀer from the
expected losses. See, Barker (1992), p. 145.
95
Limiting Noneconomic Damages As a Response to Malpractice Crisis 79
performance of the malpractice insurance market, because they make it easier for insurers to
appraise the costs of future claims.98
However, to have a more accurate understanding of how limiting noneconomic damages
inﬂuences insurance losses, it is necessary to assess the long-term eﬀects of these policy
interventions. This is a complex task since it takes several years to appreciate the eﬀect on
insurers’ payouts, resulting from the enactment of a tort reform, thus to have data on the
actual payments received by plaintiﬀs. Born et al.(2009) overcome this problem by evaluating
the impact of tort reforms not just on the incurred losses reported by insurers, rather on their
actual losses, that is, the aggregated amounts received by victims.99 To this end, the authors
analyze the annual ﬁnancial data submitted by insurance companies to the NAIC between
1984 and 2003 and apply a quantile regression based on the distribution of the losses of the
insurance companies. This study reinforces the results of previous research on the negative
relationship between capping damages and incurred losses. In addition, it demonstrates that
the introduction of caps on noneconomic damages aﬀects insurers’ losses even more heavily
than insurance companies would expect. In fact, the eﬀects on incurred losses turned out to
be smaller than those on ultimate losses. The same source of data has been used by Thorpe
(2004) to assess the eﬀects of tort reforms on aggregate premium income at the state level
from 1985 to 2001. This study has the additional merit of extending the analysis also to the
aggregate premium revenues per physician and controlling for several state characteristics,
such as the level of concentration of the reference market in each state and the number of
medical practitioners. Thorpe concludes that caps on noneconomic damages imply both lower
loss ratios and lower premium revenues for insurance companies. Speciﬁcally, a reduction of
premium income between 13 and 17% is associated with caps on non-pecuniary damages.100
Aside from investigating the eﬀect of permanent and temporary noneconomic damages
caps on malpractice premiums, Grace and Leverty (2012) also examine the possible eﬀects of
these tort reforms on both insurance losses and proﬁtability. Again, they conﬁrm the general
ﬁndings of previous studies, but the authors also show that the examination of “the eﬀect of
a current law without accounting for its future treatment produces misleading results.”101 In
particular, the combined eﬀect of permanent and temporary caps reduces insurance losses and
proﬁtability by 15.5% and 13% respectively. By contrast, the temporary ceilings alone do not
exert any statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on both the outcome variables, whereas permanent
caps lead to a 26% decrease in insurance losses and a 21% decrease in insurance proﬁtability.
Much less attention has been devoted to the competition among market players to the
extent that the potential consequences of capping damages for pain and suﬀering on insurers’
competition has been substantially disregarded. In particular, the existing empirical research
98See, also, Viscusi et al. (1993), and Born and Viscusi (1998).
99However, while information on incurred losses is available at the state level, the data on ultimate losses
is available at the national level. To use this national data in their analysis, Born et al. (2009) quantify the
share of nationwide premiums of each insurance company by state and then study the relation between this
share and the amounts actually paid out to victims.
100See Table 3.5 in the Appendix for additional empirical studies on the eﬀects of damages caps on insurance
proﬁtability.
101Grace and Leverty (2012), p. 1.
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has regarded insurers’ competition solely as an additional factor, aside from damages caps,
capable of exerting an inﬂuence on insurance premiums and proﬁtability. Hence, the degree
of competition among insurance companies has been included as an additional control in the
empirical strategy or has been observed separately from the empirical analysis on the impact
of caps and used to discuss the ﬁndings obtained. Moreover, the outcomes attained with
respect to the level of competition driven by reforms related to caps is not straightforward.
As a matter of fact, Kessler (2006) argues that the behavior of insurers does not aﬀect the
rising trend of medical malpractice premiums. By performing some simple statistics on data
from the NAIC, the author ﬁnds that over a twelve year period the competition in the medical
professional liability insurance market has become ﬁercer. Hence, the contemporary increase
in premiums could not be explained by an anticompetitive behavior of ﬁrms. Kessler also
supports his conclusion by highlighting the conﬂicting ﬁndings provided by the most recent
studies on the matter: Viscusi and Born (2005) and Thorpe (2004). The author highlights
the ambiguity of the results obtained by these two studies to conclude that there is no sound
empirical evidence of the existence and nature of a relationship between the competitive
behavior of ﬁrms and malpractice insurance rates, thus Kessler suggests that it is more likely
that there is no relation at all. Speciﬁcally, Viscusi and Born (2005) argue that a decrease in
the level of competition in the reference market triggers a decrease in the premiums paid.102
On the contrary, Thorpe (2004) reaches the opposite conclusion identifying in the weakening
of the competition among insurance companies one of the determinants of the increase in
premiums. In fact, besides showing that damages caps are associated with lower insurance
premiums, Thorpe suggests that a decrease of competition represented by a 10% reduction
of the HHI103 is associated with a 2% increase in premiums.
3.6.5 Defensive Medicine
The empirical investigation of the possible eﬀects of capping damages for pain and suﬀering
on the behavior of doctors, that is, on the use of defensive medical practices, has again
produced contrasting ﬁndings. Nonetheless, the majority of the studies support the existence
of a relation between the implementation of caps and the defensive conduct of physicians at
least in relation to some healthcare treatments and/or procedures.
Kessler and McClellan were the ﬁrst to exploit variations in tort reforms across states and
over time to determine the impact of malpractice pressure.104 Especially, in their seminal
work, Kessler and McClellan (1996) provide evidence that ‘direct’ tort reforms105 impact on
102Viscusi and Born (2005) use, as indicator of insurers’ competitive behavior, the loss ratio of these ﬁrms,
which oﬀers an inverse measure of their proﬁtability.
103Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index is a common measure of market concentration and is calculated by summing
up the square of the market share of each ﬁrm competing in the market.
104Previous works used to express malpractice pressure through medical liability premiums, the frequency
of claims and the severity of payouts using data on a single state and for a limited period of observation.
See, for instance, Localito et al. (1993) and Baldwing et al. (1995). However, as discussed by Kessler (2011),
medical liability in a state in a given period tends not to vary, thus diﬀerences in malpractice pressure may
be the result of unobserved factors associated with the costs and outcomes of medical care.
105Kessler and McClellan deﬁne direct reforms as those tort liability reforms that directly reduce malpractice
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treatment levels due to the fact that these legal interventions imply a variation in the risk
for physicians of being involved in a malpractice claim. The authors use Medicare data on
elderly patients who were treated for an acute myocardial infarction or an ischemic heart
disease in the years 1984, 1987 and 1990 and a panel of state tort legislations. They conclude
that tort reforms relaxing the liability constraints faced by physicians (e.g. damages caps)
are associated with a decline of 5% to 9% in hospitals’ expenditures for heart treatments.
At the same time, this reduction was not associated with signiﬁcant variations in health
outcomes, that is, it only negligibly aﬀected mortality and the number of medical compli-
cations. Considering this last aspect, the authors conclude that hospitals bore unnecessary
costs for heart treatments and that these costs were the result of physicians practicing defen-
sive medicine. Consequently, by reducing hospital expenditure, direct tort reforms ultimately
lead to a decrease in the use of defensive practices.
In two subsequent studies, Kessler and McClellan (2002a, 2002b) investigate the process,
whereby tort reforms exert their inﬂuence on the behavior of physicians. In particular, using
data on malpractice claims from the Physician Insurance Association of America (PIAA)
for the 1984-1994 period, Kessler and McClellan (2002a) discover that these legal changes
aﬀect doctors’ decisions mainly due to their impact on claim frequency and compensations
awarded.106 By limiting both claim frequency and cost, tort reforms reduced treatments’
intensity without any substantial change in health outcomes. From this, the authors infer
that healthcare providers adopt defensive medical practices.
Several studies have reached opposite conclusions. For instance, Dhankhar et al. (2007)
use data from the NPDB merged with Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS) information for
the year 2002. The authors apply a multinomial logit model to investigate the impact of
medical liability pressure on the procedure utilization to treat patients with acute myocardial
infarction. Their analysis reports that a higher malpractice pressure is associated with a
decline in resource utilization and with better health outcomes at least for patients with
less serious clinical conditions. Diﬀerently, Sloan and Shadle (2009) report no evidence of
an impact of liability reforms on doctors’ behavior and clinical outcomes. Combining data
from the National Long-Term Care Survey and Medicare claims for the period 1985-2000,
they report that the enactment of direct or indirect reforms does not lead to a reduction in
Medicare payments and, at the same time, has no impact on patient outcomes.
A vast part of the literature on defensive medicine has focused its attention on the conduct
of physicians in obstetrics. This is due to the fact that obstetrics is believed to be one of the
clinical areas where malpractice pressure is more acutely perceived by doctors, who therefore
are expected to be more responsive to variations in malpractice liability.107 In addition, the
utilization rate of cesarean delivery is usually a well designed case study since it has in vaginal
pressure. Consequently, as direct tort reforms, the authors include in their analysis: damage caps, the
abolition of punitive damages, collateral-source-rule reform, and the abolition of mandatory pre-judgment
interest (Kessler and McClellan, 1996, p. 371).
106Based on Medicare claims data on elderly patients with heart diseases between 1984 and 1994, Kessler
and McClellan (2002b) observe that tort reforms weakening medial liability negatively aﬀect the defensive
behavior of doctors in contexts with low and high managed care enrollment.
107Mello and Kachalia (2012).
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delivery its natural counter-factual. This allows to study how physicians react to changes in
malpractice pressure by comparing the use of two substitutive procedures entailing diﬀerent
malpractice risks. Nevertheless, mixed ﬁndings have been reached also with respect to the
obstetrical practice.
Following Kessler and McClellan (1996), Esposto (2012) provides evidence of defensive
practices in obstetrics. The author analyzes the impact of state liability reforms on the uti-
lization of C-sections in the U.S. for the years 1987, 1990 and 1993. Applying a two-step
instrumental variable approach, Esposto shows that the cesarean rate is lower in those states
where the implemented tort reforms have relaxed the malpractice pressure by reducing the
probability of being involved in a suit. Similarly, Yang et al. (2009) observe a negative
relationship between the use of C-section and caps on noneconomic damages.108 Speciﬁcally,
a cap equal or less than $250,000 leads to a 3.68% reduction in the use of primary cesarean
deliveries and to a 1.5% reduction in the total use of cesarean deliveries. However, diﬀerent
results have been obtained, for instance, by Kim (2006), who suggests that malpractice risk
does not aﬀect the use of cesarean sections.109 On the contrary, relying on data from the
Vital Statistics Natality ﬁles for the period 1989-2001, Currie and MacLeod (2008) apply a
standard panel data approach with county-ﬁxed eﬀects demonstrating that the implemen-
tation of laws capping noneconomic damages determines a 5% increase in the probability
of cesarean sections.110 More recently, Cuddy (2012) has conﬁrmed the results obtained
by Currie and MacLeod also with respect to oncology, showing that ceilings on noneconomic
damages intensify the use of both diagnostic and therapeutic procedures. Speciﬁcally, the au-
thor adopts a Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences approach, while controlling for both national trends
and per-existing state diﬀerences, and examines state-level data from the Behavioral Risk
Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) and the Surveillance Epidemiology and End Results
(SEER) Program.
Frakes (2012) extends the work of Currie and MacLeod (2008), reaching similar conclu-
sions with respect to cesarean deliveries. In order to overcome the potential problems that
108Yang et al. (2009) apply a mixed-eﬀects model to analyze a panel dataset for the 1991-2003 period, which
consists of data on births in the U.S. from the Natality Detail File (NDF) and data on liability insurance
premiums for obstetricians from the Medical Liability Monitor Annual Rate Survey.
109Kim (2006) adopts an instrumental variable identiﬁcation strategy and uses two diﬀerent measures of
malpractice risk: (i) the number of gynecology and obstetrics suits per 1,000 newborns for each state during
the last three years, or (ii) the amount of gynecology and obstetrics payouts for each state during the last
thee years. As for the data employed, the author relies on information on malpractice claims from the NPDB
and information on births from the NDF for a 15-year period (1990-2005).
110In particular, Currie and MacLeod (2008) explain their ﬁnding of a positive relationship between damages
caps and the utilization rate of C-section by analyzing the risks entailed by both vaginal and cesarean delivery.
Speciﬁcally, the authors point out that vaginal delivery implies signiﬁcant risks, that may make preferable
a cesarean section. Nevertheless, if the choice between vaginal and cesarean delivery is not straightforward
due to the conditions of the patient, it may be that the risks entailed by a cesarean section exceed those of a
vaginal delivery. As a result, this consideration may prevent the doctor from opting for a cesarean delivery
due to the physician’s malpractice fear of improperly performing a cesarean section on this marginal patient.
Accordingly, a slackening of malpractice pressure through ceilings on non-pecuniary losses may induce the
doctor to opt for riskier procedures.
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arise from the limited number of years previously investigated,111 the author considers a 27-
year period (1979-2005), ﬁnding no evidence that an increase in liability leads to a greater
utilization of cesarean sections.112 On the contrary, the authors provide further evidence
of a positive relationship between noneconomic damages caps and cesarean utilization. In
particular, Frakes suggests that with respect to C-sections “the risk associated with the pro-
cedure may be high enough and the medical circumstances of the marginal cesarean mother
may be minor enough that the balance of risks may not tip strongly in the direction of positive
defensive medicine.”113
Despite some contrasting results, the overall evidence provided by the empirical studies
on the relationship between caps on non-pecuniary losses and defensive medicine, seems to
conﬁrm that the decisions of clinicians are to some extent inﬂuenced by those tort reforms
capable of weakening the malpractice risk perceived by the physicians themselves. Following
this reasoning, one can expect to observe an analogous eﬀect in the case of the implementation
of schedules. In fact, as pointed out by Mello and Kachalia (2010), if physicians are able
to estimate with higher conﬁdence the possible consequences of malpractice thanks to the
introduction of damages schedules, they should resort to defensive practices less frequently.114
“However, if what providers fear is the psychological and reputational costs of being sued,
rather than the economic sanction of the ultimate payout on the claim, then the eﬀect of
scheduling on defensive medicine may be rather slight.”115
111In particular, the sample period considered by Currie and MacLeod(2008) poses some concerns for two
main reasons. First, two out of the four states, that have actually introduced laws capping noneconomic
awards between 1989 and 2001, have then repealed them within several years. Second, the speciﬁcation
applied also considers the limits on non-pecuniary losses of four other states, where caps were implemented
and invalidated before 1989. As pointed out by Frakes (2012), the inclusion of these states in the analysis
does not consider the possibility that obstetricians are less responsive to tort reforms when there is a high
likelihood that these legislations may be annulled. Nevertheless, the exclusion of these states would undermine
the consistency of the ﬁndings given that only two states would be left for the analysis.
112Speciﬁcally, Frakes (2012) combines data on the behavior of doctors from the National Hospital Discharge
Surveys for the period 1979-2005 with geographic identiﬁer from the National Center for Health Statistics and
data on states’ tort legislation from the Database of State Tort Law Reform by Ronen Avraham. In this way,
Frakes considers the entire decade of the 80’s, the period of most intense adoption of caps on noneconomic
damages. In addition, besides a basic Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences model, the author integrates the analysis with
further speciﬁcations that include a number of individual and state-year characteristics. Furthermore, he
takes into account the possibility that the behavior of obstetricians will be less aﬀected by tort reforms in
those states where caps are very likely to be invalidated or repealed. In fact, Frakes applies a ﬁnal more
restricted speciﬁcation by dropping the eight states that invalidated the previously-implemented ceilings on
non-pecuniary losses at some point over the observation period.
113Frakes (2012), p. 27.
114See also Bovbjerg et al. (1989).
115Mello and Kachalia (2010), p. 27.
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3.7 Conclusive Remarks
A legislative intervention aimed at limiting noneconomic damages has been invoked and
identiﬁed as an eﬀective policy tool to deal with the distresses of the malpractice insurance
market. Traditionally, insurers describe this market as being not proﬁtable enough or too
volatile and unpredictable. In particular, insurance companies would not be able to produce
accurate and reliable estimates on the payouts of claims and to assess their risk exposure
due to the high variability and uncertainty of compensations. Aspects that, therefore, would
make it even more problematic for ﬁrms to operate in the reference market.
The main cause of high variability and uncertainty of personal injury compensations has
been primarily recognized in the controversial nature of their noneconomic component and
in the subsequent diﬃculty in quantifying it. Diﬃculty that is exacerbated by the lack of a
coherent and common framework for the evaluation of this title of damages. Without proper
guidance, the discretion of juries and judges in assessing victims’ recoveries has generally
resulted in a large variance of awards, fostering the perception of a high degree of arbitrariness.
The basic intuition at the basis of this legislative intervention is that rationalizing non-
pecuniary losses would increase the predictability of personal injury compensations. By
limiting the compensation that can be granted to injured parties, caps are expected to de-
crease the heterogeneity of victims’ recoveries and, therefore, to lower the uncertainty and
variability of malpractice awards. The imposition of a bound on payouts also means restrict-
ing the discretion of juries and judges limiting to some extent to the possibility of adjusting
the compensations to the speciﬁc circumstances of the case considered. Hence, the imple-
mentation of this tort reform implies a trade-oﬀ between more predictability of awards and
less ﬂexibility of the system. In particular, the social costs entailed by the implementation
of caps can be outweighed by the positive consequences produced by a greater coverage of
the malpractice insurance market.
However, the actual result of limiting damages for pain and suﬀering largely depends on
the type of mechanism adopted. Whilst ﬂat or tiered caps (i.e. a system of ﬂat ceilings)
assure a decrease in the number and value of very large awards, they fail to provide guidance
for the quantiﬁcation of compensations below the ceiling itself. Consequently, the discre-
tionary power of juries and judges in deciding the awards within the range is not modiﬁed
and the related problem of payouts’ variance below the threshold persists. At the same time,
ﬂat and tiered caps entail only a slight improvement in terms of horizontal equity (i.e. sim-
ilar compensation for similar injuries), which increases only in relation to the more severe
injuries. In addition, they are also expected to produce poor results in terms of vertical
equity (i.e. higher compensations for more severe injuries) since they reduce the room for
diﬀerentiating compensations in the case of the more serious health impairments. Diﬀerently,
damages schedules ensure the restraint of awards outliers, while enhancing both horizontal
and vertical equity. Their tiering structure insures that similar injuries belonging to a same
group receive similar compensations and that tiers are ranked according to the increasing
severity of injuries, so that tiers associated with higher health impairments receive higher
awards. Furthermore, schedules provide juries and judges with reference compensations, thus
they succeed in dealing with the problem of very large recoveries while reducing the arbi-
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trariness of the assessment process. Scheduling constitutes a more sophisticated and sensitive
approach for the evaluation of non-pecuniary losses and a better institutional instrument to
face malpractice crises. In fact, compared to caps, scheduled damages are a more eﬀective
tool to increase the predictability of compensations, thus to increase the stability of the mal-
practice insurance market as well as the willingness of insurance companies to oﬀer coverage
against medical professional liability.
Previous empirical research provides interesting evidence on the eﬀect of noneconomic
damages caps. Speciﬁcally, even though the ﬁndings obtained are often mixed, a set of well-
designed studies suggests that caps (i.e. ﬂat or tiered) succeed in decreasing both claim
severity and insurance premiums, in increasing the proﬁtability of the medical liability in-
surance market and in aﬀecting the defensive behavior of doctors. Conversely, the impact
of caps on the frequency of claims remains much more controversial. As of noneconomic
damages schedules, the evidence base to evaluate their impact is extremely limited to the
extent that the likely eﬀects of scheduling are mainly drawn by looking at what happens in
relation to the implementation of caps. As a result, to better appreciate the actual outcomes
of scheduling noneconomic damages, more speciﬁc empirical research is needed.
The purpose of the next two chapters is precisely to investigate the impact of schedules for
pain and suﬀering on the behavior of both insurers and hospitals. In this regard, the Italian
institutional framework constitutes a promising case study since noneconomic damages are
limited through a heterogeneous system of schedules that is the result of a long debate and
study of non-pecuniary losses. Moreover, the Italian experience is a peculiar case, because
the adoption of schedules depended on the discretionary decision of each single court and has
not been driven by the speciﬁc aim of facing the problems experienced by the medical liability
insurance market. The result is that this implementation took place at diﬀerent points in
time for the diﬀerent tribunals. Even though nowadays the vast majority of Italian courts
has adopted these ceilings, some still prefer to rely on purely equitable evaluations, refusing
to apply any type of caps. Moreover, diﬀerently from the existing empirical literature on the
eﬀects of caps that usually makes a comparison between before and after the implementation
of caps, this speciﬁc feature of the Italian context will allow us to contrast what happens
under the courts introducing caps and those that do not vary their assessment process of
damages for pain and suﬀering.
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3.8 Appendix
Table 3.2: Previous Empirical Research on Claims Severity
Study Data Period Caps Outcomes Approach
Danzon
(1984)
NAIC 1975-1978 Flat on
damages
Claim severity de-
creases on average by
19% within 2 years
from caps introduc-
tion
Pooled time-series
cross-section estima-
tions
Danzon
(1986)
Data on closed mal-
practice claims from
insurance companies
that had a relevant
market share during
the period of obser-
vation
1975-1984 Flat on
damages
Plaintiﬀs’ recoveries
drop by 23%
TSLS and OLS
Sloan et
al. (1989)
NAIC and GAO 1975-1978
and 1984
Flat on
noneco-
nomic
damages
A 31% reduction in
compensations
Individual-level
analysis
Kessler
and Mc-
Clellan
(2000)
Data from PIAA and
the AMA Socioeco-
nomic Monitoring
System
1984-1994 Flat and
tiered on
noneco-
nomic
damages
No eﬀect DID with state and
years-ﬁxed eﬀects
Yoon
(2001)
Data on all claims
ﬁled by patients
against physicians
insured by the St.
Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Company
in 4 states (Alabama,
Arkansas, Mississippi
and Tennessee)
1987-1999 Flat on
damages
Reduction in claim
severity by roughly
$20,000, while caps’
nulliﬁcation results
in almost a doubling
of compensations
DID
Notes: AMA=American Medical Association, DID=Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Estimation, GAO=U.S. General Account Of-
ﬁce, NAIC=Annual ﬁnancial data submitted by insurance companies to the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners, NPDB=Data on all medical malpractice claims with a positive payout contained in the National Practitioner Data
Bank, OLS=Ordinary Least Squares Estimation, PIAA=Physicians Insurance Association of America, TSLS=Twostage Least
Squares Estimation.
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Chapter 4
Courts, Scheduled Damages and the
Malpractice Insurance Market1
4.1 Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapters, liability insurance for medical malpractice has proved
to be a problematic sector for insurance companies in comparison to other lines of insurance,
because it entails speciﬁc problems, such as long lasting claims, signiﬁcant diﬃculties in
diﬀerentiating between high- and low-risk policyholders and high uncertainty about victims’
compensations, that exacerbate the risk faced by insurers. Over time, this has resulted in
two main phenomena: i) the exit from this market by some insurers,2 and ii) a restriction of
their operational area by others.3
Insurers justify these choices by mainly stressing the limited predictability of losses due
to malpractice claims. This unpredictability combined with the fact that traditionally mal-
practice premiums are not experience-rated would make the assessment of risk exposure a
particularly uneasy task for insurers.4 However, the literature has provided contrasting ex-
planations to these behaviors. A ﬁrst strand of contributions highlights the lack of strong
evidence to deﬁne a clear cut link between trends of malpractice claims and compensations
1This chapter is co-authored with Veronica Grembi.
2Withdrawals of commercial insurers from the market of medical liability have been regular at least in
the U.S. See, Danzon (2002), Danzon et al. (2004), Mello et al. (2003), and Mello (2006b).
3Hereafter when we mention insurance and insurance premiums we refer to the market for medical liability
insurance, unless diﬀerently stated.
4Premiums for medical malpractice insurance are generally not experience-rated with respect to both
physicians and healthcare organizations. In particular, in the case of healthcare institutions, only a small
portion, equal to 25%, of the ﬁnal premium is experience-rated. See, Mello (2006b), p.1. The author also
notes that “insurers set premiums on a prospective basis based on: 1) their expected payouts for providers in a
particular risk group; 2) the uncertainty surrounding this estimate; 3) their expected administrative expenses
and future investment income; and 4) the proﬁt rate they seek. They use information on past losses and
expenses, combined with other information, to help them set rates.” Since experience rating is little or not
used to set premiums, insurers take into account the specialty and the geographical location with respect to
doctors, and the hospital location and the services oﬀered with respect to healthcare facilities.
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and the behavior of insurers.5 These studies tend to link the problems of aﬀordability and
availability with the fact that the malpractice insurance business periodically experiences
insurance cycles common to other long-tailed lines of liability insurance.6 Diﬀerently, a sec-
ond strand of contributions focuses on the role played by damages awards emphasizing the
importance of policies able to lower the level and variance of compensations.7
Noneconomic damages caps have received substantial attention in the literature on medi-
cal malpractice as one of the most sound policies to cope with rising premiums and malprac-
tice costs.8 As discussed in Chapter 3, among the diﬀerent possible types of caps, the ﬂat
ones have been recognized to be a poor instrument in promoting the horizontal, but especially
the vertical equity of compensations, while the tiered ones have proven to yield only slightly
better results in this respect. As a consequence, schedules have been long discussed as an
alternative tort reform capping non-pecuniary losses to curb medical malpractice costs. For
example, in the U.S. Bovbjerg et al. (1989) have pointed out the advantages of extending
scheduling from workers compensation plans and disability plans to all tort damages. Never-
theless, most of the existing empirical research limits its attention to the adoption of ﬂat and
tiered caps,9 while empirical evidence on the actual eﬀects of scheduled damages is lacking.10
The present work aims at ﬁlling this gap. We contribute to the wide strand of the litera-
ture investigating the impact of tort reforms on the insurance market for medical malpractice,
but unlike other empirical studies this work considers a reform that does not stem from a
top-down legislative intervention. Overall, the novelty of our study is twofold: (i) we pro-
vide an empirical analysis of the impact of schedules of noneconomic damages11 on insurers’
behavior in the market for malpractice insurance in terms of both their presence in the ref-
erence line of insurance and the premiums applied at the local healthcare provider level; and
(ii) we assess the impact of schedules, taking into account the role played by the enforcing
mechanism of the policy itself, that is, the judicial system. The existing empirical literature
on caps does not consider the role of the judiciary and generally assesses the eﬀect of tort
reforms on insurers (as well as on the other players of malpractice cases) independently from
it. Conversely, we argue that the judiciary plays an important role which has to be included
in the analysis. Eﬃciencies/ineﬃciencies in the enforcement mechanism of schedules are ex-
5See, for example, GAO (2003a) and (2003b). The U.S. General Accounting Oﬃce stresses the diﬃculty
to ascribe the problem of aﬀordability and availability aﬀecting the malpractice insurance market at least in
the U.S. to a speciﬁc cause. In particular, the available information does not allow to clearly disentangle the
eﬀects potentially exerted by insurance cycles, as well as by the frequency of malpractice claims or by the
compensations awarded.
6Danzon et al. (2004) identify the cause of malpractice insurance crises (or hard markets) in insurers’
under-reserving during the prior soft market period. Speciﬁcally, the authors ﬁnd that the upward revision of
loss forecast and reserves following initial under-reserving are positively related to premiums’ increases, and
that there is a positive relationship between the probability of insurers’ exiting the market and the average
loss forecast error.
7See, for instance, Avraham and Bustos (2010) and Kessler (2011).
8We refer only to the case of caps on noneconomic damages and not to caps on punitive damages.
9See, for instance, Danzon (2000), Mello et al. (2003), Danzon et al. (2004), and Mello (2006a).
10See, Mello and Kachalia (2010).
11Hereafter, when we mention schedules, we refer to schedules of noneconomic damages, unless diﬀerently
stated.
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pected to aﬀect how parties involved in malpractice cases (i.e. doctors, insurers and victims)
react to the introduction of the reform itself. Our argument is that insurance companies do
not only care about improving the predictability of the compensations to be paid, which is
expected to be higher under schedules than under ﬂat or tiered caps, but they can be also
inﬂuenced by the ineﬃciency related to the timing of the payment and the deterrence level of
the legal system on healthcare providers. Moreover, this eﬀect may be particularly signiﬁcant
in the European context, where the number of medical malpractice claims resolved by courts
is very high.12 In particular, we focus on one aspect of the judicial system: its performance
measured as the level of civil backlog aﬀecting each courthouse. We associate backlog to
court ineﬃciency and control for this dimension when schedules are adopted.13
To perform the analysis, we consider the Italian institutional framework, which lends
itself particularly well to this investigation. On the one hand, the public nature of its health-
care system limits the possibility of hospitals’ strategic decisions on the composition of the
healthcare provision with the aim of reducing their risk of litigation. A limited scope for
such strategic behavior reduces unobserved heterogeneity across providers in terms of risk
faced, and reduces potential sources of bias in the empirical analysis. Moreover, the dis-
cretion granted to patients in choosing among hospitals for medical specialists, lessens the
potential territorial eﬀects in terms of characteristics and needs of the population served by
the providers. On the other hand, Italy is characterized by high heterogeneity when judicial
performance is at stake, both across and within regions, and its courthouses also diﬀer in
the timing of schedules adoption.The introduction of this reform, in fact, followed the dis-
cretionary decision of each single court with the result that it took place at diﬀerent points
in time for diﬀerent courts, allowing us to beneﬁt from a quasi-experimental design.14
By exploiting this within country territorial variation in terms of both judicial perfor-
mance and schedules implementation, we rely on methods for the Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences
(DID) identiﬁcation of the impact of the policy change. Overall, this approach makes it
possible to appreciate the eﬀect of judicial performance on the decision of private insurers
to provide hospitals with malpractice coverage, while allowing us to disentangle the eﬀect of
courts’ activity from other relevant variables. In addition, to address possible omitted vari-
ables problems due to the staggered adoption of schedules, we follow the approach of Snyder
and Stromberg (2010) and take advantage of the lack of perfect territorial overlapping be-
tween court districts and the territorial competence of healthcare providers to exclude the
existence of a perfect correlation between the caseload of courthouses and the activity level
of healthcare facilities.
12For example, in Germany 40% of malpractice claims are resolved in tribunals and even higher rates are
reported by France (60%) and Italy (86%) up to the extreme case of Portugal, where all cases are resolved
in courts. See, Nys (2008).
13Since backlog is highly correlated to duration of trials, our contribution is marginally related also to
that literature addressing the importance of well functioning courts on the activity of ﬁrms, such as, among
the others, Bianco et al. (2002), Djankov et. al. (2003), Chemin (2010) and Ponticelli (2013).
14For the purpose of the present empirical analysis, we do not distinguish the diﬀerent types of schedules
applied by courts. We focus on the adoption of this reform since the key policy change is the shift to schedules
irrespectively of the speciﬁc method employed to determine the schedules themselves.
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Another important contribution relies on the fact that, for the purpose of the present
study, we construct a unique dataset from the combination of three distinct data sources:
(i) a comprehensive sample of all malpractice insurance contracts for which information is
currently available, (ii) data at the court level, and (iii) socio-economic data at the healthcare
provider level. The result is a comprehensive database containing all public procurement
procedures for malpractice insurance contracts dated from 2000 to 2010 that involve only
public healthcare providers dealing with private insurers. The ﬁnal sample includes 812
awarding processes and is representative of insurance contracts for hospitals’ personnel.15
Our ﬁndings show that the introduction of noneconomic damages schedules increases the
number of insurers interested in the market of medical liability both in absolute and relative
terms (i.e. compared to all potential competitors), when the judicial system is ineﬃcient.
Similarly, judicial ineﬃciency improves market proﬁtability for average value of schedules
penetration and such positive eﬀect increases as the weight of schedules grows. Nonetheless,
healthcare providers do not seem to beneﬁt from these improvements as no reduction in
premiums is observed. Our results, therefore, shed light on a complex set of elements aﬀecting
the decisions of insurance companies in malpractice markets, and question whether schedules
of damages for pain and suﬀering, as well as any other limitation to malpractice awards, are
an eﬀective way to reduce expenditures on premiums especially in public healthcare systems.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 4.2 describes the main institutional elements of
the Italian judiciary and of the acquisition process of malpractice coverage by Italian public
healthcare providers. Section 4.3 presents the empirical approach applied, while Section 4.4
describes the data we use for the results presented and discussed in Section 4.5. Section 4.6
concludes.
4.2 Institutional Framework
Italy is a well suited case study, because both its healthcare system and its judiciary present
peculiarities that are particularly relevant for the purposes of the present work. Speciﬁcally,
Italian courts diﬀer widely in terms of performance and have followed a very scattered timing
in the adoption of noneconomic damages schedules. The combination of these two elements
allow us to investigate the impact of the implementation of the reference reform conditional
on the performance of the courthouse in charge of it.
On the other hand, as discussed in Chapter 2, the Italian healthcare system is mainly
public and is organized on a territorial base: regions are the level of government in charge
for the provision of healthcare services, which are delivered to their residents through an
insurance scheme managed by LHUs. This conﬁguration has two signiﬁcant implications.
First, the public nature of healthcare providers obliges them to resort to public procurement
to be insured against medical malpractice. This foresees the obligation to make publicly
available some relevant information on the procurement procedures run and on the charac-
teristics of the coverages procured, allowing us to recover the necessary information to build
15Physicians can also have extra insurance coverage. Information on private insurance contracts between
physicians and private insurers are not available.
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the relevant database. Second, public hospitals must provide the entire range of medical
services identiﬁed as essential by public authorities. Healthcare facilities cannot refrain from
oﬀering a part of this beneﬁt package to reduce the risk of litigation, thus the opportunities
for strategic behavior by hospitals are minimized. In addition, even though each LHU is in
charge of all the residents in its area of reference, patients are free to choose the provider
they prefer. Consequently, the potential territorial eﬀects connected to the characteristics
and needs of the population are mitigated. Finally and more importantly, our empirical
strategy takes advantage of the peculiar organizational structure of both the healthcare and
the judicial systems and, in particular, of the lack of perfect overlapping between the jurisdic-
tions of courts and healthcare providers. These elements allow us to overcome the problem
of omitted variables with respect to both the outcomes of interest and courts’ performance
by excluding the existence of a perfect correlation between the caseload of courthouses and
the activity level of healthcare facilities. The simultaneous presence of all these institutional
features in a unique framework makes the Italian case a promising setting for our analysis.
4.2.1 The Acquisition of Malpractice Insurance in the Italian Health-
care System
Italian healthcare providers (i.e. LHUs, IHs, THs and RHs) must supply medical malpractice
liability insurance for their medical staﬀ, but being public entities they are not allowed to
go into the market to freely select a private insurer. On the contrary, providers have to
comply with the provisions on public procurement,16 thus they need to contract out their
malpractice risk through a public awarding procedure.17 Medical staﬀ working in hospitals
directly managed by a LHU will be covered by the insurance contract tendered by their LHU,
while IHs, THs and RHs run their tenders autonomously.
The procurement procedures applicable to acquire malpractice insurance can be divided
into three main categories:18 1) open procedures; 2) restricted procedures; and 3) negoti-
ations. The discretionary power of both the auctioneers and the bidders increases moving
from open procedures to negotiations, at the cost of transparency, but not necessarily of
competition.
Both open and restricted procedures are always applicable and allow all interested and
qualiﬁed parties to present an oﬀer, but once an oﬀer is submitted, it is no longer modiﬁable.
In addition, under both circumstances, the contracting authority has to verify that applicants
satisfy the requirements needed to be admitted to the procedure itself. In open procedures,
this assessment occurs simultaneously to the evaluation of the oﬀers submitted, while in
restricted procedures the auctioneer ﬁrst checks the admissibility of applicants and, then, only
16Legislative Decree 163, 12 April 2006 (known as the Public Procurement Code).
17For a complete and detailed discussion of the Italian legislation on public procurement, see Appendix
B.
18The Public Procurement Code foresees also a fourth type of procedure, the so-called competitive dia-
logue. However, this type of tender does not ﬁnd application with respect to medical malpractice insurance
since this type of service does not meet the requirements (e.g. high complexity of the contract) needed to
justify the adoption of the competitive dialogue.
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the oﬀers of the admitted applicants are examined. Therefore, the main diﬀerence between
these two types of tenders is of a substantially operational nature. Diﬀerently, negotiations
can be adopted only under speciﬁc circumstances (i.e. urgency reasons or failure of a prior
open procedure due to the absence of applicants or appropriate bids) and their auctioneers
are free to choose the operators to contact, as well as to discuss the subject and terms of
the contract with one or more of them. Therefore, negotiations allow awarding authorities
to enter into contact and exchange information with private insurers before the award of the
contract.
Thanks to the information collected for this study, it is possible to provide a comprehensive
assessment of the relative frequency of the diﬀerent tender procedures in the Italian market
for malpractice insurance. Between 2000 and 2010, 55.5% of the procurement procedures run
to contract out medical professional liability insurance by the Italian healthcare providers,
for which we have information, took the form of an open tender. Restricted procedures were
preferred in 25.5% of the time, while negotiations conﬁrmed to be an exceptional mechanism,
whose adoption has been limited to the 19% of the cases (Table 4.1).
Table 4.1: Procurement Procedures per Year and Type
Awarding Procedures Contracts
Year Open Restricted Negotiated Open Restricted Negotiated
2000 26 29 10 29 32 11
2001 52 25 11 72 29 17
2002 32 25 21 40 30 31
2003 50 22 15 99 23 24
2004 42 27 19 54 41 32
2005 32 19 23 38 23 30
2006 17 8 17 31 20 44
2007 45 7 7 76 8 10
2008 54 10 2 90 14 3
2009 48 12 8 74 29 8
2010 53 23 21 101 32 26
Total 451 207 154 704 281 237
Notes: Awarding procedures= Public procurement procedures to award medical malpractice insurance;
Contracts= Medical malpractice insurance policies contracted out through public procurement. Open= Open
procurement procedures; Restricted=Restricted procurement procedures; Negotiated=Negotiated procurement
procedures.
There is also the possibility for two or more healthcare providers to carry out a common
procedure to minimize the administrative costs entailed in the management of tendering
processes while taking advantage of a higher bargaining power with respect to bidding com-
panies. However, even if the procedure is a joint one, the winning insurer stipulates separate
contracts with each of the auctioneers. In addition, awarding authorities can also open a
tender to acquire more than one service, so to have more than one lot in the tender (e.g.
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diﬀerent layers of medical liability insurance, or the insurance for medical liability and le-
gal expenditures). When more than one service is procured, there might be more than one
winner for the same awarding procedure, one for each lot included in the call for tender.
Bidders win the tender either because they provide the service according to the lowest
price criterion or because they meet the requirements of the most economically advantageous
tender criterion (MEAT). In particular, the latter provides a higher discretionary power to
auctioneers. In fact, according to the lowest price criterion, the evaluation is based exclusively
on the price at which the tendered service is oﬀered and the applicant providing the lowest
price wins the procedure. Diﬀerently, under the most economically advantageous tender, the
auctioneer assesses the oﬀers received based on other parameters besides price (e.g. quality,
technical assistance, technical merit and environmental characteristics) and the contracting
authority itself decides which parameters to apply and how much to weigh each of them. The
auctioneer assigns a maximum score obtainable to each parameter and the tendered contract
is awarded to the applicant reporting the highest overall score. When more than one service
is tendered, the contracting authority can decide to entrust the diﬀerent lots according to
diﬀerent awarding criteria.
Table 4.2: Contracts per Type of Procurement Procedure and Type of Awarding Criterion
Type of Procedure Lowest Price MEAT Missing
Open 413 275 16
Restricted 190 83 8
Negotiated 17 166 54
Total 620 524 78
Notes: Contracts= Medical malpractice insurance policies contracted out through
public procurement. Lowest Price=The applied awarding criterion is the lowest
price criterion; MEAT=The applied awarding criterion is the most economically
advantageous tender criterion; Missing=The call for tender does not report any
information about the type of awarding criterion that is applied in the awarding
procedure. Open= Open procurement procedures; Restricted=Restricted pro-
curement procedures; Negotiated=Negotiated procurement procedures.
During the period of observation, 51% of the tendered insurance contracts have been
awarded according to the lowest price criterion, whereas the MEAT criterion have been
adopted in 43% of all cases (Table 4.2).19 In particular, the use of the MEAT criterion
clearly prevails for negotiations (70%). In the case of restricted procedures there seems to be
a preference for the lowest price criterion (68%), which is shown to be the most frequently
applied criterion also with respect to open procedures (59%).
Contracting authorities can also rely on insurance brokers, that is private operators acting
on behalf of the healthcare providers themselves in carrying out the public procurement
procedure. This type of intermediary supports the contracting authority in preparing and
19For the remaining 6% of tendered contracts, there is no available information regarding the awarding
criterion chosen by the contracting authority.
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running the tendering process, as well as in managing the insurance contract once the private
insurer has been selected. Between 2000 and 2010, Italian healthcare providers resort to this
type of intermediation to carry out 40% of all procurement procedures, equal to 39.5% of all
tendered insurance services (Table 4.3).
Table 4.3: Procurement Procedures Run in Presence of Brokers per Type of Procedure
Type of Procedure Awarding Procedures Contracts
Open 151 224
Restricted 100 75
Negotiated 75 118
Total 326 483
Notes: Awarding procedures= Public procurement procedures to award medi-
cal malpractice insurance; Contracts= Medical malpractice insurance policies con-
tracted out through public procurement. Open= Open procurement procedures;
Restricted=Restricted procurement procedures; Negotiated=Negotiated procure-
ment procedures.
In 63 procurement procedures, brokerage services have been provided by a temporary
consortium of contractors constituted on average by 2.5 brokers. Moreover, out of the 326
contract notices specifying the presence of a broker, 303 disclose also its identity. This
additional information has revealed that the ﬁrst four brokers have been involved respectively
in 97, 55, 35 and 31 procurement procedures.20
Finally, during the period 2000-2010, we recorded 32 insurance companies providing cov-
erage to 308 Italian healthcare providers and their employees: 11 operating in the three
macro-areas (i.e. North, Center, South and Islands), 8 in only two areas, and 13 in one area.
Overall, Northern regions are covered by 26 insurers, Central regions by 16 insurers, and
Southern regions and islands by 20 insurers (Table 4.15 in Appendix A).21 Insurers are both
national and international companies. If we consider the insurers providing coverage other
than for medical liability to healthcare providers during the same period, we can count 37
companies in the North, 26 in the Center, and 28 in the South and in the islands. 17 insurers
operate in all areas, 11 only in two areas, and 18 only in one area of the country (Table
4.16 in Appendix A). Therefore, overall, from 2000 to 2010, in Italy there were 46 insurance
companies dealing with healthcare providers risk. We consider this latter ﬁgure as a good
proxy to identify the number of potential competitors in the market for medical liability, of
which 32 were actually covering the malpractice risk of the providers.22
20For an overview of the companies providing brokerage services to healthcare providers during the period
2000-2010, see Table 4.17 in Appendix A.
21When an insurance company operates through one or more subsidiaries, only the holding company has
been counted.
22We control for the fact that the 46 companies, winners of contracts of ﬁre insurance, cars insurance or
theft insurance, were also oﬀering medical malpractice insurance as part of their services.
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The examination of all this information indicates that Italian healthcare providers ac-
quire malpractice insurance coverage through negotiations only in a limited number of cases.
Hence, the selection of insurers is usually done by trying to encourage the participation of all
interested companies. Besides, healthcare providers often resort to the support of insurance
brokers to improve the management of such selections and of the resulting insurance policies.
Nonetheless, the attendance of insurers at these procedures is quite limited. Only a small
portion of all the insurance companies listing medical malpractice coverage among their ser-
vices is actually willing to oﬀer it to providers. Moreover, even those insurance companies
that do provide the reference coverage to hospitals do not necessarily operate throughout the
country, but prefer instead to restrict their presence to some areas. All these considerations
substantially conﬁrm the presence of frictions between private insurers and healthcare orga-
nizations in the reference market and the limited capability of the latter to be an attractive
customer for the former.
4.2.2 The Italian Judicial System
Medical errors are perceived as a signiﬁcant problem by almost the entire Italian population
(i.e. 97% of citizens) and 69% of citizens are seriously concerned about the safety of hos-
pital patients.23 In such a responsive context to medical malpractice, the judiciary plays a
crucial role as the vast majority of malpractice disputes (86%) are resolved in courts,24 while
alternative dispute resolution procedures, including mediation, have a minor role.25
In the Italian legal system both civil and criminal disputes are settled in ordinary courts,
which are the default courts for general jurisdiction.26 Speciﬁcally, with respect to medical
malpractice, the legal administration of claims takes place in the ﬁrst grade in Collegial Courts
23Nys (2008), p. 28.
24In addition, anedoctical evidence shows that most of the malpractice claims brought to courts are
actually resolved by civil courts. For instance, the 2011 report prepared by the private insurer Rasini Vigano´
for the Lombardy region evaluating malpractice risk at the regional level indicates that Lombard healthcare
providers received a total of 24,675 civil damages claims between 1999 and 2010, while criminal proceedings
for the same period amounted to 1,303 (Rasini Vigano´, 2011, p. 16). Marsh (2011) reports the same trend
also with respect to private healthcare providers. In fact, according to this study focusing on the activity of
44 private hospitals (38% located in the North, 27% in the Center and 35% in the South) criminal damage
claims corresponded to the 4% of total compensation requests received (Marsh, 2011, p. 1).
25Nys (2008), p. 21. Only recently, mandatory mediation procedures have been introduced in the Italian
legal system. According the Legislative Decree 28/2010, as of March 2011, before ﬁling a claim against
a healthcare provider, injured parties are obliged to ﬁrst resort to mediation. Only once the mediation
procedure failed, a legal dispute can be initiated.
26The Italian legal system is structured in three diﬀerent levels of jurisdiction: the constitutional court,
ordinary courts and special courts. The constitutional court is responsible for matters related to the consti-
tutionality of legislation, the division of powers, and proceedings against the President of the Republic, while
special courts have authority over speciﬁc jurisdictions. Speciﬁcally, the Italian special courts are: Regional
Administrative Courts (Tribunali Amministrativi Regionali TAR) for administrative jurisdiction; Military
Courts (Tribunali Militari), Military Appeal Courts (Corti Militari di Appello) and Military Surveillance
Courts (Tribunali Militari di Sorveglianza) for military jurisdiction; State Auditors’ Department for auditing
jurisdiction; and Provincial Fiscal Commissions (Commissioni Tributarie Provinciali) and District Fiscal
Commission (Commissioni Tributarie Distrettuali) for ﬁscal jurisdiction.
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or Courts of the First Instance (Tribunali),27 in the second grade in the Court of Appeal
(Corte d’Appello),28 and in the third grade in the Court of Cassation (Corte di Cassazione).29
More important, in the case of a dispute against a public healthcare provider, the competent
collegial court necessarily coincides with the court in whose district the healthcare structure
is located.
The existing territorial distribution of the Italian Courts of the First Instance directly
results from the Royal Decree n.12/1941 and foresees 165 tribunal jurisdiction areas: 25 in the
North Western regions, 39 in the North Eastern regions, 31 in the Central regions, and 70 in
the South and the two main islands (i.e. Sicily and Sardinia).30 This territorial organization
of tribunals is still very similar to the one created after the uniﬁcation of the country in 1865.
In fact, over time no Court of First Instance has ever been removed, whereas eleven new
tribunals have been introduced between the Sixties and the Nineties and 14 court districts
were reshaped at the end of the Nineties according to the Legislative Decrees n. 51/1998 and
n. 491/1999.
The Italian national legal system is known for being characterized by an overall low
performance and its Courts of First Instance generally classify poorly in the world rankings
of judiciary eﬃciency,31 even though there actually is a signiﬁcant degree of within country
variation. The parameter commonly used to rank diﬀerent legal systems is the average
duration of trials in the ﬁrst instance. In Italy, between 2000 and 2007, a civil case required
on average 977 days, equal to 2.7 years, to come to a close.32 Anyway, this poor performance
cannot be ascribed to scarcity of human resources or lack of funding and not even to the
27The Italian legal system foresees other types of ordinary courts: Giudici di pace, Tribunale per i Mi-
norenni and Corte d’Assise. Giudici di pace are honorary judges competent for minor civil and criminal
claims such as, for instance, automobile incidents disputes. Tribunale per i Minorenni has civil and criminal
jurisdiction over all the proceedings involving minors.Corte d’Assise is competent for felonies.
28The Court of Appeal has authority over the appeals against decisions of collegial courts and is arranged
in three sections (civil, criminal and labor) and it is organized in 29 districts. Another court of second
instance recognized by the Italian legal system is the Corte d’Assise d’Appello, which has competence over
the appeals against decisions of the ﬁrst instance court Corte d’Assise.
29The Court of Cassation is the highest court and is competent for appeals from the courts of second
instance. It has the power to change the interpretation and the application of legal provisions made by
lower instance courts and its main goal should be to guarantee “the correct observance and the uniform
interpretation of the law” (Art. 65 Royal Decree 1/30/1941 n.12), while respecting the jurisdiction of the
other courts. See, Grembi and Garoupa (2012), p. 8. Beside the civil and criminal divisions, the Court of
Cassation comprises also an administrative and a military section and when two or more sections do not
share the same interpretation with respect to a speciﬁc legal matter, the case is submitted to the United
Sections (Sezioni Unite).
30See, Table 4.18 in Appendix A.
31CEPEJ (2008) and World Bank (2013). Speciﬁcally, the report of the European Commission for the
Eﬃciency of Justice ranks Italy at the lowest position for the duration of civil procedures (507 days in Italy,
262 in France and 261 in Spain), while the country holds the ﬁrst position for the pending cases (more than
3.5 million). Similarly, based on the length of civil disputes, the World Bank Doing Business 2013 report,
ranks Italy 160th out of 185 countries essentially conﬁrming the result of previous years (158th out of 183 in
the 2012 report; 157th out of 183 in the 2011 report, and 156th out of 183 in the 2010 report.
32The median duration was equal to 907 days, that is 2.5 years. Information on trials duration at the
district level are available through the National Institute of Statistics only till 2007.
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courts’ caseload. In fact, several studies focusing on the Italian experience have shown that
the main driver of the so-deﬁned judicial ineﬃciency relies on how judges organize their work
within each court.33 For instance, according to Coviello et al. (2009), a trial used to last
on average 174 days in Turin and 324 days in Milan, even though the number of new cases
ﬁled during the same year is higher in Turin than in Milan and the two courts are quite
similar in terms of both socio-economic characteristics and quality of disputes. The authors
identify the explanation of this divergence in claims’ duration between the two tribunals in
the diﬀerent ways judges organize their work. Speciﬁcally, they conclude that all things being
equal, the average length of trials is lower for the judges working on few cases simultaneously
than those working in parallel on many trials at the same time.
Given that the data on the duration of Italian civil trials is not available after 2007, in the
present work, courts’ performance is expressed in terms of a backlog index, which represents
a good alternative measure being highly correlated with the duration of cases.34
The backlog index of Court j=1, 2,...,165, at year t, can be written as:35
Backlogjt=
New Casesjt+Pending Casesjt
Closed Casesjt
As such, the level of backlog provides a measure of not yet solved cases per year of court
activity, so that it measures the pending caseload of a court in a given year against the court
capacity to dispose of these proceedings during the same year. The backlog index takes value
1, when all the entering cases at time t are solved during the same period. On average,
between 2000 and 2010, Italian courts reported a backlog equal to 3.59 with a median value
of 3.36, while the 95th percentile was equal to 5.66. This means that on average Italian
courts dispose of less than one third of the pending caseload in a year and that they would
actually need another three and a half years to close all the remaining cases.
In terms of regional variation, the worst performers according to this index are Southern
regions with an average value of 4.37, whereas the best performers turn out to be the Northern
regions with an average backlog of 3.04.36 Nevertheless, as shown by Figure 4.1, within each
region there are substantial diﬀerences in terms of judicial performance.
At the same time, courts vary also with respect to the introduction of schedules. Indeed,
as discussed in Chapter 3, the implementation of schedules has not been originally imposed
and not even promoted by the legislator (i.e. the central government), but rather courts
started to adopt schedules on a voluntary basis since the Eighties. Nonetheless, the adoption
of this policy has been widespread across the country and took place in both more eﬃcient
and less eﬃcient courts (when eﬃciency is measured as the civil backlog of the Courts of
First Instance).
33See, Coviello et al. (2012a) and (2012b).
34For the period 2000-2007, the correlation coeﬃcient between the average length of civil trials and courts’
civil backlog is 0.78.
35Speciﬁcally, it is the ratio of new open cases during year t plus pending cases at the beginning of each
new year (i.e. not solved at year t− 1) and the closed cases during year t.
36Northern regions can be further distinguished in North Eastern and North Western regions, which
reported an average backlog of 3.29 and 2.78 respectively. As for the Central regions, they had an average
backlog of 3.51.
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Figure 4.1: Civil Backlog per Court District (2000 - 2010)
Notes: In gray Regional borders.
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Figure 4.2: Italian Courts Adopting Schedules of Noneconomic Damages (2000 - 2010)
Notes: In black the court districts. In gray the court districts
adopting a schedule of noneconomic damages to health, in white
the others.
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In particular, 8% (14) of the Courts of First Instance relied on schedules in 1996, but this
ﬁgure has progressively increased over time. Four years later, in 2000, the courts adopting
schedules amounted already to 45% (75) and, by 2010, they increased to 76% (125) (Figure
4.2).
Finally, it must be noted that, as documented in Table 4.4, courts have followed diﬀerent
patterns in the introduction of schedules also within a same region. In 2010, seven regions
had all their courts applying schedules (i.e. Emilia Romagna, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Trentino
Alto Adige and Valle d’Aosta in the North, and Basilicata and Molise in the South). Whilst,
in the same year, the regions less covered by schedules were located in the Center and South
of the country: 50% of the courts located in Umbria and in Campania were not adopting
schedules, while Calabria was characterized by a coverage level of 63.6%.
Table 4.4: Schedules adoption by Region and Year
Regions 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
North
Emilia Romagna 0.778 0.778 0.778 0.778 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Friuli Venezia Giulia 0.800 0.800 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Liguria 0.667 0.667 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833
Lombardy 0.625 0.625 0.750 0.750 0.750 0.750 0.812 0.812 0.812 0.812 0.812
Piedmont 0.437 0.437 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.750
Trentino Alto Adige 0.667 0.667 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Valle d’Aosta 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Veneto 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875
Center
Lazio 0.222 0.222 0.667 0.667 0.778 0.778 0.778 0.778 0.778 0.778 0.778
Marche 0.286 0.286 0.571 0.571 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.714
Tuscany 0.454 0.454 0.636 0.636 0.636 0.636 0.636 0.636 0.812 0.812 0.812
Umbria 0.250 0.250 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
South and Islands
Abruzzo 0.250 0.250 0.625 0.625 0.750 0.750 0.750 0.750 0.750 0.750 0.750
Basilicata 0.250 0.250 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Calabria 0.364 0.364 0.636 0.636 0.636 0.636 0.636 0.636 0.636 0.636 0.636
Campania 0.333 0.333 0.417 0.417 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
Molise 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.333 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Puglia 0.714 0.714 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 1.000 1.000 1.000
Sardinia 0.667 0.667 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833
Sicily 0.210 0.210 0.421 0.421 0.421 0.421 0.421 0.421 0.833 0.833 0.833
Notes: Schedule=Schedules system on noneconomic damages. The numbers refer to the Courts adopting a schedules system
out of the total number of operating Courts within each Region.
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4.3 Conceptual Framework
The aim of the present chapter is to evaluate the impact of the adoption of noneconomic
damages schedules on insurers’ decisions to operate in the insurance market for medical mal-
practice liability, taking into account also the level of courts’ performance measured as civil
backlog. In fact, both judicial performance and schedules implementation may simultane-
ously aﬀect the decisions of insurers, injured parties and physicians. Therefore, a decrease of
malpractice pressure combined with a low deterrence legal system may reinforce or weaken
the unattractive features of the market. In other words, the analysis of capping damages
for pain and suﬀering without taking into account the enforcing mechanism of the policy is
partial and produces potentially biased results.
For instance, consider the expected eﬀect of the introduction of schedules with no refer-
ence to the eﬃciency of the judicial system. Schedules make the market more attractive to
insurers since they decrease the degree of both the variability and uncertainty on the possible
magnitude of compensations. However, the improved predictability of malpractice awards
may be beneﬁcial also to healthcare providers by making it easier for them to assess their
coverage needs, thus by increasing their bargaining power during the contracting process.
On the other hand, the decrease in malpractice pressure caused by the adoption of sched-
ules may induce physicians to lower the level of precaution, with higher probability of errors
and claims. Additionally, scheduled damages increase the predictability of compensations
also on the plaintiﬀ side.37 In particular, if schedules determine a decrease in the potential
amount of awards, victims may be discouraged from initiating a legal proceeding. All these
diﬀerent forces coexist and interact and it is not possible to tell a priori their intensity and
which are going to prevail. Therefore, it is impossible to anticipate the ﬁnal impact on the
attractiveness of the reference market for private insurers.
If we reframe the reference context including the ability of the judiciary to dispose of
civil cases, the theoretical predictions could change. Assume the judicial system is very
ineﬃcient, that is, the claim processing time is very long. The advantage of higher levels
of predictability stands, but compensations could arrive after a very long time. This aspect
entails both positive and negative implications for insurance companies. On the one hand,
insurers encounter diﬃculties in predicting when they are going to pay compensations (in the
case of occurrence-based coverages) and/or how many cases inherited from previous insurance
contracts they will have to pay for (in the case of claims-made coverages). On the other hand,
the postponement of payouts can be seen favorably by insurers. In fact, they may actually
prefer to delay the time of compensation and to have at their disposal the premiums collected
for a longer period to make investments. At the same time, the case of a poor performing
court may also entail a higher bargaining power for insurers with respect to victims and
the payment of compensations. Again, it is diﬃcult to predict which eﬀect will prevail and,
consequently, to anticipate the ﬁnal impact of a higher civil backlog on insurers’ preferences.
In addition, the attractiveness of the reference market is also aﬀected by the fact that a longer
processing time of claims may discourage victims from suing doctors, but, at the same time,
37See, Mello and Kachalia (2010).
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it may determine a reduction of the malpractice pressure decreasing the level of care exerted
by physicians with a higher likelihood of malpractice cases and suits. As for hospitals, a high
backlog may make it more diﬃcult to estimate their insurance needs.
In essence, noneconomic damages schedules and judicial performance aﬀect simultane-
ously all parties involved in malpractice litigation (Figure 4.5). Their respective ﬁnal eﬀects
are not easily predictable, but it is clear that the actual attractiveness of the malpractice
insurance market will result from their interaction and it is therefore an empirical issue.
Table 4.5: Diﬀerent Expected Eﬀects of Civil Backlog and Noneconomic Damages Schedules
High Civil Backlog Schedule
Victims
Willingness to ﬁle claims ↓ ↓
Predictability of Compensations ↓ ↑
Doctors
Precaution level ↓ ↓
Probability of errors ↑ ↑
Insurers
Predictability of risk exposure ↓ ↑
Investment possibility ↑ no eﬀect
Bargaining power with victims ↑ ↓ ↑
Hospitals Predictability of their coverage need ↓ ↑
Notes: Civil Backlog=Number of new cases plus number of pending cases from the previous year out of the number of closed
cases; Schedule=Schedules system on noneconomic damages; Investment possibility=The possibility for insurers to invest
the premiums they collect.
If the attractiveness of the reference market is aﬀected by schedules adoption and judicial
performance as argued, it is reasonable ﬁrst to expect a variation in the availability of the
supply of malpractice coverage. In fact, whether this line of business becomes more or
less interesting for insurers, it should be reﬂected by a higher or lower number of insurance
companies operating in this market segment. In particular, we approximate the attractiveness
of the malpractice insurance market using both an absolute and a relative measure:
• Bidders : the total number of insurers that submitted an oﬀer during a public procure-
ment procedure run by healthcare providers to acquire medical professional liability;
• Potential Bidders : the ratio between the number of insurance companies bidding in
public procurement procedures for medical malpractice coverage and the total number
of potential competitors. The latter coincides with the insurers operating in the country
that satisfy the following two conditions: (i) they already cover at least one public
healthcare provider against risk other than malpractice liability, and (ii) they also list
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medical professional liability insurance among their services.38
Bidders represents the actual number of insurance companies interested in providing
public healthcare providers with malpractice coverage. Yet, it tells us how attractive, in
absolute terms, is the reference market for private ﬁrms. Diﬀerently, the variable Potential
Bidders measures this attractiveness in relative terms as it weighs Bidders on the number
of insurers that are actually capable of oﬀering medical malpractice coverage in the same
territorial market.
A variation in the number of insurers oﬀering malpractice coverage may, in turn, modify
the market equilibrium, that is, it may lead to the application of new insurance rates. There-
fore, there might also be consequences in terms of aﬀordability of these insurance policies.
In this respect, we consider the following measures of insurance rates:
• Premium per personnel : the premiums paid by healthcare providers for medical pro-
fessional liability normalized on the total number of employees of the health structures
themselves, and
• Premium per medical personnel : the premiums paid by healthcare providers for medical
professional liability normalized on the number of medical staﬀ of the health structures
themselves.
The theoretical predictions on premiums are even less straightforward than those on the
market attractiveness, though previous studies show that ﬂat caps decrease the loss ratio of
insurance companies.39 Since premiums are not experience-rated, the mechanism according
to which we should expect a decrease in paid premiums is not unequivocally determined.
In fact, insurers could actually just cash in the extra rent not decreasing the price of the
coverage and this is likely to depend on the actual competitive pressure exerted in a market
still characterized by serious frictions.
Furthermore, the examination of whether premiums decrease, once schedules are adopted,
provides information on how the potential welfare gains of scheduled damages are split among
insurance companies and healthcare organizations. In particular, there are two possible ways
to explain why lower premiums emerge in equilibrium: schedules improve the bargaining
power of the healthcare providers so that they can extract more rent from insurers and cut
better deals during the contracting process, or schedules aﬀect the ﬁnal prices by increasing
competition, or both. Moreover, considering also the possible eﬀects of judicial performance,
it could be that competition is actually higher when the bargaining power of insurers with
respect to the payment of compensations is potentially higher (i.e. worse performing courts).
In those cases healthcare providers are probably not able to beneﬁt in a similar way since
they encounter more diﬃculties in estimating the coverage they need.
38We control that the insurers already covering healthcare providers against risk other than medical
professional liability, were also oﬀering medical malpractice insurance as part of their services.
39See, for instance, Viscusi and Born (1995), Viscusi and Born (2005), and Born et al. (2009).
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4.3.1 Empirical Strategy
Since the implementation of schedules took place in a staggered way with diﬀerent courts
applying schedules in diﬀerent years, Italy oﬀers a unique experimental setting to analyze
the implications of limiting noneconomic damages. This framework also has the advantage
of ensuring a good control of the potential selection bias based on a weaker assumption
than those generally adopted. In fact, following the approach developed by Autor et al.
(2006) and later applied in Acemoglu (2011), we rely on the fact that the timing of schedules
implementation is not correlated with problems of medical malpractice.40
In particular, in this setting, the treatment is given by the implementation of noneconomic
damages schedules by courts. The healthcare providers covered at least by one court that
introduced noneconomic damages schedules between 2000 and 2010 have been used as the
treated group, whereas the healthcare providers ruled only by courts that did not modify their
process of assessment of compensations for pain and suﬀering represent the untreated/control
group. The treatment eﬀect is assessed through a Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences (DID) estimator,
which contrasts the changes in the outcome variables of interest for the treated group with
the changes observed for the control group.
However, since both treatment and control groups are not randomly chosen as in a proper
experimental setting, a possible concern can arise with respect to the endogeneity of the
treatment. One could argue that courts with more medical malpractice cases might self select
in the adoption of schedules to speed up and/or facilitate the closure of medical malpractice
trials. However, as in Autor et al. (2006),41 the present identiﬁcation strategy relies on
a weaker assumption since what is required for our estimation is only the exogeneity of
the treatment year (i.e. the year of introduction of schedules) with respect to the outcome
variables of interest. This is highly plausible on the grounds of two reasons.
First, the outcomes of interest refer to medical malpractice, while schedules apply to the
entire civil system and therefore to every case of personal injury. In addition, the conception
of schedules itself was not aimed at solving problems directly related to medical malpractice,
but it was rather due to the diﬃculties encountered in assessing compensations for the victims
of motor accidents. So that, the levels of awards foreseen by schedules were initially set based
on compensations for car accidents.42 Hence, there are strong reasons to believe that the year
of schedules implementation is exogenous with respect to our independent variables.
Second, the courts’ heterogeneity in terms of structural (e.g. number of judges), oper-
ational (e.g. backlog) and even ideological features (e.g. more conservative judges), which
could inﬂuence the adoption of schedules, is limited and should not constitute a bias for the
present analysis. For instance, it could be argued that the courts characterized by the worst
40As discussed in Section 3.5.1, scheduled damages were primarily aimed at solving the diﬃculties encoun-
tered in assessing compensations for the victims of car accidents.
41Autor et al.(2006) exploit the variation in the extent and timing of implementation of wrongful-discharge
protection across U.S. States courts to assess the impact of these laws on employment and wages in state
labor markets. In particular, this “empirical approach contrasts the change in employment and wages in
states adopting a given wrongful-discharge doctrine in a given period with that in states not adopting any
doctrine during the same time period.”
42For more information, see Section 3.5.
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performance were also the ﬁrst to adopt schedules in order to cope with their ineﬃciency
problems. Diﬀerently, one could think that the courts with higher caseloads, which do not
necessarily imply higher levels of backlog, were the ﬁrst to introduce schedules. However,
this is not a concern in our case since our identiﬁcation relies neither on early birds (courts
treated before 2000) nor on late comers (courts treated after 2010), but on a 30% of courts
shifting to the treatment between 2000 and 2010, which therefore can be considered quite
homogeneous under all these diﬀerent circumstances.
While time invariant factors are controlled for, a further concern refers to the omitted
variable bias caused by possible time-varying omitted confounding factors correlated with
the outcomes of interest as well as civil backlog. To address this problem, we exploit the
organizational structure of both the Italian judicial system and the Italian healthcare system
by taking advantage of the partial overlap between court districts and healthcare providers’
districts.43 Within the borders of one region, municipalities are at the same time grouped
in LHUs and court districts. The territorial competences of courts are established by the
Ministry of Justice, while regional governments are responsible for determining the borders
of LHUs. As a result, the territorial competence of a court rarely perfectly coincides with
the territorial competence of a LHU and vice versa.
Speciﬁcally, partial overlapping works in two directions: a LHU district can be ruled by
more than one court, and a court district can cover more than one LHU as shown in Figure
4.3 for two representative regions (i.e. Piedmont and Sardinia) in both 2000 and 2010. For
instance, looking at Piedmont in 2000 in Figure 4.3, we see that LHU number 117 is ruled by
4 courts (i.e. Saluzzo, Cuneo, Alba and Mondov´ı), while the court of Alba covers three LHUs
(i.e. LHU number 117, 118 and 108). The partial overlapping between these two territorial
competences implies that the caseload of a court and the activity levels of LHUs are not
perfectly correlated. Moreover, since whenever a claim for medical malpractice needs to be
ﬁled, the competent court is the one where the hospital is located,44 it might be the case that
the medical personnel working in hospitals managed by the same healthcare provider will be
called to respond to medical liability in front of diﬀerent courts.45
To take into account the partial overlap between court districts and LHUs districts, the
treatment has to be deﬁned as a continuous rather than a binary variable.46 Since it could
43The approach to deﬁne the partial overlap is similar to the one used to draw the concept of territorial
congruence used to assess the impact of information on political accountability in Snyder and Stromberg
(2010).
44Recently, the Court of Cassation has reaﬃrmed this principle with its sentence n. 8093/2009. As for
public procurement claims, the competent authority is not represented by the Courts of First Instance, rather
by Administrative Courts (Tribunali Amministrativi Regionali).
45In this respect, a possible concern on the soundness of the identiﬁcation strategy can be related to
the random distribution of hospitals across diﬀerently performing courts. This phenomenon is analogous to
the courts shopping problem, which can cause the decision of ﬁrms to locate in districts more ﬁrm friendly.
However, this scenario seems quite unlikely in the case of Italian hospitals, because the decision to locate a
public facilities in a municipality rather than another is mainly related to legal requirements. In particular,
the location of a hospital must comply with speciﬁc and detailed population requirements.
46Treated providers are not just those which have Schedule moving from 0 to 1, but, for instance, also
those which have Schedule moving from 0 to 0.20.
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Figure 4.3: Courts and LHUs: Piedmont and Sardinia (2000 - 2010)
Notes: In red the court districts. In the other colors the territorial competences of LHUs. On the left Piedmont and on the
right Sardinia.
be that only a part of the territory of a given LHU is ruled by the treatment, we construct
the index, λpjt, which weighs the relative importance of Courtj at time t for provider p, with
speciﬁc reference to the level of civil backlog, Backlogpt, and the adoption of noneconomic
damages schedules, Schedulept.
The basic intuition underneath λpjt can be explained through a simple example. Assume
that a LHUp directly manages 5 hospitals, 2 placed in the district of Court1 and 3 placed in
the district of Court2. Hence, Court1 indexes (i.e. Backlog and Schedule) are weighed
2
5
and
Court2 indexes are weighed
3
5
. The insurer facing the decision to provide coverage to LHUp
should be aﬀected by the indexes of both of Court1 and Court2, combined as the sum of the
weighted indexes of the two courts. As a result, since Backlog and Schedule are weighed by
λpjt, they correspond to the following equivalences:
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⎧⎨
⎩
Backlogpt =
∑Npt
j=1(λpjtBacklogjt)
Schedulept =
∑Npt
j=1(λpjtSchedulejt)
(4.1)
with j=1, 2,...165 and λpjt∈ [0, 1].
At the same time, we are aware that hospitals are not all identical. For instance, it might
be the case that the three hospitals managed by LHUp and placed in Court2 treat more
patients than the other two hospitals. Therefore, they are more important than the two
located in Court1, because, in this case, the probability to end up before Court2 is higher.
Consequently, the relative importance of Courtj has to be approximated taking into account
the activity levels of hospitals, but being cautious not to introduce endogeneity problems. In
fact, these levels may be inﬂuenced by the malpractice pressure perceived by physicians, as
pointed out by the literature on defensive medicine.47
Given the public nature of the Italian healthcare system, public providers cannot abstain
from oﬀering the entire range of services recognized as essential by public authorities. The
aim is to ensure the coverage of the population needs also with respect to riskier medical
services. Consequently, malpractice pressure can actually aﬀect some activity measures such
as the number of diagnostic tests prescribed, but not the overall organization of the healthcare
provision itself. Keeping these considerations in mind, we introduce a weight represented by
the number of beds at the hospital level out of the total number of available beds at the
healthcare provider level, so that if hospitals in Court2 are responsible for the 70% of the
total beds managed by LHUp, Court2 indexes will play an heavier role. This measure is
independent from medical malpractice pressure since it is set according to legal requirements
and therefore is not left to the discretionary decision of physicians.48 This weight, as well as
the borders of LHUs, tend to change over time due to public ﬁnance constraints or political
decisions over the management of the healthcare system,49 thus λ is time variant.
Deﬁning Ycpt as the outcome of interest (e.g. number of bidders) for the contract c of
healthcare provider p at time t, we estimate the speciﬁcation in Equation 4.2.
Ycpt = αp + γa + ρt +Q
′
ptϕ+X
′
ptβ + Z
′
ctπ + θBacklogpt
+DSchedulept + ωBacklogpt ∗ Schedulept + εcpt
(4.2)
47See, for instance, Kessler and MacClellan (1996) and (2002), Currie and MacLeod (2008).The basic idea
is that physicians might perform additional medical treatments and/or procedures, as well as avoid certain
patients or medical treatments, with the speciﬁc aim of reducing their exposure to malpractice liability.
Therefore, the malpractice pressure perceived by doctors might inﬂuence their behavior and, consequently,
the activity levels of hospitals (e.g the number of performed diagnostic tests or the number of performed
surgeries).
48The number of beds per thousand inhabitants is decided at the central level by the Government that,
over time, has intervened several times implementing diﬀerent decrees and laws for the reorganization of the
national healthcare system (e.g. Law 595/1985 or Law 412/1991).
49As discussed in Chapter 2, during the period 2000-2010, the number of LHUs varied from 197 in 2000
to 145 in 2010 managing a total number of 617 hospitals. The decreasing trend in the number of LHUs is
due to an attempt to improve competition in the public healthcare system. As a consequence, in the same
period the number of IHs decreased from 98 in 2000 to 64 in 2010.
132
116 Conceptual Framework
where εcpt is the error term clustered at the regional level. αp are healthcare provider ﬁxed
eﬀects, γa are the geographical area ﬁxed eﬀects (i.e. North West, North East, Center and
South), and ρt controls for yearly shocks. Backlog is a continuous variable expressing courts’
civil backlog, that is, the ability of the judiciary to dispose of civil cases in a given year.
Schedule is a continuous variable, which ranges from 0 to 1 according to the proportion of
the healthcare provider’s territory covered by Court′js district, which adopts schedules of
noneconomic damages and t≥t∗j, where t∗j is the year in which the treatment was adopted
by Courtj.
50 D represents the DID coeﬃcient, that is the estimated impact of schedules in-
troduction. Backlogpt∗Schedulept represents the interaction between Backlog and Schedule.
We use two sets of controls. First, we control with Xpt for a group of socio-economic
variables at the level of the healthcare provider that reﬂect the main characteristics of the
population served. In particular, we consider:
• LHU popres : the size of the population covered by the LHU,
• LHU income: the average income level of the population covered by the LHU,
• LHU old : the share of the residents in the LHU older than 65, and
• LHU foreigners : the share of foreigner residents in the LHU.
Secondly, we control with Zct for speciﬁc features of tenders that are particularly rele-
vant when the insurers’ behavior is analyzed. In fact, when focusing on the supply side of
an insurance contract, we include the main characteristics of the public procurement proce-
dures that can contribute to the explanation of insurers’ reactions to the providers’ requests.
Speciﬁcally, we consider:
• Open Tender : the type of procurement procedures run by the healthcare providers (i.e.
ordinary procedures vs. negotiations),
• MEAT : the awarding criteria applied (i.e. the most economically advantageous tender
criterion vs. the lowest price criterion), and
• Broker : the involvement of an insurance broker in the management of the procurement
procedure.51
At the same time, we also control with Qpt for those policies at the local level that
may inﬂuence the behavior of LHUs towards medical malpractice, such as, for instance,
the monitoring system for medical malpractice claims, that has been implemented in some
regions.52 Since during the observation period 21% of the procurement procedures were run
jointly by two or more healthcare providers, as a robustness check we estimate Equation
50This means that Schedule is equal to 1 when the entire territory of the healthcare provider p is covered
by courts adopting schedules of noneconomic damages.
51For further details on variables’ deﬁnition and their sources see in Table 5.6 in the Appendix A.
52Amaral Garcia and Grembi (2012).
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4.2 dropping the cases of joint contracting. In fact, it might be that a joint procedure
yields better prices due to the higher bargaining power enjoyed by the healthcare providers
involved. Furthermore, with respect to Bidders and Potential Bidders, we also run the same
speciﬁcation on the sole tenders with at least one applicant to verify that the expected eﬀects
on the number of bidders did not aﬀect only the procedures that failed due to lack of bids.
4.4 The Dataset and Descriptive Statistics
We use a unique and comprehensive dataset, created speciﬁcally for the present study by
exploiting three main sources of information. In Italy, there does not exist an exhaustive
database gathering together all tenders run by public healthcare providers to contract out
their insurance services and the information on the related tendered contracts. However,
public procurement procedures have to fulﬁll transparency and advertising obligations.53 In
particular, they require the release of speciﬁc information on the characteristics of both the
tenders and the procured contracts on the Oﬃcial Journal of the European Union (OJ).54
For this reason, all the information on medical malpractice insurance contracts and related
awarding procedures has been gathered through this periodical,55 which constitutes the most
valuable and detailed data source on the tendering processes carried out by the public sector
in European countries.
Furtherly, we have integrated and checked this data with information provided by both
the Italian Authority for the Supervision of Public Contracts and a private ﬁrm, Telemat,
specialized in managing information on public contracts and related awarding procedures.
All these combined sources allow us to exploit the most complete picture, available so far,
of the Italian public procurement market for malpractice insurance for the period 2000-
2010.56 The information obtained comprises, among other things, the identity and type of
contracting authority; the location of the contracting authority; the type of procurement
procedure adopted; the award criterion applied; the length of the insurance contract; the
winner of the procurement procedure; the number of bidders in the tendering process; and
the ﬁnal value of the awarded contract.57
53For a more detailed description of the transparency and advertising obligations foreseen by the Italian
public procurement legislation, see Section 4.8.1 in Appendix B.
54The Oﬃcial Journal of the European Union is a periodical released every working day in all oﬃcial
languages of the European Union. This publication includes a series devoted to legislation, a related series
for information and notices, and a supplement dedicated to public procurement.
55In particular, we have resorted to the OJ’s supplement on public procurement using both its DVD-ROM
edition and its online version (the so-called Tenders Electronic Daily - TED).
56Only two other studies tried to analyze the public procurement market for malpractice insurance in
Italy: Buzzacchi and Gracis (2008) and Perna et al. (2010). However, given the deﬁciency of information
and the diﬃculties of collecting the data needed, both of them focus on a much shorter time period and,
consequently, on a more limited amount of information. Speciﬁcally, Buzzacchi and Gracis (2008) recover
information on 308 awarding procedures for the period 2003-2006, whereas Perna et al. (2010) examine 56
tendering processes run between 2009 and 2010.
57The data collected through both the Oﬃcial Journal of the European Union and Telemat do not provide
any information regarding the identity of bidders.
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A second source of information has been the Italian Ministry of Health, which releases
data on public providers characteristics (e.g. number of hospitals, personnel, beds). This
information was then integrated with data from the Italian Institute of Statistics on the
characteristics of the reference population covered by the healthcare providers (e.g. age
composition, nationality, average income).
Finally, we collected data on the judicial system through the Italian Ministry of Justice.
For each Court of First Instance and year, we have information on the number of new cases,
the number of cases closed with a sentence, and the overall number of closed cases. Further-
more, we have reconstructed the process of schedules adoption at the level of the individual
court’s district gathering data on (i) the year of introduction of schedules of noneconomic
losses; (ii) the structure of the schedules (i.e. the monetary value of the points); and (iii)
the minimum and maximum compensation foreseen in the hypothesis of death of a family
member (i.e parent, child, sibling, grandparent, grandchild and spouse).58
Consistently with the institutional framework, we did not include in the ﬁnal dataset
the information regarding the healthcare providers located in Piedmont and, for the period
2007-2010, in Friuli Venezia Giulia. As discussed in Section 2.4.1, these two regions have
implemented speciﬁc schemes of self-insurance by establishing special regional funds for the
management of malpractice risk. Consequently, the process of acquisition of malpractice
coverage of the public healthcare providers placed in these two regions signiﬁcantly diﬀers
from that of the structures located elsewhere in the country. In fact, they primarily resort to a
public insurer (i.e. the regional government), while the present work is aimed at investigating
the eﬀects of schedules and judicial performance on the decisions of private companies to oﬀer
malpractice coverage.59
Overall, we identify 812 procurement procedures for medical professional liability insur-
ance during the period 2000-2010 for a total of 1,222 observations as shown in Table 4.6.
The diﬀerence between the number of procurement procedures and the total number of ob-
servations is due to the fact that one public procurement procedure might refer to more than
one insurance service (i.e. lots>=2) and/or it can gather together more than one auction-
eer. Consequently, a single call for tender can be used to contract out one or more medical
professional liability coverages for one or more healthcare providers.
During the observation period, 77% of all procurement procedures (i.e. 625) carried out,
equaling 78% of all tendered insurance contracts (i.e. 953), have been awarded meaning that
we have knowledge of how these tendering processes were completed (i.e. with one or more
winners or without adjudication). For the remaining 22% of the cases (i.e. 187 awarding
procedures and 269 contracts), there is no information on the outcome as we do not even
know whether they ended without the award of the procured contract.60
58We recover this information from 1996 to 2010.
59Other regions have followed the example of Piedmont and Friuli Venezia Giulia (i.e. Veneto, Emilia
Romagna, Basilicata and Tuscany). However, their self-insurance schemes became operational after 2010
and, therefore, do not constitute a potential bias for our research question.
60With respect to these procurement procedures, it has not been possible to ﬁnd any additional information
once the call for tender was opened.
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Table 4.6: Procurement Procedures and Procured Contracts per Year
All Tenders
Year Awarding procedures Contracts
Advertised Awarded Advertised Awarded
2000 65 44 73 48
2001 88 71 118 86
2002 78 59 101 71
2003 87 58 146 103
2004 88 57 127 80
2005 74 46 91 59
2006 42 39 95 86
2007 59 56 94 88
2008 66 60 107 100
2009 68 60 111 101
2010 97 75 159 131
Total 812 625 1222 953
Joint Tenders
Year Awarding procedures Contracts
Advertised Awarded Advertised Awarded
2000 2 2 4 4
2001 2 2 4 4
2002 0 0 0 0
2003 2 2 50 39
2004 5 4 21 17
2005 1 1 2 2
2006 7 6 48 42
2007 2 2 16 16
2008 4 4 30 30
2009 3 3 30 30
2010 10 10 58 55
Total 38 36 263 239
Notes: Joint Tenders= Public procurement procedures run jointly by two or more healthcare
providers to award medical malpractice insurance; Awarding procedures= Public procure-
ment procedures to award medical malpractice insurance; Contracts= Medical malpractice
insurance policies contracted out through public procurement.
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Table 4.7: Treated and Control Advertised Procurement Procedures per Year
Year Awarding Procedures Contracts
Treated Control Treated Control
2000 13 65 17 56
2001 11 88 15 103
2002 8 78 12 89
2003 17 89 20 126
2004 14 89 20 107
2005 10 74 14 77
2006 8 46 12 83
2007 9 58 14 80
2008 4 67 11 96
2009 7 68 11 100
2010 6 99 14 145
Total 107 705 160 1062
Notes: Awarding procedures= Public procurement procedures to award medical malpractice in-
surance; Contracts= Medical malpractice insurance contracted out through public procurement.
Treated=In the territory of the healthcare provider running the procedure the coverage level of
schedules increased between 2000 and 2010; Control=In the territory of the healthcare provider
running the procedure the coverage level of schedules did not increase between 2000 and 2010.
In addition, Table 4.7 shows the distribution of advertised procurement procedures per
year distinguishing between treated and controls. All this information is available at the
provider level: LHUs, IHs, THs and RHs. The analyzed contracts refer to 308 diﬀerent
providers, which represent the 86% of the entire population of Italian providers. In particular,
more than half of them are LHUs (61.4%), while slightly less than a third are IHs (25.6%).
Table 4.8: Type of Healthcare Providers per Year (Treated vs. Control)
LHUs IHs THs RHs
Treated 59 9 2 0
Control 130 70 21 17
Total 189 79 23 17
Notes: LHUs=Local Health Units; IHs=Independent Hospitals; THs=Teaching Hospitals;
RHs=Institutes for Scientiﬁc Research. Treated=In the territory of the healthcare provider
running the procedure the coverage level of schedules increased between 2000 and 2010;
Control=In the territory of the healthcare provider running the procedure the coverage level
of schedules did not increase between 2000 and 2010.
Conversely, in the dataset, the presence of THs and of RHs is quite limited as they
account respectively for 7.4% and 5.5% of all healthcare providers (Table 4.8). During the
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same period, 67 healthcare providers were treated since they were covered by at least one
court that introduced schedules during the observation period. On the contrary, 231 were
not treated as they were ruled exclusively by courts that did not modify their procedure to
evaluate noneconomic damages during the same reference period.
Table 4.9: Descriptive Statistics on the Sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Backlog 3.66 1.14
Schedule 0.81 0.38
Bidders 2.19 2.72
Bidders>0 2.72 2.79
Potential Bidders 0.05 0.06
Premium per personnel (ac) 5,906.17 18,492.66
Premium per medical personnel (ac) 9,515.03 31,585.84
Premium per personnel (sc) 4,147.76 18,659.40
Premium per medical personnel (sc) 6,705.61 30,671.57
Open Tender 0.81 0.39
MEAT 0.43 0.49
Broker 0.39 0.49
Joint Contract 0.21 0.41
Duration 34.62 12.14
Number of Beds 708.33 537.76
Personnel 2,115.12 1,609.60
Medical Personnel 1,316.27 1,020.01
LHU popres 519,031.4 408,876.50
LHU income 20,516.74 4,081.58
LHU old 0.20 0.03
LHU foreigners 0.04 0.03
Notes: Backlog=Civil Backlog; Schedule=Intensity of implementation of noneconomic damages schedules by the courts
covering a same healthcare providers’ territory. Bidders=The number of insurance companies submitting an oﬀer to a
tender for medical malpractice insurance; Bidders>0=The number of insurance companies submitting an oﬀer to a tender
for medical malpractice insurance where there has been at least one other bidding insurer; Potential Bidders=Number of
insurers bidding out of potential insurers represented by all the insurers already dealing with healthcare providers that
can oﬀer medical malpractice coverage; Premium per personnel=Paid malpractice premium normalized by the employed
personnel (2011 euros); Premium per medical personnel=Paid malpractice premium normalized by the employed physi-
cians and nurses (2011 euros). Open Tender=Ordinary public procurement procedure (i.e. open or restricted auction);
MEAT=The awarding criterion is the most economically advantageous tender; Broker=The awarding authority is as-
sisted by an insurance broker. Joint Contract=Two or more healthcare providers carry out a common procurement pro-
cedure. Duration=Duration of the insurance contract in months. (ac)=all contracts. (sc)=single contracts, those with
only one contractor. Number of Beds=Number of beds at the level of healthcare providers, Personnel=Total personnel at
the level of healthcare providers, Medical Personnel=Employed physicians and nurses at the level of healthcare providers.
LHU popres=Population at the LHU level; LHU income=Income per capita (2011 euros) at the LHU level; LHU old=Quota
of the population above 65 at the LHU level; LHU foreigners=Quota of the foreign population at the LHU level.
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Table 4.9 displays the main descriptive statistics. In the overall sample, for every closed
case, a civil court leaves unresolved on average 3.66 proceedings. In 83% of the cases, health-
care providers have opted for and run an open procurement procedure (i.e. an open auction or
a restricted auction), while in the remaining 19% of the cases they carried out a negotiation.
Two or more healthcare providers joined together to run a common tendering process in
5% of the cases, which correspond to 21% of the tendered insurance contracts. Healthcare
providers have relied on the support of an insurance broker in 39% of the times, whereas
they applied a more ﬂexible awarding criteria in 43% of the tenders preferring the most
economically advantageous tender criterion to the lowest price one.
More interestingly, the insurance companies actually presenting an oﬀer to a procurement
procedure and, therefore, interested in providing Italian healthcare providers with medical
professional liability amounted on average to 2. This ﬁgure represented only 5% of all poten-
tial competitors. In other words, only 5% of all insurers already providing other insurance
policies to Italian healthcare facilities, but also capable of oﬀering this type of coverage, were
actually doing so. Furthermore, the average number of bidders turns out to be limited even
when we do not consider the procurement procedures that failed for absence of bids. In fact,
this ﬁgure increases from 2.19 to 2.72 insurers.
On average, healthcare providers pay 4,148 euros per general employee, that is equal to
6,706 euros per medical employee, to cover their personnel against third party liability. These
premiums increase to 5,906 and 9,151 euros respectively if we take into consideration also
the procurement procedures run jointly by two or more providers. As for the operational
characteristics of the LHUs, they are responsible for providing medical care services to an
average population of 519,031 individuals with an average income equal to 20,516 euros. On
average, 20% of the population covered is represented by individuals older than 65, whereas
4% is constituted by foreign individuals. Besides the descriptive statistics on the overall
sample, Table 4.10 reports some descriptives for the treated and the control.61
Overall, the data collected shows that the acquisition of insurance coverage against mal-
practice by Italian healthcare providers is characterized by the predominant use of auctions
(i.e. open or restricted) that are only in a marginal part run jointly by two or more contrac-
tors. Nonetheless, the vast majority of procurement proceedings are open to all potential
interested applicants, the average participation of insurers is very low to the extent that only
a very small portion of all the insurance companies capable of oﬀering malpractice policies
to hospitals, actually do so.
61Since courts are switching to the treatment (i.e. schedules introduction) in diﬀerent years, the usual
graphical tests are not suitable for our dataset.
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Table 4.10: Descriptive Statistics (Treated vs. Control)
Variable Treated Control
Bidders 2.07 2.21
(2.26) (2.79)
Bidders>0 2.83 2.71
(2.20) (2.86)
Potential Bidders 0.04 0.05
(0.05) (0.06)
Premium per personnel 3,209.12 6,385.24
(5,108.19) (19,916.95)
Premium per medical personnel 5,219.05 10,277.72
(8,064.65) (34,055.74)
Notes: Mean values reported. Standard deviations in parenthesis. Bidders=The number of insurance companies
submitting an oﬀer to a tender for medical malpractice insurance; Bidders>0=The number of insurance companies
submitting an oﬀer to a tender for medical malpractice insurance where there has been at least one other bidding
insurer; Potential Bidders=Number of insurers bidding out of potential insurers represented by all the insurers
already dealing with healthcare providers that can oﬀer medical malpractice coverage. Premium per personnel=Paid
malpractice premium normalized by the employed personnel (2011 euros); Premium per medical personnel=Paid
malpractice premium normalized by the employed physicians and nurses (2011 euros). Treated=In the territory of
the healthcare provider the coverage level of schedules increased between 2000 and 2010; Control=In the territory
of the healthcare provider the coverage level of schedules did not increase between 2000 and 2010.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Description of the Results
Tables 4.11 and 4.12 present the main results for the attractiveness of the market for medical
malpractice insurance, that is, for insurers’ decisions to provide medical professional liability
coverage to healthcare providers. For each outcome variable, we have estimated the same
model speciﬁcation for the entire dataset and for the dataset without joint contracts (i.e.
more than one healthcare provider as auctioneer) as a robustness check. Nevertheless, to
interpret these eﬀects we need to remember that while Schedule can be set equal to zero
as this situation would correspond to the case in which schedules are not adopted by any
of the courts ruling the territory of a given healthcare provider, the same does not hold for
Backlog. In fact, the minimum value of civil backlog is 1, which reﬂects the absence of
backlog as the court is capable to dispose of all entering and pending cases. Therefore, while
the coeﬃcient of Backlog (θ) can be interpreted independently from the coeﬃcient of the
interaction between Backlog and Schedule (ω), the impact of Schedule is always the sum of
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its coeﬃcient (D) and the coeﬃcient of the interaction (ω).
In order to interpret the diﬀerent coeﬃcients and provide an idea of the magnitude of
these eﬀects, diﬀerent scenarios have been simulated. In particular, as explained in Section
4.3.1, our treatment is a continuous variable as it is measured in relation to LHUs districts.
Given that the territory of a LHU may be ruled by more than one court, the use of scheduled
damages may actually cover only a portion of the LHU’s district. As a consequence, in
order to perform these simulations we have to consider the distribution of the intensity of
the treatment (i.e. Schedule). In practice, this means that we provide the magnitude of the
impact of a standard deviation increase in Schedule (i.e. 0.38) for diﬀerent levels of Backlog
using the percentiles of Backlog distribution. Similarly, to interpret the eﬀects of a standard
deviation increase in Backlog (i.e. 1.14) we take into account diﬀerent levels of Schedule
according to our estimates.
Table 4.11: Bidders
Bidders Bidders>0
All Single All Single
Contracts Contracts Contracts Contracts
IRR (1) (2) (3) (4)
Backlog 0.785*** 0.749*** 0.715*** 0.793***
(0.054) (0.045) (0.089) (0.041)
Schedule 0.556 1.462 0.461 1.269
(0.308) (0.992) (0.250) (0.875)
Backlog*Schedule 1.504** 1.728*** 1.787*** 1.696***
(0.244) (0.339) (0.297) (0.285)
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 577 496 416 307
Notes: All Contracts=All malpractice insurance contracts (with one or multiple contractors); Single
Contracts=All malpractice insurance contracts with only one contractor. Bidders=The number of in-
surance companies submitting an oﬀer to a tender for medical malpractice insurance, Bidders>0=The
number of insurance companies submitting an oﬀer to a tender for medical malpractice insurance
where there has been at least one other bidding insurer. Backlog=Civil Backlog; Schedule=Intensity
of implementation of noneconomic damages schedules by the courts covering a same healthcare
providers’ territory. Controls include: Open Tender, MEAT , Broker, Duration, Joint Contracts,
LHU popres, LHU income, LHU old, and LHU foreigners. FE= Fixed eﬀects at the year, provider,
and geographical area level. Poisson regressions. Coeﬃcients represent incidence-rate ratios so that
a coeﬃcient higher than 1 stands for positive impact and a coeﬃcient lower than 1 for negative im-
pact. Standard errors clustered at the regional level in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is
represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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First, we consider the impact of Schedule and Backlog on the absolute number of bidders,
thus on the insurers actually operating in the reference market (Table 4.11).62 With respect to
Backlog alone, we obtain that the number of insurers providing medical professional liability
insurance decreases as civil backlog increases in a market with no scheduled damages for pain
and suﬀering. However, once the territorial coverage of schedules is diﬀerent from zero, then
the market attractiveness for insurers increases and grows to a greater extent the slower the
judicial process. Speciﬁcally, an increase in Backlog reduces the number of insurers by 10%
in the sample of all contracts when Schedule is equal to 0. Whilst, for an average intensity of
Schedule (i.e. 0.81), the same variation in courts’ performance raises the number of bidding
insurers by 11% and this increases to 16% with Schedule equal to 1.
An increase in the intensity of Schedule per se does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect and
seems to improve market attractiveness in some speciﬁcations while decreasing it in others.
However, when interacted with Backlog, Schedule turns out to have a robust signiﬁcant
eﬀect. The simulations performed indicate that an increase in the intensity of schedules
application in an ineﬃcient judicial context makes the medical malpractice insurance market
more attractive and it increases the number of insurers willing to provide coverage. An
increase of a standard deviation of Schedule (i.e. 0.38) when the judiciary is fully eﬃcient
(i.e. Backlog=1) produces a 1% decrease in the number of bidders in the entire sample. The
same increase for an average performing court (i.e. Backlog=3.66) raises by 22% the number
of insurance companies attracted by the reference market, whereas for the tail of very poor
performing courts (i.e. Backlog=5.67, that is the 95th percentile of Backlog distribution)
this impact on bidders is equal to plus 38%.63
These results are consistent for all our speciﬁcations and are also conﬁrmed with respect
to the number of bidders out of all potential competitors (i.e. Potential Bidders) (Table
4.12).64 When a court is capable to dispose basically all the pending and entering cases
(i.e. Backlog=1), an increase of a standard deviation of Schedule is estimated to reduce the
relative number of bidders by 8% in the entire sample.
Conversely, as soon as the judiciary moves away from this level of performance, the relative
attractiveness of the malpractice insurance line grows. So that, for instance, the number of
bidders out of all potential competitors rises by 50% when an increase in the territorial
coverage of schedules occurs in an averaging performing judicial system. This means that
the increase in the number of insurance companies attracted by the reference line of insurance
is not due to the simple entrance of new insurers that never worked with healthcare facilities
before. Still, there is a shift in some insurers, which were already working with healthcare
providers, from not being, to being willing to cover Italian healthcare organizations against
third party liability. Such a phenomenon is consistent with the diﬃculties to operate in the
reference business. The provision of malpractice coverage to medical organizations requires
62Table 4.11 reports incidence rate ratios (IRR) values, because we are applying a Poisson estimator.
Consequently, values higher than 1 identify coeﬃcients with a positive eﬀect on the reference outcome,
whereas values lower than 1 stand for a negative eﬀect.
63In particular, for more information on how to interpret incidence rate ratio, see Cameron and Trivedi
(2005), p. 562.
64Table 4.12 reports ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation results.
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Table 4.12: Potential Bidders
All Single
Contracts Contracts
OLS (1) (2)
Backlog -0.015** -0.021***
(0.006) (0.007)
Schedule -0.068** -0.004
(0.029) (0.040)
Backlog*Schedule 0.029*** 0.039***
(0.008) (0.013)
FE Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
Obs 577 496
Notes: All Contracts=All malpractice insurance contracts (with one or mul-
tiple contractors); Single Contracts=All malpractice insurance contracts with
only one contractor. Potential Bidders=Number of insurers bidding out of po-
tential insurers represented by all the insurers already dealing with healthcare
providers that can oﬀer medical malpractice coverage. Backlog=Civil Backlog;
Schedule=Intensity of implementation of noneconomic damages schedules by the
courts covering a same healthcare providers’ territory. Controls include: Open
Tender, MEAT , Broker, Duration, Joint Contracts, LHU popres, LHU income
LHU old, and LHU foreigners. FE= Fixed eﬀects at the year, provider, and ge-
ographical area level. OLS regression. Standard errors clustered at the regional
level in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5%
level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
speciﬁc expertise that combines the knowledge of the insurance industry and of malpractice
coverage with that of the hospital sector.
As for courts’ performance alone, an increase of a standard deviation of Backlog, when
noneconomic damages are not scheduled, determines a 30% decline of the relative attractive-
ness of the market. This negative eﬀect gets smaller and smaller for higher levels of schedules
coverage. So that, for instance, the number of bidders out of all potential medical malpractice
insurers decreases by 4% when there is an intensity of schedules implementation equal to 0.4,
while it increases by 24% for an average value of Schedule (i.e. 0.81).
Finally, it is important to remark that no signiﬁcant eﬀect is detected in relation to paid
premiums (Table 4.13).
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Table 4.13: Paid Premiums
Per Personnel Per Medical Personnel
All Single All Single
Contracts Contracts Contracts Contracts
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4)
Backlog -63.352 -116.330 -172.341 -190.252
(343.919) (391.117) (548.540) (645.541)
Schedule -1,326.754 -2,104.937 -2,182.202 -3,680.632
(2,024.897) (2,187.660) (3,235.044) (3,441.143)
Backlog*Schedule 98.986 302.969 183.747 526.217
(420.005) (331.458) (712.428) (567.250)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 577 496 577 496
Notes: All Contracts=All malpractice insurance contracts (with one or multiple contractors); Single Con-
tracts=All malpractice insurance contracts with only one contractor. Per Personnel=Paid malpractice pre-
mium normalized by the employed personnel (2011 euros); Per Medical Personnel=Paid malpractice premium
normalized by the employed physicians and nurses (2011 euros); Backlog=Civil Backlog; Schedule=Intensity
of implementation of noneconomic damages schedules by the courts covering a same healthcare providers’
territory. OLS regressions. Controls include: Number of Beds, Open Tender, MEAT , Broker, Duration,
Joint Contracts, LHU popres, LHU income, LHU old, and LHU foreigners. FE=Fixed eﬀects at the year,
provider, and geographical area level. Standard errors clustered at the regional level in parenthesis. Signiﬁ-
cance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
4.5.2 Discussion of the Results
The outcomes of an increase in schedules coverage on both Bidders and Potential Bidders
are consistent with the combined expected eﬀect of Schedule and Backlog on the expected
frequency and severity of errors. A well performing court entails a higher degree of certainty
in trials’ duration, thus injured parties might be encouraged to ﬁle claims, exerting a stronger
pressure on physicians, who therefore have higher incentives to take an eﬃcient level of care.
In such a context, an intensiﬁcation of schedules adoption has the actual eﬀect of decreasing
the malpractice risk perceived by doctors leading to more frequent, and potentially more
serious, errors. Yet, since it is not straightforward for insurers to estimate the potential
increase in errors and related claims that they will have to face, this eﬀect might contrast that
of the eﬃcient court system, making the malpractice insurance market less attractive for the
incumbents. For new operators, this reduction in the market attractiveness is higher, because
they suﬀer a more limited knowledge of the speciﬁc line of business and of its dynamics. By
contrast, if an increase in the territorial coverage of schedules occurs in a poor performing
judiciary, the subsequent reduction of the variability and uncertainty of awards reinforces the
attractive features of the market for both existing and prospective insurers.
144
128 Results
To make the interpretation of the ﬁnal results more straightforward given the actual
distribution of Backlog and Schedule, we plot graphs with an upper part reproducing the
estimated eﬀects of either Backlog or Schedule given diﬀerent values of the other variable,
and a lower part with the actual distribution of the latter in the sample. As a matter of fact,
it might be the case that full judicial eﬃciency (i.e. Backlog=1) is a scenario that never
takes place in our sample, or that Schedule is only in a very limited number of cases equal,
for instance, to 0.2. Yet, this further exercise will help to form a better view of the predicted
eﬀects and to understand – through a visual inspection based on the actual distribution of
observations – the relative importance of simulating the actual eﬀects of one variable for
diﬀerent points of the distribution of the other (i.e. for speciﬁc possible values of Schedule or
Backlog). The simulated impact of increases of Schedule on Bidders and Potential Bidders
are plotted in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 respectively, while the eﬀects of a change of Backlog on
the same outcomes are plotted in Figures 4.6 and 4.7.
In reality, as depicted in the lower part of Figures 4.4 and 4.5, the ideal case of the impact
of Schedule in the hypothesis of a fully eﬃcient court basically does not describe situations
that can be found in our sample. Only 5% of the courts in our sample report a level of civil
backlog lower than 2.37, whereas around 50% register a value between 2.93 and 4.14. This
means that for a small fraction of cases an increase in the territorial coverage of schedules
enhances the presence of bidding insurers by 10% and these bidders weighed on all potential
competitors grow by 22%. Whilst, for a more representative part of the sample an increase
of a standard deviation of Schedule raises the absolute number of bidders between 15 and
25% and the weighed one between 35 and 60%.
Figure 4.4: Eﬀects of Noneconomic Damages Schedules on Bidders
Notes: Vertical axis: Estimated impact of an increase of a standard deviation
of Schedule— 0.38 — given diﬀerent levels of civil backlog on the number of
bidders. The impact is expressed in percentages. Horizontal axis: Levels of civil
backlog.
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Figure 4.5: Eﬀects of Noneconomic Damages Schedules on Potential Bidders
Notes: Vertical axis: Estimated impact of an increase of a standard deviation
of Schedule— 0.38 — given diﬀerent levels of civil backlog on the number of
bidders out of all potential competitors. The impact is expressed in percentages.
Horizontal axis: Levels of civil backlog.
The most likely explanation behind the negative relationship between Backlog and in-
surers’ interest in the reference market when noneconomic damages are not scheduled is that
poorly performing judiciaries entail greater diﬃculties for insurance companies in determin-
ing their risk exposure. A high civil backlog means that it is more complex for insurers
to predict when a case will come to an end. Therefore, in the case of an occurrence-based
policy, insurers do not know when and how much they will have to pay; while in the case
of a claims-made policy, insurers cannot also predict how many cases they will inherit from
previous years. These negative implications prevail on the possible advantage of postponing
the payment in the future gaining more time to invest the collected premiums, and poorly
performing courts end up discouraging insurance companies from oﬀering malpractice cover-
age. Diﬀerently, if courts’ backlog grows in a context covered, even partially, by schedules,
then the potential increase in the number and severity of medical error is contrasted by the
positive eﬀect of schedules on the predictability of compensations and also by an increase in
the bargaining power of insurers with respect to victims and the payments of compensations.
According to the actual distribution of schedules adoption in our sample (lower part of
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 ), once civil backlog increases, we estimate a decrease in the number
of bidding insurers only for 17% of the cases, whereas in the overwhelming majority, we
estimate an increase in the number of insurers attending the procurement process. Likewise,
a lengthening of the processing time of trials produces a decline in the number of bidders
out all potential competitors in 18% of the cases. In fact, the upper part of both Figures 4.6
and 4.7 shows that the negative impact of an increase in Backlog on both the absolute and
weighed number of insurers ranges between -10 to -2% and -30 to -17% respectively, as the
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Figure 4.6: Eﬀects of Backlog on Bidders
Notes: Vertical axis: Estimated impact of an increase of a standard deviation of
Backlog— 1.14 — given diﬀerent levels of Schedule on the number of bidders.
The impact is expressed in percentages. Horizontal axis: Levels of schedules
implementation.
Figure 4.7: Eﬀects of Backlog on Potential Bidders
Notes: Vertical axis: Estimated impact of an increase of a standard deviation
of Backlog— 1.14 — given diﬀerent levels of Schedule on the number of bid-
ders out of all potential competitors. The impact is expressed in percentages.
Horizontal axis: Levels of schedules implementation.
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intensity of schedules adoption grows from 0 to 30% in the healthcare provider’s territory. For
a coverage level of around 40%, a worsening of the judicial performance actually increases
the number of bidders by 1% which becomes 3% if the healthcare provider’s territory is
covered for a 50%. Similarly, the number of bidding insurance companies out of all potential
competitors decreases by 4% for a coverage level of around 40%, but it grows by 3% when
the intensity of schedules adoption amounts to 50%.
As for paid premiums, the lack of signiﬁcant results is not at odds with the expectations
since insurance rates require a lengthly process of adjustment to changes in paid compen-
sations after an increase in the coverage of schedules.65 Therefore, our observation period
might be too short to appreciate the impact on the premiums paid by healthcare providers.
It might also take time to appreciate the potential impact of an increase in competition.
We can expect that the new bidders attracted by the reference market after this variation
in Schedule are in a disadvantaged position compared to incumbents. In fact, they have to
deal with a completely new business that signiﬁcantly diﬀers from other lines of insurance.66
Therefore, these new entrants might not be able from the very beginning to make an oﬀer
that constitutes a real threat for the companies already operating in the market and the
increase in the number of bidding companies results in being too weak to immediately aﬀect
insurance rates.
However, even if the market becomes more attractive to insurers, healthcare providers
might not be able to extract the rent out of the insurance companies. Markets become more
attractive especially in very poorly performing judicial districts. The healthcare providers
covered by those districts could suﬀer from such an information asymmetry when it comes
to estimate their risk exposure that they are not able to take advantage from the increased
competition during the acquisition of malpractice coverage. Being without proper monitoring
systems and dealing with long lasting trials that give less valuable guidance on the attitude
of judges towards damages and their assessment, makes it more diﬃcult for hospitals to
be aware of the coverage they need. Hence, since an increase in market attractiveness for
insurers does not reduce the information gap for providers, it might not lead to a variation
in premiums.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
The present chapter provides an empirical evaluation of the impact of an increase in the
territorial coverage of noneconomic damages schedules on the number of insurers operating
in the market for malpractice insurance – in absolute terms and in relation to all potential
competitors in the market – and on insurance premiums. The novelty of our approach,
aside from working at the healthcare provider level, is grounded in the analysis of schedules
65See, for instance, Currie and MacLeod (2008). Speciﬁcally, the authors point out that, given the lengthy
mean time between an injury occurrence and the settlement of a claim (6 years in the U.S. experience),
tort reforms, including caps, aﬀect premiums only with a relative long lag. Diﬀerently, for instance, the
probability of a claim can be faster responsive to these legislative interventions.
66See Mello (2006b).
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adoption in the context of diﬀerent scenarios of its enforcing mechanism, that is, the judicial
system.
Our results are based on the analysis of the Italian case, whose institutional framework
lends itself particularly well to the investigation of the impact of schedules. First, the public
nature of the Italian health system limits the strategic decisions, that are made by healthcare
organizations with the intention of reducing their litigation risk, on the composition of medical
services. Second, Italy is characterized by a spatial variation in both the implementation of
schedules and judicial performance. Third, the imperfect territorial overlapping between
court districts and healthcare providers’ districts rules out a possible correlation between
courts’ caseload and hospital activity. All these elements allow us to beneﬁt from a quasi-
experiment design with the exogeneity of the year of treatment defended on the base that
schedules apply to every kind of injury.
More in general, the present analysis sheds light on the potential impact of malpractice
reforms in countries where trial cases play a key role with respect to malpractice litigation.
The main indication that emerges from our ﬁndings is that while premiums are not signif-
icantly aﬀected, the level of courts’ civil backlog and the intensity of schedules adoption
conditional on judicial performance inﬂuence the participation rate of private insurers in
the reference market. Speciﬁcally, depending on courts’ performance, this market becomes
more, or less attractive for insurance companies. In particular, the higher the civil backlog
in the absence of scheduled damages, which increases the uncertainty and potential length of
claims, the fewer the insurers willing to cover public healthcare providers against third-party
liability. In addition, the share of insurers willing to operate in the reference market gets
smaller also compared to all potential competitors. Hence, the lower number of companies
oﬀering malpractice coverage reﬂects a loss of interest in this speciﬁc line of insurance com-
pared to other insurance services. The main determinant of this negative relation is that
companies facing poorly performing courts have greater diﬃculties in predicting how much
and how many damages claims they will compensate due to the more uncertain and longer
duration of trials. Furthermore, these negative implications end up playing a greater role
in driving the decisions of insurers than the potential advantage of delaying the payment of
compensations and of having at their disposal the premiums collected for a longer period.
Conversely, the intensity of the adoption of schedules increases the attractiveness of the
reference line of insurance when the judicial system is a poor performer. The longer the
time required by the judiciary to dispose a claim, the bigger is the positive eﬀect exerted by
this legislative intervention, and the more attractive the reference market becomes. In such
contexts, insurers exploit the double advantage of a higher degree of certainty over the ﬁnal
amount of the compensations to be paid and a more stringent bargaining power with respect
to plaintiﬀs and the payment of compensations. Moreover, this positive result also emerges
with respect to the market’s relative attractiveness. This means that the increased number
of insurers interested in covering public healthcare providers against malpractice actually
corresponds to a shift in some of the existing competitors towards the reference market.
Finally, the absence of signiﬁcant eﬀects on paid premiums could be due to the fact that
it takes time before insurance rates are adjusted and competition exerts an impact on prices
after the intensiﬁcation of schedules adoption. At the same, it could also be that healthcare
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providers are simply not able to take advantage of the higher presence of insurers because
of their limited capacity in determining their coverage need, which lowers their bargaining
power during tenders. Our analysis suggests that when the target is a decrease in premiums,
policymakers should try to improve not only the attractiveness of the market to insurance
companies, but also the bargaining power of healthcare providers with respect to private
insurers. In this regard, for example, a possible instrument to strengthen the bargaining
power of Italian hospitals could be the implementation of monitoring systems for malpractice
claims as shown by Garcia and Grembi (2012). The authors ﬁnd precisely that such a policy
increases the available information on malpractice, leading to more convenient premiums.
Speciﬁcally, thanks to this greater amount of information, providers become more aware of
their risk exposure. Consequently, they would improve their ability “to extract the rent from
private bidders.”67
67Garcia and Grembi (2012), p. 18.
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4.7 Appendix A: Additional Tables and Figures
Table 4.14: Variables deﬁnition and sources
Variable Type Deﬁnition Source
Backlog Continuous Number of new cases plus number of pending cases from
the previous year out of the number of closed cases
IMJ
Bidders Continuous Number of insurance companies submitting an oﬀer to a
tender for medical malpractice insurance
TED, ASPC
and Telemat
Bidders>0 Continuous Number of insurance companies submitting an oﬀer to a
tender for medical malpractice insurance where there has
been at least one bidder
TED, ASPC
and Telemat
Broker Dummy Equal 1 if (and 0 otherwise): TED, ASPC
the contracting authority is assisted by a broker and Telemat
Duration Continuous Length of the contract expressed in months TED, ASPC
and Telemat
Joint Contract Dummy Equal 1 if (and 0 otherwise): TED, ASPC
two or more healthcare providers carry out a common pro-
curement procedure
and Telemat
LHU foreigner Continuous Quota of the foreign population at the local healthcare IMH and
provider level ISTAT
LHU income Continuous Income at the local healthcare provider level IMF
LHU old Continuous Quota of the population above 65 at the local healthcare IMH and
provider level ISTAT
LHU popres Continuous Population at the local healthcare provider level IMH
MEAT Dummy Equal 1 if (and 0 otherwise): TED, ASPC
the applied award criterion is the most economically ad-
vantageous tender criterion
and Telemat
Notes: TED= Tender Electronic Daily; ASPC=Italian Authority for the Supervision of Public Contracts; Telemat=Private
ﬁrm specialized in the management of information on public contracts and public procurement procedures; IMH= Italian
Ministry of Health; IMF= Italian Ministry of Finance; IMJ=Italian Ministry of Justice; ISTAT=Italian Institute of Statistics.
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Table 4.15: Insurance Companies for Medical Malpractice Insurance
Insurer North Center South
Allianz X X
Amtrust Europe Limited X X X
Aon SpA X
Assimoco SpA X X
BPB Assicurazioni X X
Carige Assicurazioni SpA X X
Chartis Europe SA X
City Insurance X
Ergo Assicurazioni X
Europe Assistance SpA X X
Faro SpA X X X
Fondiaria SAI X X X
Generali X X X
Gerling X X X
IGI Insurance Company Limited X X X
INA Assitalia X
Intermedia Broker X
Janua X
Lloyd’s X X X
Marsh SpA X
Navale Assicurazioni X X
Obe International Insurance LTD X
QBE Insurance LTD X X X
Reale Mutua Assicurazioni X X
Societa` Cattolica Assicurazioni X X X
Trust Risk Group X
Unionvita X
Unipol X X X
Ventura Assicurazioni Sas X
Willis X
XL Insurance Company LTD X X
Zurich Insurance Company X X X
Notes: Insurance Companies Medical Malpractice=Insurance companies that
have signed at least one medical malpractice insurance policy with at least one
healthcare provider as a result of a public procurement procedure run in the
period 2000-2010 in Italy.
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Table 4.18: Courthouses Distribution
Region Courthouse Region Courthouse Region Courthouse
Abruzzo Emilia Lombardy
Romagna
Avezzano Bologna Bergamo
Chieti Ferrara Brescia
L’Aquila Forl`ı Busto Arsizio
Lanciano Modena Como
Pescara Parma Crema
Sulmona Piacenza Cremona
Teramo Ravenna Lecco
Vasto Reggio nell’Emilia Lodi
Rimini Mantova
Milano
Monza
pavia
Sondrio
Varese
Basilicata Friuli Venezia Marche
Giulia
Lagonegro Gorizia Ancona
Matera Pordedone Ascoli Piceno
Melﬁ Tolmezzo Camerino
Potenza Trieste Fermo
Udine Macerata
Pesaro
Urbino
Calabria Lazio Molise
Castrovillari Cassino Campobasso
Catanzaro Civitavecchia Isernia
Cosenza Frosinone Larino
Crotone Latina
Lamezia Terme Rieti
Locri Roma
Palmi Tivoli
Paola Velletri
Reggio di Calabria
Rossano
Vibo Valentia
Campania Liguria Piedmont
Ariano Irpino Genove Alba
Avellino Imperia Alessandria
Benevento La Spezia Asti
Cassino Sanremo Biella
Napoli Savona Casale Monferrato
Nocera Inferiore Cuneo
Nola Ivrea
Sala Consilina Mondov`ı
Salerno Novara
Sant’Angelo dei Lombardi Pinerolo
Santa Maria Capua Vetere Saluzzo
Torre Annunziata Torino
Vallo della Lucania Tortona
Verbania
Vercelli
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Table 4.18: Courthouses Distribution (cont’d)
Regions Courthouse Regions Courthouse Regions Courthouse
Puglia Trentino Veneto
Alto Adige
Bari Bolzano Bassano del Grappa
Brindisi Rovereto Belluno
Foggia Trento Padova
Lecce Rovigo
Lucera Treviso
Taranto Venezia
Trani Verona
Vicenza
Sardinia Tuscany Valle
d’Aosta
Cagliari Arezzo Aosta
Lanusei Firenze
Nuoro Grosseto
Oristano Livorno
Sassari Lucca
Tempo Pausania Massa
Montepulciano
Pisa
Pistoia
Prato
Siena
Sicily Umbria
Agrigento Orvieto
Barcellona Pozzo di Gotto Perugia
Caltagirone Spoleto
Caltanissetta Terni
Catania
Enna
Gela
Marsala
Messina
Mistretta
Modica
Nicosia
Palermo
Patti
Ragusa
Sciacca
Siracusa
Termini Imerese
Trapani
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Figure 4.8: Bidders: Trend of the Treated
Notes: On the vertical axis: the number of insurers submitting an oﬀer in a tender for
medical malpractice insurance (upper part) and the number of insurers out of the potential
number of insurers dealing with healthcare providers and capable of oﬀering malpractice
coverage (lower part). On the horizontal axis: years from schedules adoption.
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Figure 4.9: Paid Premiums: Trend of the Treated
Notes: On the vertical axis: Paid Premiums normalized per personnel and medical person-
nel. On the horizontal axis: years from schedules adoption.
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4.8 Appendix B: The Award of Public Service Con-
tracts in Italy
The Italian legislation regulating the award of public contracts has experienced a number
of reforms over the last ten years, in response, among others, to the introduction of the EU
Directives 2004/18/EC and 2004/17/EC and their successive amendments and corrections.68
Speciﬁcally, until the Seventies the award of public service contracts was governed by the
State records legislation (R.D. 2440/1923 and R.D. 827/1924) and its related modiﬁcations.
In 1995 a speciﬁc regulation was introduced with the Legislative Decree 157, 17 March 1995,
implementing the European Directive 92/50/CEE. This Decree remained in force until 2006
when it was replaced by the existing legislation, that is, the Legislative Decree 163, 12 April
2006 (known as the Public Procurement Code) also regulating the procurement of public
work contracts and public supply contracts.
Under Article 10(3) of the Public Procurement Code, public service contracts are deﬁned
as “public contracts other than public works or supply contracts having as their object the
provision of services referred to in Annex II.” This annex is further divided into two sections,
A and B. This distinction is particularly relevant since the award of the services contained
in Annex IIA is entirely regulated by the provisions of the Public Procurement Code. Con-
versely, the Legislative Decree 157 is only partially applied with respect to the acquisition of
the services listed in section B.
The Public Procurement Code also envisages the application of diﬀerent rules to public
contracts on the basis of their value distinguishing between those contracts that are of Com-
munity interest and those that are not. To be considered of Community interest, a contract
has to have a value69 exclusive of value-added tax (VAT) greater than the pre-established
thresholds that the European Commission computes every two years.70
As for the insurance service of this study, medical professional liability insurance belongs
to the category of the ﬁnancial services listed in Annex IIA and the value of contracts for this
type of insurance coverage always substantially exceeds the EU thresholds. Consequently,
the provisions applicable to the award of medical malpractice liability insurance are those
68The legislation governing the award of public service contracts has undergone minor changes compared
to those experienced by the rules applicable to the procurement of public works contracts and public supply
contracts. The awarding procedures and their functioning have remained essentially unchanged. In fact, the
main modiﬁcations have regarded the requirements that a contract has to meet in order to be considered
of community interest. However, this has no implication in case of medical malpractice liability insurance
contracts and, therefore, no impact on the present study.
69To calculate the estimated value of a public contract, the contracting authority shall take into account the
estimated total amount payable, including any form of option and any renewal of the contract. Furthermore,
the subdivision of a contract to prevent its coming within the scope of the Public Procurement Code is
forbidden. In particular, with respect to insurance services, the value, which should be taken as a basis
for the calculation of the estimated value of the contract, shall be the premium payable and other form of
remunerations. See Art. 29 of the Public Procurement Code.
70For the period from 1 January 2010 until 31 December 2011, the value of the thresholds for public service
contracts amounts to 193.000 euros. In addition, as the contracts of interest for this study are basically always
worth over 200.000 euros, the changes of this threshold occurred over time do not aﬀect the study itself.
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foreseen by the Public Procurement Code for contracts of community interest. The present
section, therefore, focuses only on the study of these norms and of their application.71
4.8.1 Provisions on Advertising and Transparency
Under the principles of transparency and advertising, contracting authorities have the duty
to disclose any procurement procedure they intend to carry out and any document related to
it. At the same time, the applicants have the right to accessible procedures. The purpose of
these obligations is to ensure that all potential interested operators can be informed about
the procurement procedures. The provisions for advertising and transparency are also meant
to assure the general principle of equal treatment, avoiding the possibility that national ﬁrms
could be unfairly favored. In fact, the publication in the national press cannot occur before
the release in the Oﬃcial Journal of the European Union and cannot contain additional
information.72
In particular, awarding agencies are required to disclose: (i) their intention to entrust a
speciﬁc contract by releasing a prior information notice, where applicable,73 and a call for
tender; (ii) the ﬁnal decision on the award of a tender, reporting even the possible grounds for
not awarding it, by means of an award notice.74 The publication of both the contract notice
and the award notice is compulsory in the case of ordinary procedures, negotiations with
prior publication of a call for tender, and competitive dialogues. As a result, procurement
agencies have the obligation to release a prior information notice only when they want to
shorten the time limits for receiving oﬀers. All these documents are published in both the
Italian Oﬃcial Journal (Gazzetta Uﬃciale della Repubblica Italiana) and the Oﬃcial Journal
of the European Union.75
For reasons of transparency, all these documents shall be drawn up in accordance to stan-
dard Commission forms, hence they shall contain detailed and standardized information.76
Speciﬁcally, the information listed in the prior information notice concerns, for instance, the
name and contact details of the procurement authority, the total value of the proposed con-
tracts and the estimated date for initiating the awarding procedure. In addition, the call for
tender must include information such as the identity and contact details of the awarding en-
tity, a description of the object of the contract, the adopted tendering procedure, the length of
71However, the diﬀerence between the rules applicable respectively to contracts below and above the
pre-established thresholds is quite limited. Speciﬁcally, in the case of contracts that are not of Community
interest, some obligations for the public institutions are simpliﬁed (such as those regarding information and
transparency) and the timing of the award process is shortened. For further details, see Presidenza del
Consiglio dei Ministri (2010) and Bertuzzi and Fumarola (2011).
72Art. 66 of the Public Procurement Code.
73Art. 63, para 4, of the Public Procurement Code.
74Artt. 63- 65 of the Public Procurement Code.
75Speciﬁcally, they are published in the Supplement to the Oﬃcial Journal of the European Union ded-
icated to European public procurement, which also has an online version called Tender Electronic Daily
(TED). On subscription, the TED is also available in CD-ROM. Moreover, the most important information
is released in all the European languages and the translation is at the expenses of the European Union itself.
76Annex IXA of the Public Procurement Code.
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the contract, any deposit and guarantees required, the technical and economic requirements.
Finally, the award notice shall provide information regarding the number of tenders re-
ceived, the identity and contact details of the successful economic operators, and the identity
of the body responsible for appeal and, where appropriate, mediation procedures.77 Fur-
thermore, with regards to the award notice, an additional obligation in terms of publicity
foresees that, at the request of the party concerned, procurement agencies shall as soon as
possible inform: (i) any rejected applicant of the reasons for the exclusion of her application;
(ii) any unsuccessful bidder of the reasons for rejecting her oﬀer; and (iii) any bidder, who
has presented an admissible oﬀer, of the relative advantages of the chosen bid, and of the
name of the winner.78
4.8.2 Suitability of Applicants
Under the Public Procurement Code, ﬁrms shall comply with general conditions to be ad-
mitted to a tendering process. These conditions are aimed at assessing the suitability of
applicants and concern their economic and ﬁnancial capacity, as well as their technical and
professional knowledge or abilities.
As a general rule, any economic operator is excluded from taking part in a procurement
procedure when she has been found guilty of being corrupt or involved in a criminal or-
ganization, of fraud or money laundering. Speciﬁcally, any candidate may not be allowed
to participate in a tendering process when that candidate: (i) is bankrupt, is being wound
up or has suspended business activities; (ii) is subject to proceedings for a declaration of
bankruptcy or the court is administering her aﬀairs; (iii) has been convicted of any oﬀense
concerning her professional conduct; (iv) has been found guilty of grave professional miscon-
duct; (v) has not complied with the obligations related to social security contributions or
taxes; (vi) has provided a false declaration to the procurement agency.79
Moreover, applicants may be required by awarding authorities to provide any document
testifying their professional conduct and/or economic and ﬁnancial situation. As proof of
the economic and ﬁnancial standing of candidates, procurement agencies may require one
or more of the following references: (i) appropriate bank statements; (ii) a statement of
the candidate’s overall turnover and, where appropriate, of turnover in the area covered by
the contract for a maximum of the last three ﬁnancial years; and (iii) the presentation of
balance-sheets or extracts from the balance-sheets for those candidates that are obliged to
publish the balance-sheet under the law of the country in which they are established.80
As for the assessment of the technical and professional abilities, economic operators may
be required to submit one or more of the following means: (i) a list of the main services
delivered over the last three years, with sums, dates and recipients involved; (ii) information
on the technicians or technical bodies involved; (iii) indication of the candidate’s study and
research facilities, and of the technical facilities of the service provider; (iv) description of the
77Annex IXA of the Public Procurement Code.
78Art. 79, para 2, of the Public Procurement Code.
79Art. 38 of the Public Procurement Code.
80Art. 41 of the Public Procurement Code.
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educational and professional qualiﬁcations of the service provider or those of its managerial
staﬀ; (v) only in appropriate circumstances, indication of the environmental management
system of the applicant; (vi) statement of the manpower of the service provider and/or
applicants and the number of managerial staﬀ for the last three years; (vii) statement of
the technical equipment, plants and tools the service provider and/or applicant can use for
delivering the service; (viii) indication of the proportion of the contract the applicant is
possibly willing to subcontract.81
4.8.3 Awarding Procedures
The Italian regulation foresees four main mechanisms that public institutions can adopt in
order to select private contractors: open procedures or open auctions (procedure aperte);
restricted auctions or restricted procedures (procedure ristrette); negotiated procedures (pro-
cedure negoziate); and competitive dialogue (dialogo competitivo).82
The ﬁrst two types of procurement mechanisms are deﬁned as ordinary procedures and
characterized by limited discretionary power of the awarding authority in the choice of con-
tractors. Ordinary procedures assume the capability of the contracting entity of deﬁning,
from the beginning, the subject of the contract and its technical requirements. Public in-
stitutions are, therefore, expected to provide bidders with all the necessary information to
present immediately accurate, non-renegotiable bids.
Conversely, negotiated procedures and the competitive dialogue are basically exceptional
mechanisms. The former entails a signiﬁcant discretionary power of the procurement agency
and can be adopted only under speciﬁc circumstances such as those related to urgency or lack
of appropriate bids or applicants. The latter can be run only in case of complex contracts.
Namely, when the contracting authority is not able to identify by itself the technical solutions
to meet its needs or is not capable of stating precisely the legal and/or ﬁnancial make-up of
the project.
In choosing which procedure to apply, public institutions must take into account the
diﬀerent nature of the awarding mechanisms at their disposal. Contracts should be awarded
preferentially through an ordinary procedure, while the use of the competitive dialogue and
negotiated procedures is admissible only in the cases explicitly stated by the law (Figure
4.10). However, even when allowed, the adoption of an exceptional procedure is optional, as
the contracting authority can, but has no obligation to resort to it.
81Art. 42 of the Public Procurement Code.
82Art. 54 of the Public Procurement Code.
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Figure 4.10: How to Chose the Procurement Procedure to Apply
Ordinary Procedures
Open procedures coincide with sealed-bid auctions in which the contracting authority re-
leases a call for tender, providing a precise description of the subject of the contract. This
type of awarding mechanism is supposed to assure the highest possible level of competition
in the tendering process since all interested parties can present an oﬀer. However, these
economic operators cannot propose modiﬁcations to the submitted bids in a later stage of
the tender. In addition, applicants are only required to satisfy basic competence requisites
for their economic, ﬁnancial and technical capacities to deliver the service being procured.83
The fulﬁllment of these requisites established by the procurement agency is assessed simul-
taneously at the evaluation of bids, thus this type of procedures takes place in one single
phase. Unlike open auctions, restricted procedures consist of two stages. First, the tender
has to be announced in advanced by the contracting authority, which also has to provide all
necessary information about the conditions that bidders are requested to meet in order to be
admitted to the tendering process. In the subsequent phase, the procurement agency invites
83See, Vellez (2011).
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to the tender all those applicants who have expressed their interest in participating and that
satisfy the requirements listed in the contract notice. At the same time, it gives them all the
necessary information on how to submit a bid. Consequently, private operators interested
in participating in a restricted auction have ﬁrst to inform the contracting authority about
their will to present an oﬀer, but they can actually submit their oﬀer only once the awarding
agency has veriﬁed that they satisfy the requirements set in the call and has invited them to
take part in the auction.
In the past, restricted and open procedures clearly diﬀered because the former foresaw the
possibility for the procurement authority to limit the number of bidders.84 Speciﬁcally, the
awarding agency had the power to invite to the tender only a limited number of operators
chosen among those who expressed their interest to participate in the auction. However,
to exercise this power the contracting authority had the obligation to expressly state in
the contract notice its intention to apply this option. The existing legislation regulating
the award of public service contracts no longer envisages this possibility and it eliminates
any discretionary power of contracting authorities in admitting applicants to the restricted
procedure. All those private operators, that have applied to a restricted auction and have
proven to meet the qualiﬁcation requirements contained in the call for tender, must be invited
to present an oﬀer.
Nowadays, apart from the number of stages foreseen, there is no substantial diﬀerence
between open and restricted auctions. In both open and restricted auctions, all interested
and qualiﬁed economic operators may present an oﬀer. Therefore, both types of ordinary
procedures promote equal access for all qualiﬁed ﬁrms to the public procurement market and
its opportunities. The equal access for all qualiﬁed operators combined with the procedural
pattern of these procedures (e.g. the ban to modify the bids once they have been submitted)
also limits the discretionary power of administrations to the beneﬁt of the equal treatment of
applicants and the accountability of the process. Moreover, the opening of the participation
to all qualiﬁed operators should also ensure the maximum possible number of applicants
enhancing the competitiveness of suppliers. On the one hand, the room for collusion among
ﬁrms should decrease since a higher number of bidders makes it more diﬃcult for undertakings
to collude. On the other hand, it should be more likely for awarding authorities to beneﬁt
from the best ﬁrms operating in the market, improving value for money.85
Given these characteristics, ordinary procedures are considered to be the most eﬀective
awarding method to pursue the key general principles at the heart of the procurement system.
For this reason, procurement agencies can always adopt either open or restricted procedures
and the Italian legislation does not contemplate situations in which one type of auction has
to be preferred to the other. The Public Procurement Code provides only a preferential, thus
non-binding, criterion to decide which ordinary mechanism should be adopted.86
84The power to limit the number of applicants was envisaged in the Legislative Decree 157, 17 March 1995.
However, Article 22, para 2, speciﬁed that the number of bidders, that the contracting authority invites to
submit an oﬀer, could not be less than ﬁve. The database built for this study takes into account this option
for the restricted auctions that have been published before 2006.
85Arrowsmith et al. (2010)
86Art. 55, para 2, of the Public Procurement Code.
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Indeed, contracting authorities should apply restricted procedures preferably when the
subject of the contract is the mere execution of a service or when the award criterion is
the most economically advantageous tender. Under this criterion, the awarding authority is
required to clearly deﬁne the parameters taken into account to select the private contractors.
Thus, a restricted procedure seems better structured to deal with the greater complexity
entailed by this criterion since it takes place into two distinct phases. On the contrary,
being a more streamlined procedure, an open auction seems to be preferable when the award
criterion is the lowest price. Under both open and restricted auctions, the awarding agency
has the additional power not to award the service procured when only one or two appropriate
bids have been submitted.87 However, to be exercisable, this option has to be stated in the
contract notice.
Negotiated Procedures
Negotiations are those awarding procedures where the procurement agency chooses the eco-
nomic operators to contact and discusses the subject and terms of the contract with them.88
This type of tendering process allows public institutions to contact potential private contrac-
tors before awarding the contract and constitutes a derogation of the general prohibition on
renegotiating bids. Administrations enjoy a much wider discretion compared to the case of
ordinary procedures, thus they have greater chances to favor a speciﬁc ﬁrm, undermining the
general principles of equal treatment and transparency. Given these peculiarities, negotiated
procedures are considered an exceptional procurement mechanism whose adoption is admis-
sible, but not compulsory, only under speciﬁc circumstances, such as in case of urgency or
lack of appropriate bids or applicants.89
Depending on the type of information obligations imposed on the awarding agency, that
is, on the greater or lesser discretionary power conferred to the administration, the Public
Procurement Code diﬀerentiates between two diﬀerent negotiated procedures:90
• negotiated procedures with prior publication of a contract notice. The adoption of this
type of negotiations for the award of public service contracts is justiﬁed only when, after
the completion of an open or restricted auction or of a competitive dialogue, all the
submitted bids are irregular or unacceptable. However, this is admissible only insofar
as this new negotiated procedure does not substantially modify the original terms of
the contract.91 In case of particularly diﬃcult or complex services, these procedures
allow the awarding agency to limit the number of economic operators to negotiate
with. Nevertheless, no less than six applicants have to be invited to the tender and the
procurement authority has to expressly state in the contract notice: (i) its intention to
87Art. 55, para 4, of the Public Procurement Code.
88Art. 3, para 40, of the Public Procurement Code.
89Art. 54, para 4, of the Public Procurement Code.
90See, Decarolis et al. (2010).
91Art. 56 of the Public Procurement Code.
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exercise this power, (ii) the minimum number of bidders it wants to contact, and (iii)
the criteria for the choice of the economic operators to invite;92
• negotiated procedures without prior publication of a call for tender. Clearly this type
of negotiations entails an even higher risk of discrimination of economic operators.
The fact that no notice is required reduces transparency and monitoring objectivity,
increasing the discretionary power of administrations. Consequently, the possibilities
of applying this procurement mechanism are strictly limited and foreseen in the Public
Procurement Code. Speciﬁcally, this procedure is admissible only under the following
conditions: i) when no bids have been submitted in response to an ordinary procedure;
ii) when, due to artistic or technical reasons, or because of reasons related to the
protection of exclusive rights, the contract may be awarded only to a speciﬁc private
operator; iii) in case of extreme urgency due to unforeseeable circumstances; iv) when
the contract follows the completion of a design contest and should be entrusted to the
winner of the contest itself; v) when additional services, which are not envisaged in
the original project, have become necessary due to unforeseen events and if their value
does not exceed 50% of the amount of the initial contract; and vi) in the case of new
services consisting in the repetition of similar services that have already been awarded
for a maximum of 3 years.93
The Competitive Dialogue
Competitive dialogue is one of the major changes introduced by the Public Procurement Code
in response to the implementation of the European Directive 2004/18/EC. The aim of this
new mechanism is to provide “a ﬂexible procedure [...] which preserves not only competition
between economic operators but also the need for the contracting authorities to discuss all
aspects of the contract with each candidate.”94
Its adoption is admissible only in the cases expressly provided for in Article 58 of the
Public Procurement Code. Speciﬁcally, the subject of the tender has to entail a high level of
complexity that makes open or restricted procedures impracticable.95 This occurs (i) when
the contracting authority is not able to identify by itself the technical solutions to meet its
needs; (ii) when it is not capable to state precisely the legal and/or ﬁnancial make-up of a
project; or (iii) when, due to objective reasons outside its responsibility, it does not have any
study that identiﬁes and quantiﬁes its needs or the means necessary to achieve its objectives.
Competitive dialogue aims at enabling awarding entities to determine the solution best
suited to their necessities when these needs are very complex and/or alternative results can
be achieved and desired. At the same time, this attracts, as potential bidders, as many
private operators as possible. Since it does not identify a single possible solution, economic
92See Art. 62 of the Public Procurement Code.
93See Art. 57 of the Public Procurement Code.
94Directive 2004/18/EC.
95To resort to a competitive dialogue, the procurement agency must provide reasons supporting this status
of complexity: see Art. 58 of the Public Procurement Code.
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operators have more discretionary room to propose and develop a solution according to their
speciﬁc technical and economical capacity.
According to ordinary procedures, as well as negotiated procedures, a contracting entity
has to identify the procurement speciﬁcations, on whose base applicants make their bids. On
the contrary, the competitive dialogue does not require detailed tender speciﬁcations, but
rather a document stating the necessities and requisites of the authority. On the grounds
of this document, the awarding entity opens a dialogue with each applicant about which
solution might satisfy its necessities. To counteract this wider range of discussion between
applicants and the contracting authority and to prevent administrations from abusing it, the
competitive dialogue is characterized by a strict procedural structure. (i.e. the procedural
pattern and the form of its diﬀerent phases are stated precisely and in more detail compared
to the case of ordinary and negotiated procedures).
Speciﬁcally, this procurement mechanism consists of three phases. First, the administra-
tion selects the economic operators to invite to the tender, thus it releases a contract notice
including its needs and objectives.96 Since, the only adoptable award criterion, in the case
of competitive dialogue, is the economically most advantageous tender, the notice contains
also the criteria for evaluating the bids. It also includes the requirements to be admitted to
the tender and the time limit within which interested parties may submit their participation
requests. If the awarding agency decides to limit the number of economic operators to be
invited to the tender, the notice should also contain the selection criteria it intends to use,
the minimum number of applicants it intends to invite (in any case no less than three) and,
where appropriate, the maximum number. Finally, the contract notice also has to report the
intention, if this is the case, of the procurement agency to exercise the power laid down in
Article 58(8) to gradually reduce the number of solutions to be discussed in the following
phase (the so-called dialogue phase).
Second, the procurement agency, simultaneously and in writing, invites the selected eco-
nomic operators to conduct a dialogue. The Public Procurement Code does not provide any
speciﬁc and detailed provision in relation to the conduct of the dialogue, but it only oﬀers
some general rules. In particular, the dialogue should be carried out individually with each
applicant and the awarding authority has to ensure the equal treatment of all applicants and
protect the conﬁdentiality of the information exchanged. Furthermore, the legislation does
not even provide any information regarding the timing of this phase. Hence, the administra-
tion has the discretionary power to decide that the discussion has to take place in successive
stages in order to reduce the number of solutions to discuss. The dialogue continues until a
solution has been identiﬁed. However, this phase might also have a negative outcome if the
administration considers that none of the solutions proposed satisﬁes properly its needs or
objectives.
Third, once the contracting authority has identiﬁed an appropriate solution, the dialogue
is declared concluded. At the same time, participants are informed and asked to submit their
ﬁnal oﬀers on the basis of the solution (or possible solutions) presented and speciﬁed during
96The procurement authority can also specify its needs and objectives in a descriptive document attached
to the contract notice itself.
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the dialogue phase. The ﬁnal bids may be further speciﬁed, but without modifying the basic
features of the contract, and are then assessed based on the most economically advantageous
tender criterion.
In conclusion, the competitive dialogue may be seen as a particular procurement mecha-
nism which shares features with both restricted auctions and negotiations with prior publi-
cation of a call for tender. This procedure mainly diﬀers from restricted auctions because the
contracting agency is authorized to discuss every aspect of the contract. In turn, the com-
petitive dialogue also diﬀers from negotiated procedures because, essentially, the discussion
is concentrated and limited within a speciﬁc phase of the procedure.
4.8.4 Contract Award Criteria
In awarding its public contracts, a contracting authority can apply as award criterion either
‘the lowest price’ criterion or ‘the most economically advantageous tender’ one and it is
obliged to specify in the call for tender the criterion that it has decided to adopt.97
According to the lowest price criterion, the evaluation of the bids submitted is based ex-
clusively on the price oﬀered, thus the applicant providing the lowest price wins the tender.
By adopting this criterion, the procurement agency is required to deﬁne in detail the tech-
nical and qualitative characteristics of the procured service. Conversely, where the contract
is awarded to the most economically advantageous tender, several other parameters besides
price are taken into consideration (e.g. quality, technical assistance, technical merit and en-
vironmental characteristics) and the procurement agency has to specify both the parameters
adopted and the relative weighting assigned to each of them.98 Consequently, the bids sub-
mitted by applicants include an economic section concerning the price at which private ﬁrms
are willing to provide the service and a technical section related to the procedures for the
completion of the contract. In particular, the technical part is deﬁned by the applicants on
the basis of the minimum characteristics of the service procured that the awarding authority
has to identify in the call for tender. Each section of the oﬀers is then evaluated and receives
a score on the grounds of the various parameters chosen by the procurement agency and the
contract is entrusted to the applicant whose oﬀer has obtained the highest overall score.
Clearly, this second type of awarding criterion is more complex and entails greater dis-
cretion for the purchasing authority in relation to the identiﬁcation of both the additional
selection criteria besides price and the way in which these parameters are weighted. Its ap-
plication allows contracting agencies to adapt the evaluation of bids to their speciﬁc needs,
which do not necessarily and primarily coincide with paying the lowest price. It can also be
useful when auctioneers still have to identify the best solution according to their necessities
and, therefore, they might beneﬁt from receiving alternative proposals from applicants.
However, contracting entities may take advantage of the wider discretionary power to dis-
criminate tenderers, favoring speciﬁc operators and pursuing private objectives. Undesirable
social outcomes may also be a consequence of the improper use of this criterion by public
97Art. 81 of the Public Procurement Code.
98Art. 83 of the Public Procurement Code.
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bodies, whose oﬃcials can lack the experience or the skills to properly exercise this criterion.
Nevertheless, contracting authorities can freely choose among these two diﬀerent awarding
criteria without restrictions.
The decision of which criterion to apply has to be performed respecting the principles
of competition, transparency, non-discrimination and equal opportunities, and the chosen
criterion should be the most appropriate one with respect to the characteristics and the
type of service procured. The lowest price is preferable when the subject of the contract is
standardized and well-deﬁned. If the qualitative characteristics and the procedures for the
provision of the service are well identiﬁed, the services oﬀered by diﬀerent suppliers do not
vary that much in terms of nature and quality and the price plays a more important role.
On the contrary, the most economically advantageous tender criterion is desirable for non-
standardized contracts where quality and other characteristics of the procured object also
matter and where the awarding authority wants to receive diﬀerent technical oﬀers in order
to choose the optimal solution to its needs.99 In these circumstances, the best allocation of
public resources may not coincide with the lowest price, but rather with the best combination
of price and quality.
Regardless of the criterion applied in awarding the contract, the procurement agency
has to verify that the price oﬀered by the applicants could be considered ‘reliable’ on the
basis of the norms regulating abnormal tenders. An anomalous bid is deﬁned as a bid
that, due to its very low price, arouses concerns about the actual ability of the applicant to
perform the contract, while respecting the terms oﬀered. Under this hypothesis, there are two
possible negative scenarios: (i) the applicant might not meet the contract requirements (e.g.
the applicant may provide the object of the contract at a lower quality); (ii) the applicant
might pursue either a renegotiation of the contract once the tender is awarded or additional
payments while performing the contract. However, a very low price could be justiﬁed by
other objective reasons, such as, for instance, the fact that the applicant could operate very
eﬃciently thanks to new method of productions. Consequently, the Public Procurement
Code foresees a set of instruments to assess abnormally low bids.100
Speciﬁcally, it deﬁnes a threshold of ‘presumed anomaly’ and the price that falls below
this threshold is considered an anomalous bid.101 Once an oﬀer is identiﬁed as anomalous, the
contracting authority has to perform a congruity check during which the interested parties
99For further details on public sector contracts in Italy, see Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri (2010)
and Decarolis et al. (2010).
100Artt. 86-89 of the Public Procurement Code.
101When the award criterion is the lowest price, this threshold is computed as “the arithmetic mean of
the percentage discounts of all the oﬀers admitted, excluding the highest ten percent and lowest ten percent
of oﬀers (rounded to the next highest integer), increased by the mean arithmetic deviation of the discount
percentages that exceed the aforementioned mean.” See, Decarolis et al. (2010), p. 5. Nevertheless, if the
contracting authority has received less than ﬁve oﬀers, this criterion no longer ﬁnds application and the
assessment of abnormally low tenders is based on the best market price, when this can be observed, or on
speciﬁc elements. Conversely, when the award criterion is the most economically advantageous tender, a bid
is considered anomalous if “both the scores relating to the price and the sum of scores relating to the other
assessment elements are equal to or greater than four-ﬁfths of the corresponding maximum scores stated in
the call for tender.” See, Decarolis et al. (2010), p.5 .
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are given a hearing. Finally, as a general principle, the procurement agency can decide not to
award the contract if no oﬀer results to be appropriate with respect to the object procured.102
However, the contracting authority is always required to evaluate the bids received and to
provide appropriate justiﬁcations for not awarding the contract.
4.8.5 Time Limits
In ﬁxing the time limits for the receipt of the participation requests and oﬀers, procurement
agencies shall take into due consideration the complexity of the procured contract and the
time necessary to draw up bids. In any case, they cannot opt for time limits shorter than the
minimum period set by the Public Procurement Code.103 These provisions on time limits are
aimed at preventing administrations from making the participation for ﬁrms more diﬃcult.
In particular, an unreasonably short time frame might constitute a relevant obstacle for
foreign operators (e.g. foreign ﬁrms may need time to provide certiﬁed translations of oﬃcial
documents or to translate their bid).
Speciﬁcally, in case of an open auction, the minimum time limit for the receipt of oﬀers
is 52 days from the date on which the call for tender has been published. When a prior
information notice has been released, this time limit may be shortened to 36 days, but
under no circumstances it can be less than 22 days.104 In a restricted procedure, once that
the contract notice has been published, candidates have 37 days to send their participation
requests to the awarding authority. Afterwards, the applicants who have successfully proved
that they meet the participation requirements are, simultaneously and in writing, invited to
submit their oﬀers. These tenders shall be received in 40 days from the date on which the
invitation is sent.
As it happens for open procedures, when the procurement authorities have published a
prior information notice, this time limit may be lowered to 36 days, but in no case it can
be less than 22 days. Moreover, under circumstances of extreme urgency, the minimum time
limit may be further cut to 15 days (10 day if the call for tender is sent electronically) for the
receipt of participation requests and to 10 days for the receipt of bids.105 In these hypotheses,
a restricted auction is also called an accelerated restricted procedure. As for negotiations with
prior publication of a call for tender, the minimum time limit for the reception of participation
requests shall be 37 days from the publication date of the contract notice. If there are reasons
of urgency, the awarding agency may use an accelerated negotiated procedure. Therefore,
it may lower the minimum time limit to 15 days, which can be further reduced to 10 if the
contract notice is sent electronically.
As a general rule, when contracting authorities decide to carry out either an accelerated
negotiation or an accelerated restricted procedure, they shall provide appropriate justiﬁca-
tions for their choice in the contract notice. Finally, in the case of a competitive dialogue,
102Art. 81, para 3, of the Public Procurement Code.
103Art. 70 of the Public Procurement Code.
104Art. 70, para 2 and 7, of the Public Procurement Code.
105Art. 70, para 4, 7 and 11, of the Public Procurement Code
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participation requests have to be received in no more than 37 days from the date on which
the call for tender was released.
4.8.6 Brokerage Services
In carrying out tenders, the public administration is often supported by a so-called broker,
that is a private operator acting on behalf of the contracting authority itself.106
Procurement agencies are supposed to make use of this type of intermediary because of
the brokers’ professional experience and independence. In fact, brokers assume a crucial role
during tenders, as well as once the private contractor has been selected. In particular, they
may be in charge of one or more of the following tasks: (i) risks identiﬁcation and assessment;
(ii) consulting in risk management; (iii) analysis of the needs, in terms of insurance coverage,
of the awarding entity and drafting of the technical speciﬁcations; (iv) assistance in running
the tendering process to award the contract; and (v) assistance in the management of the
insurance coverage.107 108
Contracting authorities, who are assisted by a broker, are obliged to disclose this infor-
mation in the contract notice. They also have the obligation to provide all the information
regarding how much they pay for these brokerage services and how this remuneration is
computed.109 By examining the calls for tender collected and the technical speciﬁcations
available, the standard remuneration of brokers can be placed in a range between 5 and 14
% of the value of the proposed medical malpractice liability insurance.
106Even in the case of the acquisition of brokerage services, health organizations are obliged by law to
resort to public procurement.
107Buzzacchi and Gracis (2008).
108Speciﬁcally, brokers may be responsible for managing the claims and, more generally, they may be the
representative of the insured healthcare providers.
109The remuneration of the broker is usually included in the value of the procured contract. For more
information on brokers’ remuneration, see Associazione Italiana Broker di Assicurazione e Riassicurazione
(2008), pp. 4-19.
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Chapter 5
Courts, Scheduled Damages and
Hospital Activity
5.1 Introduction
The present chapter extends and complements the analysis developed in the previous one.
After having investigated the impact of limiting noneconomic damages on insurance com-
panies, it is interesting to examine the eﬀects of this policy on the behavior of healthcare
providers. The understanding of the possible relation between malpractice pressure and the
levels and composition of medical activity in the public sector is relevant, especially, in a
policy perspective. In fact, such a relation ultimately impacts on how the healthcare sys-
tem meets the medical needs of the population with possible consequences on healthcare
expenditures and on the fairness of the public provision of medical care.
Limiting noneconomic damages is traditionally expected to aﬀect the behavior of doctors
through the impact that it exerts on one of the main determinants of malpractice pressure:
the likelihood that injured parties ﬁle a claim.1 Some studies have provided opposite ﬁndings
with respect to claim frequency.2 Still, when we consider only the impact of the reference
1A number of studies recognize the impact of caps on the magnitude of claims as one of the main driver
of doctors’ behavior (Kessler and McClellan, 2002a and 2002b). Whilst several others deny this conclusion
pointing out that malpractice litigation usually does not entail a signiﬁcant ﬁnancial risk for physicians since
doctors are usually covered against losses in malpractice trials (Frakes, 2012a) and the ﬁnal compensations
awarded are rarely higher than the amount doctors are insured for (Silver et al. 2007, Hyman et al. 2007, and
Vidmar 2009). Anyway, regardless of its possible ﬁnancial implications, medical liability (i.e. the probability
of being sued) plays a signiﬁcant role in shaping the behavior of doctors due to the signiﬁcant non-monetary
(i.e. physiological and time) costs entailed by legal proceedings (Currie and MacLeod, 2008). In addition,
malpractice litigation foresees many costs that are not generally covered by insurance and, more important, it
constitutes a real threat to the reputation of healthcare professionals (Quinn 1998, and Currie and MacLeod
2008).
2As discusses in Section 3.6.2, Waters et al. (2007) and Donohue and Ho (2007) ﬁnd no evidence of
a relationship between noneconomic damages caps and the frequency of claims. Nevertheless, these null-
ﬁndings are consistent with the potential contrasting eﬀects that limiting noneconomic damages may have
in relation to physicians and injured parties. On the one hand, lower compensations may induce physicians
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policy on victims’ decisions, the conventional wisdom waves in favor of the idea that capping
noneconomic damages is likely to discourage injured parties from ﬁling a claim as caps should
limit the average compensation per claim.3 This is particularly important for doctors, who are
concerned about being involved in a legal dispute because of all the material and immaterial
costs entailed by litigation.
However, variations in malpractice pressure are not caused exclusively by the adoption
of tort reforms and the present chapter aims at investigating also the role of judicial per-
formance, measured in terms of civil backlog. The basic intuition is that a poor performing
judicial system is likely to discourage victims from ﬁling claims as the trials processing time
is longer and more uncertain. If limiting noneconomic damages alone is generally expected
to reduce the probability of malpractice litigation, the impact of the introduction of caps
conditional on the performance of its enforcing mechanism is not straightforward, but it will
rather be the combination of the eﬀects of both factors (i.e. the implementation of sched-
ules of noneconomic damages and judicial performance).4 Therefore, the actual impact is
an empirical issue that depends on the intensity of these two forces and on whether they
contrast or intensify each other. Despite the possible consequences of judicial eﬃciency, this
element has been substantially disregarded so far by the literature on defensive medicine. In
addition, even though a number of empirical contributions have investigated the speciﬁc link
between noneconomic damages caps and doctors’ defensive behavior,5 schedules of noneco-
nomic damages have attracted much less attention. As a result, the potential impact of the
reference policy on the conduct of physicians remains inconclusive.6
The present chapter aims precisely at making up for these two shortcomings by examining
to decrease – even unintentionally – their level of precaution. On the other hand, injured parties may be
discouraged from ﬁling claims. Therefore, as discussed by Donohue and Ho (2007), a null eﬀect of caps on
claim frequency can be simply the result of cross-cutting eﬀects on both clinicians and victims. The frequency
of lawsuits, therefore, is determined by the reactions of both physicians and patients to the introduction of
caps. On the contrary, we are considering only the impact of limiting noneconomic damages on the decisions
of victims to initiate a legal dispute.
3See, for instance, Avraham (2007). The actual impact of caps/schedules on victims’ decisions depends
on the level at which these ceilings are set.
4Hereafter, when we mention schedules we refer to schedules of noneconomic damages, unless diﬀerently
stated.
5See, Section 3.6.5. For instance, Kessler and McClellan (1996) provide evidence of a positive relationship
between damages caps and defensive medicine with respect to elderly heart patients. Later on, Kessler and
McClellan (2002a, 2002b) also ﬁnd that by lowering the malpractice risk faced by physicians, tort reforms,
including damages caps, favor the adoption of defensive practices and this eﬀect is larger on diagnostic than
therapeutic treatment decisions. A signiﬁcant part of the literature focuses on the use of defensive medicine
in obstetrics and, in particular, with respect to C-sections. For instance, Baicker et al. (2006) show that
the geographical variations in the utilization rate of cesarean deliveries is not justiﬁed by variations in risks
factors. Similarly, Esposto (2012) outlines that the state diﬀerences in the utilization of c-sections partially
result from state-level liability reforms (including damages caps), whereas Yang et al. (2009) ﬁnd that
reduced litigation pressure caused by damages caps determines a reduction in the use of C-section, as well as
in delivery expenditures.
6Mello and Kachalia (2010) and Mello et al. (2011) suggest a small negative impact of noneconomic
damages schedules on defensive medicine, but they substantially base this conclusion on the evidence provided
by the literature on the eﬀects of noneconomic damages caps (i.e. ﬂat or tiered caps).
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how the adoption of noneconomic damages schedules impacts on the medical decisions of
doctors in the Italian experience while including in the analysis also the performance of
courts measured as civil backlog. The purpose is to examine whether schedules and courts’
performance impact on the composition and intensity of the treatments oﬀered by public
healthcare facilities and their wards.7
Traditionally, the relation between tort reforms and defensive medicine has been studied
at the level of individual physicians and mainly with reference to the U.S. context, that is, to a
privately funded healthcare context.8 Nevertheless, the organizational characteristics and the
functioning of a public system are inherently diﬀerent from those of a private one to the extent
that malpractice pressure may inﬂuence professional choices diﬀerently and work through
diﬀerent channels and with a diﬀerent intensity in public facilities. For example, in Italy,
compared to the U.S., the public insurer (i.e. the State and regions) can exert less pressure
and control over the treatments and tests reimbursed. At the same time, public hospitals
enjoy less discretion in the organization of their activities. These facilities must comply with
the objectives and guidelines set by health authorities, whose primary goal is to ensure the
coverage of the medical services required by the population also with respect to the most
risky activities. So that, for instance, we do not expect hospitals to retain from performing
high-risk procedures or having high-risk specialties in order to avoid malpractice litigation.
As seen in Chapter 2, healthcare organizations are also the entities responsible for providing
their medical personnel with malpractice insurance. For their part, clinicians are hospitals’
employees in all respects. Therefore, they are subject to the higher levels of management, in
which facilities are organized, and end up facing simultaneously the incentives provided by
both medical liability and the structures they work for.
The result is that the response of public employed physicians to medical liability may diﬀer
from that of private practitioners, because they may have a diﬀerent perception of malpractice
pressure. At the same time, even if physicians are concerned by the risk of litigation, they may
have less room or lower incentives to adopt defensive practices in a public context. Hence,
it is not obvious whether malpractice pressure aﬀects the provision of medical services at
the level of public hospitals. Furthermore, given its characteristics, such a setting requires
the adoption of a diﬀerent approach from the one traditionally applied. Individual doctors
are no longer the best suited dimension of analysis, but rather an examination of possible
variations in medical decisions at the level of the healthcare facilities themselves proves to
be more eﬀective and appropriate.
Using Italian public hospitals data for the period 2000-2010, we take advantage of the
scattered timing of the implementation of noneconomic damages schedules to study the exis-
tence and features of a hospital- and ward-wide response to variations in malpractice pressure
due to the adoption of schedules. At the same time, we also exploit the organizational struc-
ture of both the healthcare and judicial systems of the country to examine the implications of
7The analysis of the impact of schedules on the activity levels of Italian private hospitals goes beyond
the scope of the present work.
8In Italy, the study of defensive medicine has been primarily done through the use of surveys of healthcare
professionals, while the empirical investigation of doctors’ behavior has had a marginal role. See, Section
5.2.1.
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courts’ performance. Speciﬁcally, we take advantage of the fact that Italian public hospitals
may fall under a same regulating scheme implemented at the regional level, but they may
be located in diﬀerent court districts. Hospitals operating in the a same regional health-
care system may actually face diﬀerent courts, which diﬀer in terms of performance (i.e civil
backlog). This allows us to disentangle the actual eﬀects of judicial performance on the ac-
tivities of hospitals and wards from the inﬂuence exerted by the healthcare policies set by
regional governments, as well as to examine how the introduction of schedules aﬀects doctors’
behavior conditional on judicial eﬃciency.
Accordingly, we apply a Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences (DID) regression model that includes
region, year, court and specialty ﬁxed eﬀects, and controls for the adoption of schedules,
courts’ performance and the operational characteristics of hospitals/wards. Our ﬁndings
provide evidence that schedules do aﬀect the behavior of clinicians, who tend to resort less
frequently to defensive practices once the reference policy is implemented. This also means
that publicly employed clinicians do vary their decisions on the composition and intensity of
treatments in response to changes in malpractice pressure. Still, such a reaction is observed
with respect to some but not all the outcome variables considered. The estimated eﬀect is
modest in magnitude, though it proves to be consistent among hospitals and their wards.
In particular, when the liability constraints are lowered by the implementation of schedules
of noneconomic damages, doctors tend to extend the preoperative hospitalization period of
patients, but to reduce patients’ overall length of stay. Our evidence supports the conjecture
that malpractice pressure aﬀects the provision of healthcare services by public hospitals, but
the impact is limited in size and concerns only some dimensions ( e.g. patients’ preoperative
length of stay) and not others (e.g. the case mix index). These results are also consistent with
the idea that institutional features such as the public nature of the providers, the hierarchical
structure of the healthcare organizations, and the employment condition of physicians restrict
the impact of policy interventions to speciﬁc dimensions of care provision.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 5.2 provides the basic background for the present
analysis with respect to previous literature and the Italian experience, while Section 5.3 illus-
trates the theoretical framework to understand the possible response of physicians to changes
in malpractice pressure. Section 5.4 describes the empirical methodology, whereas Section
5.5 introduces the data. Finally, Section 5.6 presents and discusses the results obtained and
Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 Background
The study of the implications of tort reforms, including noneconomic damages caps, on the
behavior of physicians and subsequently on healthcare utilization, has attracted much of
attention from scholars in the last two decades. In Section 3.6.5, we have already presented
two strands of the literature that are particularly relevant for the present work: (i) the
analyses by Kessler and McClellan and the following studies on myocardial infarctions for
Medicare patients, and (ii) the studies concerning the obstetrical practice. These studies
show that the ﬁndings on the inﬂuence of the legal environment on the behavior of clinicians
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so far are, to some extent, still mixed and inconclusive. Nonetheless, the overall evidence
weighs in favor of the conclusion that tort reforms relaxing malpractice pressure do aﬀect the
decisions of physicians at least with respect to some types of health treatments.
Besides the two above-mentioned strands of the literature, a number of studies have also
investigated the eﬀects of malpractice liability on hospital activities. For instance, Cotet
(2012) examines the implication of the adoption of noneconomic damages caps on general
measures of healthcare delivery: surgeries, hospital admissions and outpatient visits. The
author analyzes county-level data on healthcare delivery from the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services for the 1990-2006 period and state-by-state information on tort legisla-
tions from Avraham’s (2010) Database of State Tort Law Reforms.9 The author concludes
that limitations on noneconomic awards negatively aﬀect all the healthcare delivery measures
analyzed: surgeries declines by 3.5%, admissions by 2.5% and outpatients visits other than
emergency by 4.5%. Moreover, since “noneconomic damages caps reduce the cost of malprac-
tice, they change physicians’ incentives and preferred courses of treatment”,10 according to
Cotet these lower utilization rates are consistent with a decrease in defensive medicine.
In particular, for the present analysis, relevant studies are those investigating the relation-
ship between medical liability exposure and hospital activities in the British NHS. In fact,
even though these studies do not test the eﬀects of damages caps or any other tort reform,
they oﬀer signiﬁcant insights on how the exposure to the risk of litigation may shape hos-
pital activity in a healthcare system which shares relevant features with the Italian one. In
particular, Fenn et al. (2007) explore the relationship between malpractice liability and the
utilization of imagining and scanning diagnostic procedures. As proxy of the litigation risk,
the authors use the level of deductibles on the malpractice insurance premiums of hospitals.
Using data on the UK healthcare facilities for the year 2001, they ﬁnd that hospitals dealing
with higher expected cost from litigation (i.e. higher deductibles) report a more frequent
use of costly imagining procedures. By contrast, routine tests (e.g. X-rays) are not aﬀected
by fear of litigation, but rather by the underlying activity levels of the healthcare facilities
themselves.
Fenn et al. (2010) extend the previous study by covering a 5-year period (2000-2004)
and by including an additional measure of liability risk such as the premium discounts that
hospitals receive by the NHSLA for achieving pre-determined risk management standards.
By doing so, the authors test whether the choice of both higher deductibles and higher risk
management standards is associated with a higher frequency of diagnostic tests. Diﬀerently
to their previous work, Fenn et al. (2010) conclude that the diagnostic activity of hospitals
was not aﬀected by the ﬁnancial incentives related to their liability exposure. The authors
oﬀer a number of possible explanations. They suggest that the existing incentives provided
by the NHSLA are too weak to stimulate a hospital-wide response because of the complexity
9The speciﬁcations applied by Cotet (2012) foresee county and year ﬁxed eﬀects and control for state-
speciﬁc trends. The author also introduces a measure of the distance between county population centroid
and the bordering state implementing caps. This additional variable is meant to take into account the fact
that, as consequence of the implementation of caps, (i) doctors may move to another state; and (ii) patients
may devote more time to look for a doctor and consider physicians operating in neighboring states.
10Cotet (2012), p. 227.
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of hospitals’ structure. The diﬀerent organizational levels of a hospital (i.e. administration
and medical staﬀ) not only have diﬀerent goals and constraints, but they also do not usually
communicate properly. As a result, “hospitals are not good at passing the tort incentives to
their employees and, as such, the variations in liability may have a weaker eﬀect on care
than expected.”11 A last possible justiﬁcation lies in the fact that the utilization of diagnostic
tests might not be a good measure of care in the English context,12 as it may actually be
more responsive to ‘clinicians-targeted’ initiatives than to ‘hospital-targeted’ mechanisms.13
In this regard, Fenn et al. (2010) suggest that a better measure of care levels may be
infection controls. The eﬀects of ﬁnancial incentives connected to a better risk management
on patient safety is examined in Fenn et al. (2013). Based on hospitals data on the MRSA14
infections in England and Wales for the period 2001-2008, the authors apply a dynamic panel
speciﬁcation concluding that higher risk management standards are actually associated with
lower infection rates.
Although they do not directly investigate the impact of tort reforms, these papers and
their ﬁndings show the complexity that characterizes the relationship between hospital ac-
tivity levels and malpractice risk. If we can expect hospital levels of performed treatments
or procedures to be aﬀected by the risk of litigation, the possible eﬀects and their magnitude
are harder to predict. Moreover, these diﬃculties increase in the case of a public healthcare
system, where other forces besides malpractice risk (e.g. budget constraints or policy goals)
come into play in driving doctors’ decisions.
To sum up, the existing literature studying the impact of noneconomic damages caps on
medical practice has mainly devoted its attention to the reaction of physicians, therefore the
dimension of this type of analyses is traditionally the conduct of individual clinicians. In
contrast, the existing empirical studies investigating the eﬀects of malpractice risk at the
level of public healthcare facilities, essentially fail to test the eﬀects of damages caps or other
tort reforms. Hence, how public hospitals respond to the implementation of ceilings on non-
pecuniary damages and to the subsequent loosening of malpractice pressure is still open to
question. In addition to this, the examination of the implications of limiting noneconomic
damages on the behavior of doctors has basically considered only the case of caps (i.e. ﬂat
caps or basic forms of tiered caps) and has provided mixed ﬁndings so far, while the investi-
gation of the actual eﬀects of schedules has been substantially disregarded. Moreover, caps
have always been examined regardless of the judicial system in charge of their application,
thus the potential inﬂuence exerted by the judiciary on the decisions of physicians has never
been included in the analysis leading to potentially partial and biased results. The present
11Fenn et al. (2010), p. 239.
12In particular, Fenn et al. (2010) point out that, in the U.S., diagnostic tests “have sometimes been
interpreted as good measures of excess or supplier-induced care. However, overall rates of diagnostic activity
are very much lower in the United Kingdom, rendering that interpretation less likely.” In addition, other
institutional diﬀerences such as the private nature of the U.S. system and/or the resource-constrained nature
of the English NHS may play a role.
13Speciﬁcally, Fenn et al. (2010) highlight that “certain types of patient care activity, including the use
of diagnostic tests, may be less responsive to incentives placed at the level of the hospital by comparison with
incentives placed at the level of the clinician”.
14The acronym MRSA indicates methicillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus infections.
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chapter seeks to make up for these shortcomings by examining the implications of schedules
adoption on hospital activities in relation to the Italian healthcare and judicial systems.
5.2.1 Past Research on Defensive Medicine in Italy
As extensively illustrated in Section 2.4.2, in the Italian context the phenomenon of defensive
medicine has been traditionally studied through surveys administered to doctors. Overall,
these inquiries suggest that the use of defensive practices is a common behavior among
clinicians and, in particular, among the younger ones. The main determinant of such conduct
can be identiﬁed as the fear of being involved in a legal dispute and of facing a compensation
request. However, surveys of healthcare professionals entail drawbacks that make them not
a very eﬀective instrument to assess the extent and magnitude of defensive medicine for a
number of reasons.15
First, participants in these surveys may be reluctant in truthfully reporting practices that
might give rise to malpractice claims. Second, to a certain extent, doctors may actually adopt
defensive practices unconsciously, thus they can underestimate the relevance of defensive
medicine in their professional activity. Third, physicians may manipulate their responses
to pursue political purposes. In other words, clinicians may actually claim a more frequent
use of defensive practices than in reality in order to stress that they are subject to excessive
malpractice pressure. By doing so, they may seek to convey to the great public the message
that clinicians should receive more protection and that a policy intervention is needed to
reduce their malpractice exposure.16 Fourth, there might be a selection through participation,
whereby the respondents to these surveys are also those physicians more sensitive to the risk
of litigation and, thus, more prone to defensive medicine. A further concern is related to
the general form of the questions usually included in these surveys. General questions may
not well capture the actual behavior of doctors or depict all the possible scenarios faced by
physicians and they may also leave room for biased responses. Finally, a further problem
is speciﬁcally related to the characteristics of the Italian system, where doctors, besides
working as hospital employees, are also generally engaged in private practice outside the
public healthcare facilities. Consequently, physicians may actually adopt diﬀerent behaviors
depending on the public or private environment in which they operate. However, these
surveys simply ask question regarding doctors’ professional activity in general without taking
into account the existence of two potential distinct behaviors.
Still, the results obtained to date are substantially in line with the ﬁndings reported
for the U.S. context.17 Nonetheless, these results based on self-statements rather than on
observed behaviors may actually diﬀer from actual clinical decisions as physicians may adopt
a diﬀerent behavior from the one reported by these surveys especially when they work in a
public hospital. Therefore, to provide a more accurate picture of this phenomenon in Italy,
15See, Klingman et al. (1996).
16In particular, Klingman et al. (1996) suggest that “physicians may be tempted to manipulate their
responses to buttress their professional societies’ pro-malpractice reform positions and thus may exaggerate
their true level of concern about malpractice”.
17See, for instance, Studdert el al. (2005), or Massachusetts Medical Society (2008).
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it is essential to move from analyses exclusively based on statements provided by clinicians
to analyses based on the observation of the actual conduct of doctors.
5.3 Theoretical Framework
A theoretical framework that oﬀers an explanation for the contrasting ﬁndings of the liter-
ature has been provided by Currie and MacLeod (2008). The authors model the impact of
tort reforms on behavior of individual physicians by modifying the standard tort model to
express doctors’ decisions as directly dependent on patient condition and on the probability
of committing an error with possible legal consequences.18
A preliminary issue is related to improve the understanding of why doctors are potentially
concerned about the possibility of being sued given that malpractice claims usually seem not
to imply an actual ﬁnancial risk for them. On the one hand, malpractice claims are unlikely
to lead to payouts that exceed the limits of the professional liability policy underwritten by
clinicians.19 On the other hand, insurance premiums are, in general, not experience-rated.
Therefore, the involvement in malpractice claims is not expected to increase the malpractice
premiums to pay at the individual level. In addition, even if insurers would use experience
rating, physicians have the possibility, to some extent, to pass the higher insurance rates
onto patients by raising medical fees.20 Nevertheless, despite the low ﬁnancial exposure,
healthcare professionals are deemed to take seriously into account the problem of medical
liability because of all the non-insurable costs that malpractice litigation implies. Speciﬁcally,
malpractice litigation may entail signiﬁcant psychic and time costs, but even more important,
it may have serious negative consequences on the reputation of clinicians.21 In any case,
although physicians take professional liability into consideration and may respond to an
increased liability pressure by applying a higher precaution level, a medical accident with
potential legal consequences is always possible. In fact, as suggested by Arlen and MacLeod
(2005), even though doctors may increase their degree of care and invest in their expertise,
they cannot eliminate the possibility of incurring a mistake that leads to liability, but rather
they can only lower it. This probability – or error rate22 – plays a key role in the model
18In a more recent work, Currie and MacLeod (2013) further extend their study of doctors’ behavior by
investigating how diﬀerences in both diagnostic and surgical skills of physicians inﬂuence procedure utilization
and health outcomes. In particular, with respect to the speciﬁc case of C-sections, they ﬁnd that “better
diagnostic skill improves the matching between patients and procedures and leads to better health outcomes.”
The result is that cesarean delivery is less likely to be chosen for low-risk women, while its utilization increases
for both medium- and high-risk women with a larger eﬀect for the latter.
19See, for instance, Hyman et al. (2007). In this regard, for example, Fisk (1998) notes with respect to
the U.S. experience that “Large jump verdicts are frequently no more than an illusion. With relatively rare
exceptions, verdicts are cut back, thrown out, set for dramatically less than the original amount. Or they are
awarded against people or entities with little or no money to pay them.”
20See, for example, Danzon (1991) and Sloan (1982).
21On the importance of reputation for physicians, see Sage (2004). As for the time costs, for example,
Seabury et al. (2013) show that doctors on average spend over 4 years of a 40-year career with an open
malpractice claim.
22Hereafter, when we use the term ‘error rate’, we refer to the probability for doctors of committing an
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under discussion.
The starting point of the model is that clinicians cannot entirely rule out the risk of
committing an error and, thus, of being found liable. These risks are both present when
physicians perform a treatment and when they decide not to perform it. That is to say,
doctors may injure a patient by mistakenly applying a medical procedure, but they may
also harm a patient by not performing a procedure that would have been beneﬁcial.23 Both
situations may in principle lead to a malpractice dispute and, thus, imply a speciﬁc error
rate. It is important to include both these aspects in the analysis of the eﬀects of a liability
variation on physicians’ decisions and this is precisely one of the main strengths of the model
proposed by Currie and MacLeod (2008). In fact, this framework explicitly considers the fact
that physicians have to decide whether or not to perform a treatment and, to this purpose,
they compare the error rate (i.e. the probability of making an error and being found liable)
entailed by both the performance and the non-performance of a given treatment.
In particular, the model regards the case of a negligence-based system, whereby physicians
are found liable only when their conduct – the decision either to provide or not to provide a
given treatment – has been negligent, that is, when their level of precaution was lower than
the legal standard of care. In such a context, physicians take into account the malpractice
pressure they face by weighing the net beneﬁt and cost of their choices. The former includes
“the intrinsic reward from treating the patient, any pecuniary rewards from treatment, and the
opportunity cost of care”,24 while the latter consists in the expected liability that physicians
will incur in by committing an error. An important feature to be born in mind is that the
model abstracts the resource constraint with which physicians’ treatment choices have to
deal with in reality and that limits treatment provision in many circumstances. Within the
theoretical framework considered, the decision to provide or not to provide a treatment is
driven, on the costs side, exclusively by liability considerations and not by resource use. In the
case of public hospitals, for example, clinicians may decide not to perform a procedure and/or
treatment because the related expenditure would be too high and would not be justiﬁed
by the possible beneﬁts. The inclusion of budget constraints in the model would increase
the frequency of the non-performance of a procedure and/or treatment. Nevertheless, the
fact that resource use has been disregarded should not aﬀect the present empirical analysis,
whereby this aspect is accounted for by control groups. 25
error that gives rise to liability.
23This approach is perfectly consistent with the medical liability regime existing in Italy. As discussed
in Chapter 2, clinicians may be found liable for negligence or imprudence. The former corresponds to the
case where the patient is damaged by an omission of care (i.e. non-performance of a treatment). The
latter coincides with the hypothesis of a victim damaged by the performance of a treatment without all the
precautions that are considered as necessary.
24Currie and MacLeod (2008), p. 11.
25In fact, the reference context is uniform as we are dealing with data on a same country and hospitals
present substantially uniform technologies and clinical practice. Therefore, the potential eﬀect exerted by
budget considerations should be canceled out on average. Clearly, the model of Currie and MacLeod is a
stylized description of the procedure choice of physicians and a possible version of it should also include these
budget constraints. However, the result would be more complex than the proposed setting, which allows
anyway to include in the analysis the fact that doctors may err either by performing a treatment or by not
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Both beneﬁts and costs are shown to be inﬂuenced by the existing liability system, by
patient conditions and by the likelihood that a medical error leads to a malpractice claim.
Since physicians cannot modify the ﬁrst two factors, they choose the severity threshold from
which to start treating patients in the attempt to minimize their error rate (i.e. maximizing
their expected payoﬀ). In this respect, a crucial role in the Currie and MacLeod’s framework
is played by the so-called marginal patient. This corresponds to the patient, for whom,
given her health status, the clinician is indiﬀerent between providing and not providing the
treatment. In particular, the authors assume an exogenous distribution of both costs and
beneﬁts, thus an exogenous distribution of the payoﬀ that doctors obtain by providing and
by not providing a certain treatment. The result is that, for a given malpractice rule, these
distributions are driven solely by patient condition. (Figure 5.1).
Figure 5.1: Physician’s Decision Process Between Performing and Not Performing a Treat-
ment
Notes: Notes: NP=Distribution curve of doctor’s payoﬀ when the treatment is not per-
formed; P=Distribution curve of doctor’s payoﬀ when the treatment is performed.
More speciﬁcally, as drawn in Figure 5.1, P and NP represent the distribution curves of
physicians’ payoﬀ for any given patient condition when doctors decide to perform and not to
provide a given treatment respectively. In this speciﬁc case patient condition worsens going
from left to right and the distribution curves have an increasing slope at a decreasing rate,
indicating that the payoﬀs for doctors from treating a patient increase, the more severe the
patient condition becomes. This implies that not performing a given treatment in the case
performing it.
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of a patient with a very serious health status entails a greater risk of committing an error,
potentially leading to medical liability. Then, clinicians choose to apply the treatment when
the curve P is above NP since it means that the payoﬀ resulting from the performance of the
treatment is higher than the one resulting from the non-performance of the same treatment.
In turn, when P is below NP, physicians prefer not to prescribe the treatment. The marginal
patient is depicted by point X, where clinicians’ payoﬀ stemming from no-treatment equals
that derived by the performance of the treatment. As a consequence, the marginal patient
identiﬁes the amount of treatments physicians perform and, in our example, all patients with
a more severe health condition than the marginal one are treated, while those with a less
serious condition are not.
A ﬁrst implication of this setting is that any change in liability rules potentially modiﬁes
the payoﬀ of doctors and shifts the distribution curves P and NP (the direction of this shift
depends on the actual eﬀect of the legal change in terms of malpractice pressure). In response
to this shift, physicians will change the number of treatments performed in order to minimize
their risk and maximize their payoﬀ under the new legal rules. So that, they will identify
the new health condition deﬁning the marginal patient. As a result, a tort reform ultimately
modiﬁes the amount of patients treated as it aﬀects the probability of being sued in the event
of an error for both performing and not performing a treatment. Graphically, this means
that the new point of intersection between the two distribution curves P and NP – when the
performance and the non-performance of the treatment entail the same payoﬀ – will represent
the new marginal patient, thus the new amount of treatments provided.
A fundamental feature of the model is that it does not focus on how doctors perform a
given treatment, but rather whether they perform it or not. Considering that a variation
in liability produces a change in doctors’ decisions between providing and not providing
the treatment with respect to the marginal patient, Currie and MacLeod oﬀer guidance
to evaluate the response of clinicians to tort reforms in term of levels and composition of
hospital activity. Traditionally, the concept of liability itself provides that a variation in
malpractice pressure produces a change in the level of care undertaken by physicians in
performing the treatment. On the contrary, the theoretical framework developed by Currie
and MacLeod focuses on a quantitative dimension (i.e. the number of patients treated),
because it recognizes that clinicians deal with two sources of risk: physicians face the risk of
being found liable for committing an error when they decide to apply a treatment, as well as
when they decide to avoid it. Hence, before even deciding the degree of care to undertake,
clinicians have to decide whether or not to perform the treatment, taking into account that
both options may lead to litigation in the event of an error.
A second relevant implication is that, when doctors’ payoﬀ from treating a patient grows
with the increasing severity of a patient’s condition, the eﬀect of a tort reform loosening the
liability constraints faced by physicians is to shift downwards the condition of the marginal
patient. This means that the marginal patient is now identiﬁed by a less serious health status
as a consequence of the decrease in malpractice pressure. Going back to Figure 5.2, we see
that such a legal change determines a shift upward of both curves with the marginal patient
moving to the left (i.e. from X to Z). Hence, if the probability of incurring an error with
legal consequences is higher when the treatment is chosen than when the treatment is not
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Figure 5.2: Physician’s Decision Process When Medical Liability Is Reduced
Notes: Notes: NP=Distribution curve of doctor’s payoﬀ when the treatment is not per-
formed; P=Distribution curve of doctor’s payoﬀ when the treatment is performed.
chosen - as depicted in Figure 5.2 - the actual eﬀect of a weakening of malpractice liability
is an increase in the utilization of the treatment itself. This can also be interpreted as a
reduction in the negative defensive practices undertaken by physicians. By contrast, if the
non-performance of the treatment implies a higher risk of being sued in the event of an error
than the performance of the same treatment, such a variation in malpractice pressure leads to
a decrease in the number of patients treated. Similarly to the previous scenario, this means
that positive defensive conduct of doctors becomes less frequent.
More in general, the model suggests that the direction of the impact produced by a
weakening of malpractice liability on the use of a therapeutic or diagnostic procedure is an
empirical issue that depends on the risk-risk trade-oﬀ between executing the procedure and
avoiding it with respect to the marginal patient. In this way, this theoretical framework
illustrates why the ﬁnal eﬀect of a tort reform on the utilization rate of a procedure can-
not be uniquely determined ex ante on theoretical grounds.26 As the authors themselves
26In particular, usually there is no reference point on the clinical appropriateness of medical treatments.
This makes it diﬃcult to formulate a hypothesis ex ante with respect to the ﬁnal impact of a variation of
malpractice pressure on the utilization rate of a treatment. The formulation of a hypothesis becomes possible
only when the empirical literature provides a reference. This is, for example, the case of the performance of
C-sections in Italy which is characterized by an excess in cesarean utilization. Given these circumstances,
as observed by Frakes (2012), “it may be reasonable to assume that the marginal mother is inappropriate,
in an absolute sense, for cesarean delivery. Accordingly, it may be reasonable to assume that a physician
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state: “whether the change in the law results in increases or decreases in procedure use de-
pends on what the relative error rates are when procedures are performed or not performed.”27
Consequently, the model provides a framework to interpret the observed changes in medical
decisions as a response to the relative risk between performing and not performing a proce-
dure. More precisely, by examining how physicians react to a variation in medical liability, it
is also possible to infer whether healthcare professionals undertake a higher malpractice risk
by providing or not providing a treatment.
5.4 Empirical Framework
5.4.1 Outcome Variables of Interest
We exploit here the model just illustrated to evaluate and interpret the evidence of the
estimated impact of limiting noneconomic damages on the provision of healthcare at the
level of both hospitals and their wards. However, applying this theoretical framework to a
public healthcare system such as the Italian one, requires the modiﬁcation of the perspective
of analysis.
Indeed, Currie and MacLeod (2008) oﬀer a model that focuses on the choices of the in-
dividual practitioners and that, therefore, ﬁts better the case of the U.S. healthcare system:
a privately funded system, where doctors act mainly as contracted professionals and ulti-
mately bear the cost of malpractice litigation and malpractice insurance.28 Diﬀerently, in
the Italian system, physicians employed by hospitals are not directly exposed to the ﬁnancial
implications derived from the clinical decisions that may lead to malpractice litigation and,
thus, aﬀect the cost of malpractice. On the contrary, these implications relate primarily to
the healthcare facilities themselves.
In Italy, in fact, most of the physicians work in public hospitals or in healthcare facilities
aﬃliated to the public system. These structures are hierarchically organized with diﬀerent
levels of management and primarily committed to the pursuit of the policy guidelines set by
public health authorities. They are also the entities responsible for providing their medical
staﬀ with appropriate insurance against third party liability. In turn, being their employees
in all respects, clinicians must comply with the internal regulations and objectives of these
hospitals. Besides these general rules, doctors have also to deal with the incentives and
guidelines provided by the management levels that may set speciﬁc priorities. As a result,
the inﬂuence and control exerted by the management may move doctors aways from the
pursuit of their sole professional interest, which in Currie and MacLeod (2008) corresponds
to the reduction of physicians’ litigation risk.
Moreover, contrary to what happens in a private system, doctors cannot even easily decide
treating this marginal mother is sensitive to the risk of improperly performing a cesarean delivery and that
malpractice pressure thus pushes the cesarean rate downward (not upward) on the margin.”.
27Currie and MacLeod (2008), p. 14.
28For more information on the U.S. healthcare system, see, for instance, Shi and Singh (2010) and Leﬂar
(2013).
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to move from a public hospital to another in order to reduce their malpractice exposure
since public facilities hire physicians through public selections.29 Such a context has two
main implications. First, when it comes to investigate medical defensive practices – more in
general, the impact of malpractice reforms on the provision of medical services in a public
healthcare system – it is more appropriate to examine the possible reactions of hospitals
rather than those of individual doctors. Hence, the most appropriate dimension for the
analysis has to be set at the level of the healthcare facilities and their wards and not at
the level of individual practitioners. Second, the existence of a hospital-wide response to
changes in medical liability is not straightforward since, in this case, doctors work under
diﬀerent conditions compared to their privately employed colleagues. They are subject to
diﬀerent incentives and standards, so that they may perceive to a diﬀerent extent the risk
of litigation and not react to it in the same way. For instance, a doctor working in a public
hospital may be less concerned by compensation requests since she does not directly bear the
cost of malpractice coverage. Similarly, she may also be less worried about the reputational
consequences of a lawsuit if she knows that the attention of the media will be focused on
the involvement of the facility she works for, rather than on the identity of the medical staﬀ
accused.
In the event of a response at the level of healthcare structures, we expect that the possible
reactions of hospitals will concern primarily the arrangements through which treatments are
provided to patients. Given the features of the system, clinicians are expected to have
a limited capacity to substantially impact with their decisions the macro level of hospital
activity (e.g. volume of admissions or discharges), but they may rather aﬀect the micro
level. The activity volumes of Italian hospitals depend mainly on public capacity and the
epidemiological needs of the population since the NHS oﬀers universal healthcare coverage to
all citizens and residents of the country. Consequently, we do not focus on volumes of hospital
activity but on the combination of the diﬀerent volumes. In particular, we investigate the
possible eﬀects on the intensity and composition of the treatments provided.
As a result, in the present analysis, we apply the theoretical framework oﬀered by Cur-
rie and MacLeod (2008) to the Italian NHS system. In particular, moving away from the
analysis of doctors’ reactions and focusing on hospitals, we examine indicators of treatments’
composition, rather than investigating individual practice areas or the utilization of speciﬁc
medical procedures. In this regard, physicians working in public hospitals are expected to
have greater discretionary power specially with respect to two main aspects of the provision
of medical services: (i) the regime under which patients are treated (e.g. day hospital and
standard inpatient stay), and (ii) the duration of the period spent by patients in the hospital.
In particular, to examine the possible changes in the composition of treatments, a promis-
ing line of investigation consists in analyzing how doctors vary the recourse to standard
29A number of papers have studied the eﬀect of tort reforms on the supply of physicians. For example,
Matsa (2007) shows that damages caps cause a signiﬁcant increase in the supply of specialists in rural areas.
Similarly, in a previous work Encinosa and Hellinger (2005) report that damages caps increase physicians
supply in general and, in particular, in rural counties. Diﬀerently, Klick and Stratmann (2007) examine the
eﬀects of tort reform on doctors supply in high-risk specialties ﬁnding that only noneconomic damages caps
signiﬁcantly aﬀect doctors supply and only in high-risk specialties.
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inpatient stay in response to a change of medical liability. In practice, this information is
obtained by examining the extent of the variation in the amount of patients treated under the
so-called one-day regime, that is the amount of patients who are discharged within 24 hours
of their admission and after having spent one night in the healthcare facility. Unlike total
discharges (i.e. patients treated) and day-hospital patients, this measure is relatively more
suitable to appreciate how clinicians use their discretionary power to modify the composition
of treatments in response to liability variations. In public facilities, physicians cannot in the-
ory refuse patients, but they can decide under which hospitalization regime to admit them
(i.e. inpatient standard regime, day-hospital or one-day regime). However, since day-hospital
services are deﬁned quite strictly, the room for physicians to opt for this type of hospitaliza-
tion is rather limited. On the contrary, doctors enjoy greater discretion with respect to the
application of the one-day regime. Moreover, under this regime they comply with the public
nature of their profession while avoiding the inpatient standard regime when the day-hospital
one is not applicable.
Aside from deciding the composition of treatments (i.e. under which regime to admit
patients), doctors have also to decide the intensity of treatments. In this sense, one of
the most traditionally used indicators of patients’ hospital experience is length of stay. The
duration of patients’ stay in a hospital is also often considered as one of the aspects of medical
provision that is more aﬀected by the defensive purposes of doctors.30 However, patients’
stay can be broken up into three main phases: the pre-treatment, the treatment, and the
post-treatment phase. Therefore, besides the overall length of stay, the examination of the
duration of these phases may provide further information on the risk trade-oﬀ entailed by
each stage of inpatient stay. In this respect, the preoperative length of stay is particularly
interesting. This coincides with the period spent in the hospital by a patient before a surgery
and allows us to focus on a speciﬁc aspect of inpatient stay while also considering a more
speciﬁc sample as this indicator regards only surgical activities. As a consequence, this
measure also makes it possible to investigate the behavior of doctors in relation to a sample
that is qualitatively diﬀerent from the general one observed through the overall length of stay
and potentially at higher risk of malpractice claims.
Finally, it is interesting to verify whether there is evidence of any patient discrimination
(i.e. cream skimming) as a consequence of a change in malpractice pressure. To this end,
we consider the case mix index and the entropy index, which tell us whether doctors tend to
treat less complex patients or to focus on similar cases respectively.
To sum up the empirical purposes of our analysis, we investigate the impact of schedules
of noneconomic damages on the following measures of treatment composition and intensity:
• One-day admissions (1d admissions): the ratio between the number of patients admit-
ted under the one-day regime and the overall number of discharged patients;
• Length of stay (los): the average number of days spent by a patient in the hospital;
• Preoperative length of stay (po los): the average number of days elapsed between the
date of admission of a patient and the day of the surgery;
30See, for instance, Frakes (2012b), Avraham and Schanzenbach (2011) or Huesch and Richman (2012).
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• Case mix index (icm): the ratio between the composition of the cases treated weighted
on the basis of the DRG system and the weighted composition of the cases treated at
the national level,31 and
• Entropy index (entropy): measure of the heterogeneity of the distribution of patients
in the various DRG.32
In this way, our aim is to oﬀer valuable insights into the possible eﬀects exerted by
a modiﬁcation of malpractice pressure on the treatment decisions undertaken by publicly
employed physicians. In our study the modiﬁcation of malpractice pressure can be due to
the introduction of schedules and/or a worsening of judicial performance.
5.4.2 Estimation Strategy
In order to evaluate the eﬀect of the implementation of noneconomic damages schedules
by Italian courts on hospitals’ activity levels, our empirical strategy exploits the scattered
timing of the reform to apply a Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences (DID) estimator already discussed
in Chapter 4. The goal is to examine the existence and characteristics of a hospital-wide
response to variations in malpractice pressure. In particular, we focus our attention on the
changes in medical liability induced by the introduction of noneconomic damages schedules
while taking into consideration also the judicial environment in which this policy intervention
ﬁnds application.
Consequently, as in the previous chapter, the treatment consists in the introduction of
noneconomic damages schedules by Italian courts. However, in this case, the dimension of
analysis is no longer represented by public local healthcare providers (i.e. LHUs, IHs, THs and
RHs), but by public hospitals. Speciﬁcally, healthcare providers can manage more than one
hospital and the hospitals run by a same healthcare provider can be placed in diﬀerent courts.
In the present analysis, we focus directly on the managed hospitals that are now regarded
as individual units of observations. Therefore, to evaluate the eﬀects of this treatment, we
compare changes in the outcome variables of interest for the hospitals under the competence
of courts that have adopted schedules during the period of observation (treated) with the
changes referring to those hospitals placed in the districts of courts that did not make such
a switch (untreated/control group). This control group includes the hospitals ruled by courts
that introduced the treatment before 2000, as well as those facilities placed in courts that
did not implement schedules neither during nor before the observation period.
31The case mix index expresses the complexity of the cases treated by a hospital or ward compared to the
average complexity of a set of reference hospitals or wards (i.e. the Italian hospitals and wards). A case mix
index higher than one indicates that the related hospital or ward treats more complicated cases compared to
the national average, whereas a value lower than one corresponds to a lower degree of complexity than the
average one.
32The heterogeneity is minimum when all discharged patients present the same DRG and maximum when
the discharged patients are divided into the diﬀerent DRG in equal parts. For further details on variables’
deﬁnition and their sources see Table 5.6 in the Appendix.
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The present empirical approach shows a number of similarities with the one adopted
in Chapter 4 to examine the impact of the reference policy on insurers’ behavior.33 Given
the scattered timing of the implementation of the treatment, what matters is the year of
the schedules introduction and the main problem for the soundness of the analysis concerns
precisely the choice made by courts of such a year. This decision has not to be inﬂuenced by
omitted variables related to medical malpractice and this condition is likely to be met in the
case of Italy. In fact, ﬁrst schedules are not speciﬁcally directed to deal with malpractice cases
to the extent that, originally, they were not implemented to respond to problems related to
either malpractice litigation or the general phenomenon of medical malpractice. Second, the
chosen period of observation leaves out from the analysis those courts that were among the
ﬁrst to implement schedules (before 2000), as well as those that were among the last (after
2010). Therefore, one can expect that courts’ heterogeneity in terms of structural, operational
and even ideological features, which could condition the introduction of schedules, is limited
and should not constitute a bias for the analysis itself. In addition, we also include in the
regressions court ﬁxed eﬀects further controlling for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity
among courthouses. As a result, our identiﬁcation relies on the assumption that the treatment
year (i.e. the year of schedules adoption) is exogenous with respect to the outcome variables,
which appears reasonable in this context. A possible further concern can arise with respect to
the distribution of public hospitals across court districts’ borders. In particular, the soundness
of the present analysis would be questioned if public hospitals could strategically choose their
location preferring those courts where there is a lower risk of malpractice litigation. However,
as seen, this is not the case and the distribution of Italian public hospitals can be considered
a random one with respect to courts, because the opening and location of public hospitals
are decided at the level of regional governments and are mainly driven by legal requirements
and political long run horizon decisions.34
Finally, as in the previous chapter, we also take advantage of the organizational structure
of both the judicial and healthcare systems in Italy. Nonetheless, since the observational unit
is now the single public hospitals, what we exploit here is the fact that healthcare facilities
falling under a same regional government may actually be placed in diﬀerent court districts as
depicted by Figure 5.3 in the case of the Sicilian public hospitals for the years 2000 and 2010.
This is particularly relevant since the determinant for the identiﬁcation of the courthouse,
where a claim for medical malpractice has to be ﬁled, is the location of the hospital where
the alleged case of medical malpractice took place. These two elements combined together
imply that hospitals subject to a same regional healthcare policy may be ruled by diﬀerent
courthouses. Therefore, they may deal with courts that diﬀer in level of performance (i.e.
civil backlog) and in the adoption of schedules. Moreover, an additional consequence is that
a single court may be responsible for more than one public hospital, so that the caseload of
the court is not exclusively determined by one healthcare structure. This is, for example, the
case of the Courts of Catania and Termini Imerese that in 2000 had under their competence
6 and 5 public hospitals respectively (Figure 5.3).
33For a more detailed individual discussion of all these common aspects, see Section 4.3.1.
34In particular, the decision of the municipality has to comply with speciﬁc population requisites.
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Figure 5.3: Court Districts and Hospitals Location in Sicily (2000-2010)
Notes: Distribution of public hospitals across court districts in 2000 and 2010 in Sicily. The colored areas identify
the diﬀerent court districts, while numbers indicate the location of the diﬀerent hospitals managed by a same LHU.
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This unique conﬁguration enables us to disentangle the eﬀects of both the treatment
(i.e. schedules adoption) and judicial performance from possible omitted variable problems.
As discussed in Chapter 2, regions are the level of authority in charge of the planning and
organization of healthcare provision within their territorial borders. Hence, falling under the
same regional government means being part of the same regulatory framework. Hospitals
have to pursue aligned policy goals and organize their activities according to common policy
guidelines.
As a result, we study the behavior of hospitals that operate under the same system of
rules and policies as set by regional healthcare authorities, and we can investigate how these
facilities respond to variations in malpractice pressure. Variations due to the implementation
of noneconomic damages schedules, as well as changes in the levels of judicial performance,
which diﬀer according to the diﬀerent area where the facility is located within the region.
In addition, we use ﬁxed eﬀects estimators, controlling for court ﬁxed eﬀects, specialty
ﬁxed eﬀects as well as year and region ﬁxed eﬀects. Year ﬁxed eﬀects allow adjustment
for common shocks that impact on the provision of care. Region and specialty ﬁxed eﬀects
control for region- and specialty-speciﬁc time-invariant unobservable characteristics that may
aﬀect medical care utilization rates and composition. Whilst, the unobservable features of
courts potentially inﬂuencing the adoption of schedules are controlled by court ﬁxed eﬀects.
A further important implication is that, in this case, each hospital is directly and uniquely
associated with a single court and it is no longer necessary to include a weight to express the
relative importance of a court for the related healthcare provider.35 Hence, our treatment
(i.e. Schedule) is now deﬁned as a binary variable: treated hospitals are those for which the
dichotomous variable Schedule moves from 0 to 1.
Deﬁning Y as the outcome of interest for hospital h at time t, we ﬁrst estimate the
following Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences speciﬁcation:
Yht =αh + γa + ρt + ϑj +X
′
htβ + θBacklogjht
+DSchedulejht + ωBacklogjht ∗ Schedulejht + εht
(5.1)
where εht is the error term, while αh are hospital ﬁxed eﬀects, γa are the regional ﬁxed
eﬀects, ρt controls for yearly shocks and ϑj are court ﬁxed eﬀects. Backlog is a continuous
variable expressing the level of civil backlog of Courtj, while Schedule is a dummy vari-
able equal to one when Courtj applies noneconomic damages schedules and t≥t∗j, where
t∗j is the year of adoption of the treatment by Courtj. D is the DID coeﬃcient, whereas
Backlogjht ∗ Schedulejht represents the interaction between Backlog and Schedule. Finally,
with Xht we control for a group of variables at the hospital level, which reﬂect the main oper-
ational characteristics of the hospitals themselves. In particular, we included: the number of
inpatient beds, the total number of staﬀ employed, the total number of doctors employed,36
35For a detailed explanation of the weights used to include the partial overlapping between courts and
healthcare districts in the empirical analysis performed in the previous chapter, we refer to Section 5.3.1.
36The number of doctors employed by public hospitals is exogenous with respect to our treatment (i.e.
the introduction of schedules). In fact, in a public system such as the Italian one, physicians cannot simply
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the number of wards, the case mix index, and the entropy index.37
We also investigate the impact of adopting noneconomic damages schedules and of judicial
performance on the activity level of hospitals’ wards. To this end, Equation (5.1) is modiﬁed
as follows:
Ywht =αw + γa + ρt + ϑj +X
′
wtβ + θBacklogjwt
+DSchedulejwt + ωBacklogjwt ∗ Schedulejwt + εht
(5.2)
where, diﬀerently from the previous speciﬁcation, Y is the outcome of interest for ward
w at time t and αw are ward ﬁxed eﬀects. Moreover, in this case, we include a set of controls
Xwt related to the operational characteristics of wards. Speciﬁcally, we consider: the number
of wards’ inpatient beds, the total number of beds devoted to day-surgery, the number of
beds for day-hospital care, and the number of beds actually used.
5.5 The Dataset and Descriptive Statistics
For the purpose of the present work, we combine the data on the judiciary provided by the
Italian Ministry of Justice, which has already been presented and employed in the previous
chapter, with a second dataset containing information on the activity levels and operational
characteristics of hospitals for the period 2000-2010.
The data on the judicial system, in particular, concern: (i) the caseload of each single
court (i.e. new, pending and closed cases per year), and (ii) the year of adoption and the
structure of the noneconomic damages schedules eventually applied by each courthouse.38
Thanks to this information, we computed for each court the related civil backlog, which
again has been used as proxy of judicial performance: a higher civil backlog suggests that
the court is characterized by a longer processing time of civil cases.39 Even though Italian
courthouses vary widely in terms of performance (expressed by the backlog index), our data
indicates that the courts of our dataset were able on average to close less than a third of the
annual pending proceedings. In fact, between 2000 and 2010, for every closed case there were
3.67 undisposed proceedings (Table 5.1). As for the introduction of schedules, on average
83% of courts in our sample were limiting noneconomic damages for personal injuries during
our period of observation.
decide to move from one hospital to another in response to malpractice pressure. On the contrary, to obtain
a position in a public hospital, they need to successfully pass a public selection, which then assigns them to
a speciﬁc healthcare facility.
37When the outcome of interest is the case mix index or the entropy index, both these variables are not
included in the analysis as controls.
38In this regard, see Section 4.4.
39Likewise in the previous chapter, courts’ civil backlog is calculated as the ratio of new open cases during
year t plus pending cases at the beginning of each new year (i.e. not solved at years t − 1) and the closed
cases during year t. Yet, if this index is greater than one, it means that the proceedings disposed by the
related courthouse were less than those pending during the same year. For a discussion of the validity of the
backlog index as proxy for courts’ performance, see Section 4.2.2.
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics at the Hospital Level
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Civil Backlog 3.67 1.18
Schedule 0.83 0.38
1d admissions 0.11 0.07
Los 10.10 8.49
Po los 4.22 2.58
Icm 0.94 0.14
Entropy 1.18 0.21
Beds do h 273.82 304.45
Doctors h 149.51 180.75
N wards 15.80 17.13
Personnel h 797.25 988.13
Notes: Civil backlog=Number of new cases plus number of pending cases from
the previous year out of the number of closed cases; Schedule=Schedules sys-
tem on noneconomic damages. 1d admissions=The ratio between the num-
ber of patients admitted under the one-day regime and the overall number
of discharged patients; Los=The duration of patients’ stay in the hospital
expressed in days; Po los=The number of days elapsed between the patient’s
admission date and the day of the surgery (excluded); Icm=The ratio between
the composition of the cases treated in each hospital’s ward, weighted based
on the DRG system, and the weighted composition of the cases treated at
the national level; Entropy=Measure of the heterogeneity of patients’ dis-
tribution in the various DRG. Beds do h=The number of inpatient beds;
Doctors h=The number of doctors employed; N wards=The number of hos-
pitals’ wards; Personnel h=The overall number of staﬀ employed.
The data on both the operational characteristics and the activity levels of hospitals and
their wards comes from the Italian Ministry of Health. Speciﬁcally, the information on the
operational characteristics consists of the number of overall personnel and doctors employed,
number and type of wards, and total number of beds for inpatient care. Whilst, at the level
of the single wards, we have data on the number of beds devoted to the following healthcare
services: inpatient care, day-hospital care and day-surgery, as well as the number of beds
actually used by each ward. On the contrary, we have the same type of information on the
activity levels of both hospitals and wards. In particular, they include the case-mix index,
the entropy index, the patients’ overall length of stay, as well as the duration of patients stay
before a surgery, and the one-day admissions.
The resulting sample comprises information on 526 public hospitals with a unique iden-
tiﬁer observed over the period of interest, which amount to a total of 78,071 observations at
the ward level.40 During 2000-2010, 104 hospitals were placed in courts which introduced
40Our sample is representative since it covers 83.6% of all the public hospitals in the country, which
amounted to 629 facilities for the year 2010. The data for the missing 16.4% is not available at the hospital
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schedules during the period of observation (i.e. treated cases). Conversely, the remaining
422 were not treated. In fact, 355 of them are located in courts that adopted schedules for
the ﬁrst time before 2000, while the other 67 are under the competence of courts that never
applied limits on noneconomic damages for personal injury (i.e. neither before 2000, nor
during our period of interest).
As reported in Table 5.1, which provides the main descriptive statistics for the key vari-
ables considered in the analysis that follows, each public hospital has on average 16 wards41
for an average total of 797 employees of which 149 (i.e. 18.6%) are doctors. On average, a
patient spends slightly more than 4 days in the hospital before receiving surgery, whereas the
average overall stay slightly exceeds 10 days. Comparing the overall and the preoperative
length of stay, we obtain that on average 40% of the time spent by a patient in the healthcare
facility precedes the surgery itself, thus it is preparatory to it.
Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics at the Ward Level
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
1d admissions 0.13 0.14
Los 8.98 8.29
Po los 4.31 4.45
Icm 0.99 0.24
Entropy 1.20 0.39
Beds dh w 2.50 4.17
Beds do w 24.15 29.57
Beds ds w 0.24 1.21
Beds used w 23.32 28.52
Notes: 1d admissions=The ratio between the number of patients admit-
ted under the one-day regime and the overall number of discharged pa-
tients; Los=The duration of patients’ stay in the hospital expressed in days;
Po los=The number of days elapsed between the patient’s admission date
and the day of the surgery (excluded); Icm=The ratio between the compo-
sition of the cases treated in each ward, weighted based on the DRG sys-
tem, and the weighted composition of the cases treated at the national level;
Entropy=Measure of the heterogeneity of patients’ distribution in the var-
ious DRG. Beds dh w=The number of beds devoted to day-hospital care;
Beds do w=The number of inpatient beds; Beds ds w= The number of beds
devoted to day-surgery care; Beds used w=The number of beds actually used.
In addition, Table 5.2 displays the main descriptive statistics at the ward level, where
the pre-surgery length of stay lasts on average 4 days, while the total number of days spent
in a ward by patients amounts to 9. With respect to patients receiving surgery, the pre-
operative hospitalization accounts for 48% of the overall time spent by the patients in a
level.
41See, in the Appendix, Figure 5.8 on wards’ distribution.
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ward. On average, the complexity of the cases treated by individual wards proves to be
almost perfectly in line with what happens at the national level.
As for the structure of wards, we record on average 24 beds for inpatient care and 2.5
beds for day-hospital care, while the presence of beds devoted to day-surgery activities is
still very sparse. In addition, on average, the occupied patient beds almost coincide with the
totality of the beds held by a ward, thus there is no evidence of extra beds capacity.
Finally, it is possible to distinguish 66 diﬀerent types of wards based on medical spe-
cialty. The most common one is general surgery, as present in 62% of the public hospitals
examined, followed by general medicine (61%), intensive care (61%), obstetrics-gynecology
(60%), orthopedics (59%), cardiology (58%) and pediatrics (57%). On the contrary, the
most infrequent type of ward in the Italian public hospitals is toxicology being present in
only 3 structures of our sample. Almost as infrequent as toxicology are also immunology (9
hospitals), allergology (17 hospitals) and burn center (22 hospitals).
5.6 Results
The theoretical framework of Currie and MacLeod (2008) suggests that clinicians may vary
the treatments they provide in response to a variation in medical liability. Based on the type
of reaction shown by physicians, the model also clariﬁes whether doctors associate a higher
malpractice risk with the performance of a given treatment or with its non-performance.
Table 5.3: The Expected Eﬀects of Noneconomic Damages Schedules
Risk Tradeoﬀ Expected Eﬀect on the Procedure Use
P riskier than NP ↑
P less risky than NP ↓
Notes: P=The procedure is performed; NP=The procedure is not performed. The Risk Tradeoﬀ
tells whether it is riskier for physicians to perform or to not perform a given treatment.
The framework previously described has two main implications for the present analysis.
First, since both the implementation of noneconomic damages schedules and an increase in
courts’ civil backlog are expected to weaken malpractice pressure, consistent with the model,
they are also expected to aﬀect the decisions of doctors in the same direction. Hence, even
though Currie and MacLeod’s framework does not identify a priori the direction of the impact
of schedules and judicial performance, the eﬀects of these two features are predicted to have
the same sign. Second, the model infers from the direction of the observed eﬀects doctors’
perception of the relative malpractice risk between the provision and the non-provision of a
given treatment. Speciﬁcally, given that the introduction of schedules eases the litigation risk
faced by clinicians, an increase in the use of a given treatment means that for doctors the
performance of the treatment entails a higher probability of making a mistake, which gives
rise to liability, than its non-performance. Whilst a decrease in the utilization rate of the
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treatment coincides with a situation where clinicians associate a higher probability of being
sued in case of an error with the decision of treating the patient rather than with that of not
providing the treatment (Table 5.3). Meanwhile, no change in doctors’ behavior is consistent
with the hypothesis that the variation of liability constraints have aﬀected the relative error
rates of performing and not performing a treatment to the same extent or has not aﬀected
such probabilities at all.
5.6.1 Hospitals
Table 5.4 reports the main results obtained from the estimation of Equation (5.1). It shows
that, after controlling for region, year, court and healthcare provider ﬁxed eﬀects and hospi-
tals’ characteristics, in most cases there is either no signiﬁcant impact (e.g., overall length of
stay) or the impact observed is a minor one (e.g., one-day admissions), but with one notable
exception represented by the preoperative length of stay.
Table 5.4: Hospital Results
1d admissions Los Po los Icm Entropy
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Backlog 0.001 -0.018 0.045 -0.001 -0.0003
(0.001) (0.101) (0.040) (0.002) (0.003)
Schedule 0.009* -0.161 0.600** -0.006 -0.011
(0.006) (0.675) (0.266) (0.013) (0.020)
Backlog*Schedule -0.002* 0.058 -0.153*** 0.003 0.005
(0.001) (0.149) (0.059) (0.003) (0.005)
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Healthcare Providers Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 6,688 6,727 6,437 6,731 6,728
Notes: 1d admissions=The ratio between the number of patients admitted under the one-day regime and the
overall number of discharged patients; Los=The duration of patients’ stay in the hospital expressed in days;
Po los=The number of days elapsed between the patient’s admission date and the day of the surgery (excluded);
Icm=The ratio between the composition of the cases treated in each hospital’s ward, weighted based on the
DRG system, and the weighted composition of the cases treated at the national level; Entropy= Measure of
the heterogeneity of patients’ distribution in the various DRG. Backlog= Civil Backlog; Schedule=Schedules
system on noneconomic damages. OLS regressions. HealthcareProvidersControls include: Number of Beds,
Personnel, Number of Doctors, Number of Wards, Average Case Mix Index, Average Entropy Index. FE=Fixed
eﬀects at the year, provider, court and geographical area level. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *,
at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
Speciﬁcally, this outcome variable is signiﬁcantly correlated with Schedule. The im-
plementation of scheduled damages leads to an increase in the duration of the preoperative
length of stay. The positive sign of this eﬀect suggests that physicians perceive a higher prob-
ability of committing an error for which they are found liable when they decide to prolong
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the preoperative stay of patients rather than when they decide to shorten it.
Before performing a surgery, physicians need to monitor the patient and carry out medical
examinations in order to acquire all the information on her health status that are needed
for the success of the surgery and the reduction of the general risk of complications. These
checks can often be performed in outpatient or day-hospital regime. Alternatively doctors
can also decide to hospitalize the patient. This last option is believed to ensure a greater
control on the quality of the diagnostic examinations performed. If these checks are managed
under standard inpatient stay, physicians can give more precise indications on how to do the
examinations, thus they can obtain more speciﬁc and targeted information. Nevertheless,
the hospitalization of a patient poses the risk of hospital-acquired infections and clinicians
often end up associating the preoperative stay of patients in the hospital with a higher risk of
malpractice.42 Therefore, in the presence of high malpractice pressure, despite the possible
advantages, clinicians may have reasons that induce them to shorten the preoperative length
of stay. If this is the case, they adopt a negative defensive behavior to protect themselves
against the risk of litigation. On the contrary, once that malpractice pressure is reduced due
to the introduction of schedules, clinicians are less concerned about hospitalizing patients
and the risk of hospital-acquired infections. Consequently, they may be more inclined to
admit patients to the hospital before the surgery and to prolong their preoperative stay in
the facility.
Likewise in the previous chapter, the size of the eﬀect of Schedule has to be evaluated
considering that it cannot be determined without jointly taking into account the level of
backlog, thus it is always the sum of D (i.e. the DID coeﬃcient) and w (i.e. the coeﬃcient
of the interaction between Schedule and Backlog) from Equation (5.1). Consequently, to
appreciate the magnitude of the eﬀects of Schedule, we present diﬀerent simulations con-
sidering the impact of schedules implementation for diﬀerent levels of Backlog chosen based
on the percentiles of Backlog distribution. In order to oﬀer a better understanding of the
factual eﬀects of this policy intervention with respect to our sample, we then plot graphs with
an upper part reproducing these simulations and a lower part with the actual distribution of
Backlog in the sample.
As a result, we see that the adoption of schedules has a positive eﬀect on patients’
preoperative length of stay, but with a decreasing trend when backlog grows. So that, when
schedules are introduced in a judiciary characterized by full eﬃciency (Backlog=1), the
preoperative length of stay rises by 13%. Nevertheless, the size of this eﬀect gets smaller and
smaller for increasing levels of backlog to the extent that this increase is equal to 9.2% for an
average performing courthouse and to 7.4% for a very ineﬃcient one (Backlog=5) (Figure
5.4). A possible pathway explaining the outlined trend is that well performing courthouses
may encourage injured parties to ﬁle claims. Hence, for a given liability rule, clinicians cope
with a higher risk of litigation in the case of an eﬃcient judiciary than in the hypothesis
of an ineﬃcient one. Consequently, the reduction of malpractice pressure caused by the
introduction of schedules has a stronger impact on such a context compared to a situation
42See, Currie and MacLeod (2008) and Frakes (2012a). In this regard, Hassan et al. (2010) ﬁnd that the
lengthening of patients’ length of stay by one day rises the likelihood of hospital-acquired infection by 1.37%.
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where doctors already face fewer liability constraints due to the poor performance of the
judiciary (i.e. high level of civil backlog). The simulations performed also show that, in
reality, for a substantial part of our sample a limitation in noneconomic damages through
schedules leads to a lengthening of the preoperative length of stay between 10.2% and 8.5%
since around 50% of courts report a backlog between 2.93 and 4.19 (Figure 5.4).
Figure 5.4: Eﬀects of Noneconomic Damages Schedules on Hospital Preoperative Length of
Stay
Notes: Vertical axis: Estimated impact of an increase of a standard deviation of
Schedule (i.e. 0.38) given diﬀerent levels of civil backlog on Preoperative Length
of Stay. The impact is expressed in percentages. Horizontal axis: Levels of civil
backlog.
As for the other outcomes, it is worth mentioning that schedules adoption also shows a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on one-day admissions, but only at the 10% level. In particular, the more
poorly performing is the court in charge of schedules implementation, the smaller is the in-
crease in the share of patients treated under the one-day regime out of all the discharged
ones. So that, for example, the introduction of schedules in a hypothetical context char-
acterized by full eﬃciency would produce a 7.5% estimated increase in one-day admissions,
whereas this increase would stand at 5.6% for an average performing court and at 4.7% for
highly ineﬃcient courts with a Backlog equal to 5. However, around 50% of the courts of
our sample register an increase of one-day admissions between 6.2% and 5.3% (Figure 5.5).
According to Currie and MacLeod’s model, this ﬁnding also suggests that physicians
associate a higher probability of making an error leading to legal consequences with the one-
day regime than standard inpatient stay. Hence, physicians seem to adopt a positive defensive
behavior by opting more frequently for the standard inpatient regime when they perceive
a high malpractice pressure in order to protect themselves against the risk of litigation.
Conversely, once this pressure is lowered, clinicians become more inclined to move a higher
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Figure 5.5: Eﬀects of Noneconomic Damages Schedules on Hospital One-day Admissions
Notes: Vertical axis: Estimated impact of an increase of a standard deviation
of Schedule (i.e. 0.38) given diﬀerent levels of civil backlog on One-Day Admis-
sions. The impact is expressed in percentages. Horizontal axis: Levels of civil
backlog.
share of patients from standard inpatient stay to a less intensive treatment setting, and this
can be explained as a reduction of their concern about limiting their malpractice exposure.
5.6.2 Wards
The estimated reaction at the ward level caused by a change in the liability constraints
faced by clinicians is substantially in line with what we observed for hospitals. However, the
reﬁnement of the observational unit makes it possible to overcome some of the limits of the
previous investigation based on healthcare facilities. Exploiting information at the ward level
reduces the heterogeneity across units of observation, thus the resulting analysis measures
more precisely the estimated eﬀects and oﬀers additional insights into the behavior of doctors
in public hospitals.
Table 5.5 displays the results obtained from the estimation of Equation (5.2) and shows
that the signiﬁcance of some eﬀects is blurred by the aggregation across diﬀerent heteroge-
neous wards when the impact of schedules introduction is evaluated at the level of hospitals.
In particular, one-day admissions are no longer signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by Schedule, but
rather the eﬀect of judicial performance prevails. Nevertheless, this relationship still results
to be signiﬁcant only at the 10% level.
The signiﬁcant positive relation between Schedule and the preoperative length of stay
observed at the hospital level is conﬁrmed. Again, for clinicians, the extension of patients’
hospitalization before a surgery entails a higher malpractice risk compared to a shortening
200
184 Results
Table 5.5: Wards Results
1d admissions Los Po los Icm Entropy
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Backlog 0.001* -0.054 0.010 -0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.037) (0.027) (0.002) (0.002)
Schedule 0.006 -0.458** 0.350** -0.009 -0.005
(0.004) (0.205) (0.152) (0.009) (0.008)
Backlog*Schedule -0.002 0.135*** -0.081** 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.047) (0.035) (0.002) (0.002)
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wards Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 74,625 76,426 77,923 76,270 75,807
Notes: 1d admissions=The ratio between the number of patients admitted under the one-day regime
and the overall number of discharged patients; Los=The duration of patients’ stay in the hospital
expressed in days; Po los=The number of days elapsed between the patient’s admission date and
the day of the surgery (excluded); Icm=The ratio between the composition of the cases treated in
each hospital’s ward, weighted based on the DRG system, and the weighted composition of the cases
treated at the national level; Entropy= Measure of the heterogeneity of patients distribution in the
various DRG. Backlog= Civil Backlog; Schedule=Schedules system on noneconomic damages. OLS
regressions. WardsControls include: Number of Beds, Number of Beds for Day-hospital, Number
of Beds for Surgery, Number of Beds for Standard Inpatient Stay, Number of Beds Used. FE=Fixed
eﬀects at the year, specialty, court and geographical area level. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is
represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
of this phase. Moreover, the reduction of malpractice pressure due to schedules adoption
is perceived anew to a greater extent when this policy is introduced in a well performing
judiciary than in a poor performing one. Hence, the higher the court’s civil backlog, the lower
the increase in the duration of the preoperative stay. This increase reaches the maximum
value of 7.4% when the court is fully eﬃcient (i.e. Backlog=1), while it amounts to 5.5%
in case of an average performing court (i.e. Backlog=3.67) and to 4.5% in the case of a
very ineﬃcient court (i.e. Backlog=5). With respect to our sample, the prolongation of the
preoperative length of stay mainly ranges between 6 and 5.1% (Figure 5.6).
More interestingly and diﬀerently from what happens for hospitals, the overall length of
stay turns out to be signiﬁcantly and negatively inﬂuenced by Schedule. Speciﬁcally, the
poorer the court performs, the shorter the stay of patients on the ward. So that, patients’
length of stay is curtailed by -4.5% when the judiciary manages to dispose of all pending
cases, by -3% with an average poorly performing court, and by -2.2% with an extremely
poorly performing court. With respect to the actual distribution of Backlog in our sample,
as displayed by Figure 5.7, for about half of the courthouses observed, the actual reduction
of the length of stay ranges between -3.4 and -2.7%.
201
Courts, Scheduled Damages and Hospital Activity 185
Figure 5.6: Eﬀects of Noneconomic Damages Schedules on Ward Preoperative Length of Stay
Notes: Notes: Vertical axis: Estimated impact of an increase of a standard
deviation of Schedule (i.e. 0.38) given diﬀerent levels of civil backlog on Pre-
operative Length of Stay. The impact is expressed in percentages. Horizontal
axis: Levels of civil backlog.
Figure 5.7: Eﬀects of Noneconomic Damages Schedules on Ward Length of Stay
Notes: Vertical axis: Estimated impact of an increase of a standard deviation of
Schedule (i.e. 0.38) given diﬀerent levels of civil backlog on Length of Stay. The
impact is expressed in percentages. Horizontal axis: Levels of civil backlog.
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In accordance to Currie and MacLeod’s theoretical framework, we can infer that physi-
cians perceive a lower risk of committing an error that gives rise to liability when they extend
patients’ stay. This means that high malpractice pressure induces clinicians to extend the
period of time spent by patients in the hospital providing evidence of positive defensive
medicine. Hence, once malpractice pressure is lowered due to the adoption of schedules, clin-
icians tend to reduce the use of this defensive practice as they are less concerned about their
risk exposure. These ﬁndings also suggest, that for surgical activities what actually increases
is the post-treatment stay since a higher malpractice pressure would lead to a longer overall
length of stay, but to a shorter preoperative one.
Finally, it is worth to mention that we do not outline any signiﬁcant impact with respect to
both the case mix index and the entropy index neither at the hospital level nor at the ward
level. The point estimates obtained would indicate a negative relation between these two
outcome variables and both Schedule and Backlog. This would suggests that, theoretically,
a decrease in medical liability regardless of the cause (i.e. the introduction of schedules or
poor judicial performance) determines a reduction of both these indexes. Nonetheless, the
lack of signiﬁcance conﬁrms that there is no evidence of any patient discrimination (e.g.
refusal to treat high-risk patients) operated by publicly employed physicians in response to
a variation in malpractice pressure.
5.7 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have investigated the reactions of physicians in terms of composition and
intensity of treatments to variations in malpractice pressure due to both the introduction
of schedules of noneconomic damages and changes in the judicial performance. Given the
speciﬁc features of the Italian healthcare system, the most appropriate perspective of analysis
is not the single practitioner, but rather the activity levels of hospitals and wards.
Our purpose was to examine whether, and to what extent, the implementation of sched-
ules inﬂuences the medical decisions of doctors in terms of defensive medicine. At the same
time, this allowed us also to study whether and how clinicians working for public structures
are aﬀected by malpractice pressure since this would ultimately inﬂuence how the healthcare
system itself satisﬁes the health needs of the population. This aspect is particularly relevant
also in the light of the fact that the existing literature provides mixed evidence on the de-
fensive behavior of privately employed clinicians and the phenomenon of defensive medicine
is even less obvious when analyzed in a public system. In fact, the adoption of defensive
practices in such a context cannot be taken for granted since doctors working in public facil-
ities may be aﬀected by malpractice liability through diﬀerent channels and with a diﬀerent
intensity compared to their privately employed colleagues. Because of this, the evidence on
the U.S. experience cannot be straightforwardly extended to diﬀerent contexts such as NHS
based systems.
In particular, in Italy publicly employed physicians do not directly bear either the costs
of liability insurance or those of malpractice litigation, therefore they may have a diﬀerent
perception of malpractice pressure than private practitioners. Aside from medical liability,
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their conduct also faces additional constraints provided by the guidelines and internal regu-
lations of the hospital they work for. Consequently, they not only may be diﬀerently aﬀected
by the risk of litigation, but it may also be the case that they are not willing or do not
have enough discretion to adopt a relevant behavior. Moreover, the assessment of doctors’
reaction to diﬀerent levels of malpractice pressure in the public sector is particularly relevant
and requires an ad hoc investigation since such a reaction can have wide consequences for
public health.
In this regard, our ﬁndings have two main implications. First, we show that public
providers are not neutral to variations in malpractice pressure. Our analysis highlights that
there are variations in their treatment decisions at both the hospital and ward level as
consequences to changes in medical liability. Second, the implementation of schedules of
noneconomic damages aﬀects both hospital and ward activity levels, determining a reduction
in the use of some defensive practices on the part of doctors. However, the intensity of
the eﬀects of the reference policy is ultimately determined by the actual level of backlog
characterizing the court in charge of its application. A poorer judicial performance (i.e.
higher backlog) usually attenuates the eﬀects of schedules introduction, while, by contrast,
a higher level of judicial eﬃciency (i.e. lower backlog) tends to intensify it. When schedules
are adopted in well performing courts, the subsequent loosening of liability constraints is
perceived to a greater extent than when this legal change occurs in a poor performing judicial
context. This happens, because a judiciary characterized by a longer processing time of trials
already generates a lower degree of malpractice pressure for doctors. Therefore, a further
reduction of this pressure triggers a smaller reaction of physicians.
As for the medical treatment examined, we observe a positive and signiﬁcant relationship
between the introduction of schedules and the preoperative length of stay at both the hospital
and ward level. This positive impact of schedules adoption is always intensiﬁed by decreasing
civil backlog, so that a better performing court coincides with a higher number of days spent
by patients in the facility before a surgery. Consistently with the theoretical framework of
Currie and MacLeod (2008), the interpretation of these outcomes indicates that, for clinicians
working in public facilities, hospitalizing a patient before a surgery and/or prolonging her
preoperative stay entails a higher risk of committing an error leading to liability than not
doing so. Consequently, when malpractice pressure is high, physicians undertake a (negative)
defensive behavior by shortening patients’ preoperative stay in the hospital. Conversely, once
schedules are adopted and malpractice pressure is lowered, there is a less frequent use of this
defensive practice.
Diﬀerently, patients’ overall length of stay is negatively aﬀected by scheduled damages,
but this relation is statistically signiﬁcant only at the ward level. Moreover, this negative
eﬀect results to be attenuated by increasing civil backlog, so that a more ineﬃcient judiciary
is associated with a higher number of days spent by patients in the hospital. The negative
sign of the relationship between scheduled damages and patients’ length of stay also suggests
that physicians face a lower error rate when they prolong the overall period of hospitalization
than when they shorten it. Therefore, once malpractice pressure lowers, they tend to reduce
the duration of the patients’ stay. This is also consistent with the commonly held idea that
doctors dealing with high liability constraints often resort to (positive) defensive medicine,
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by extending patients’ stay with the main purpose of reducing their malpractice exposure. In
addition, consistent with our expectations, there is no evidence of a discriminatory behavior
of doctors with respect to the cases they treat as no change in the case-mix index and in the
entropy index emerges in response to schedules introduction.
Besides the speciﬁc considerations made with respect to the introduction of noneconomic
damages schedules and judicial performance, our ﬁndings stress the complexity of the incen-
tives faced by physicians working in public hospitals. These incentives have diﬀerent sources
(i.e. the medical specialization, the public hospitals doctors work for, medical liability) and
their coexistence and interplay make it diﬃcult to anticipate the general impact of a reform
such as noneconomic damages schedules. In fact, it is very unlikely that such a legal change
will exert the same eﬀect on all the diﬀerent branches of the medical profession. Nevertheless,
from a policy perspective, the existence of the responses at the hospital and ward level to
changes in malpractice pressure are particularly relevant as they may have signiﬁcant conse-
quences in terms of healthcare expenditure and of the fairness and equity of the healthcare
system itself.
In particular, the goal of a public NHS is, in theory, to oﬀer universal medical coverage
to the residents of a country. Yet, one could argue that the system should be neutral to this
type of forces. If this is not the case, medical services end up being determined by the place
of their provision and this may threaten both the fairness and the equity of the system. In
fact, in the case of Italy, even though in principle individuals can choose the provider they
prefer across the entire country, the mobility of patients is actually expensive and not always
feasible for people.
Policymakers should be aware of all the possible implications of malpractice reforms. They
should not focus their attention solely on the desired eﬀects for which these legal interventions
are meant as malpractice reforms can actually produce additional eﬀects beyond those for
which they were conceived.
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5.8 Appendix: Additional Tables and Figures
Table 5.6: Variables deﬁnition and sources
Variable Type Deﬁnition Source
Backlog Continuous Number of new cases plus number of pending cases from the
previous year out of the number of closed cases
IMJ
Beds dh w Continuous The number of beds devoted to day-hospital care at the ward
level
IMH
Beds do h Continuous The number of inpatient beds at the hospital level IMH
Beds do w Continuous The number of inpatient beds at the ward level IMH
Beds ds w Continuous The total number of day-surgery beds at the ward level IMH
Beds used w Continuous The number of used beds at the ward level IMH
Beds w Continuous The overall number of beds at the ward level IMH
Doctors h Continuous The total number of doctors employed by the hospital IMH
Entropy Continuous Measure of the heterogeneity of patients distribution in the
various DRG
IMH
Icm Continuous The ration between the composition of the cases treated in
each hospital’s ward, weighted based on the DRG system, and
the weighted composition of the cases treated at the national
level
IMH
Los Continuous The duration of patients’ stay in the hospital expressed in
days
IMH
N wards Continuous The number of active wards in the hospital IMH
Personnel h Continuous The total number of staﬀ employed by the hospital IMH
Po los Continuous The number of days elapsed between the patient’s admission
date and the day of the surgery (excluded)
IMH
Schedule Dummy Equal 1 if (and 0 otherwise): Molinari
the Courthouse adopts a schedules system on noneconomic
damages
(several
years)
1d admissions Continuous The ratio between the number of patients admitted under the
one-day regime and the overall number of discharged patients
IMH
Notes: IMH= Italian Ministry of Health; IMJ= Italian Ministry of Justice.
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Figure 5.8: Distribution of Hospitals Wards
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Figure 5.9: Length of Stay as Distributed across Hospitals (2000-2010)
Notes: Length of Stay= The duration of patients’ stay in the hospital expressed in
days.
Figure 5.10: Length of Stay as Distributed across Wards (2000-2010)
Notes: Length of Stay= The duration of patients’ stay in the hospital expressed in
days.
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Figure 5.11: Preoperative Length of Stay as Distributed across Hospitals (2000-2010)
Notes: Preopervative Length of Stay=The number of days elapsed between the patient’s
admission date and the day of the surgery (excluded).
Figure 5.12: Preoperative Length of Stay as Distributed across Wards (2000-2010)
Notes: Preoperative Length of Stay=The number of days elapsed between the patient’s
admission date and the day of the surgery (excluded).
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
In the last decades, medical malpractice has held a central place in both the policy agenda
and the public debate. Among the general public this phenomenon raises serious concerns,
because it is seen as a threat to general well-being. Individuals are concerned about being
victims of medical accidents, which they perceive as a sign of low quality provision of med-
ical care. From a policy perspective, it is a debated topic, because it can compromise the
conﬁdence of patients in the health system and it is an important determinant of healthcare
expenditure and outcomes. In fact, aside from the high cost of medical professional liability
coverage, medical malpractice entails negative consequences also for the cost of healthcare
services, because physicians may over- or under-perform a given treatment and/or procedure
for defensive reasons. As a consequence, the system may be required to bear unnecessary
costs and/or oﬀer a suboptimal response to the health needs of the population.
Clearly, the immediate eﬀects of medical errors involve patients and healthcare providers.
The former may suﬀers serious consequences for their health and, more in general, for their
life. In turn, the latter bears the ﬁnancial costs of compensating injured parties, as well as
the emotional and reputational costs entailed by the involvement in a legal dispute. Still,
medical accidents do not only aﬀect these two categories, but their eﬀects extend to the
liability system, the insurance market and the healthcare system as a whole.
In particular, the increasing trend of malpractice litigation combined with the growth in
damages awards reported in many diﬀerent countries is usually claimed to have negatively
impacted the insurance market for medical professional liability. This impact translates into
negative consequences for healthcare providers and has led to strong criticisms about the
liability system itself. In fact, the liability system should, ﬁrst of all, provide the right incen-
tives for clinicians to undertake a standard level of care in order to deter them from engaging
in negligent behaviors. Second, once doctors fail to apply such a precaution, the system
should be able to ensure proper compensation for victims. Nonetheless, the eﬀectiveness of
the liability system in performing both these tasks have been repeatedly questioned.
At the same time, the insurance market should be able to make available to healthcare
providers at aﬀordable prices, policies against third party liability. However, when it comes
to real world markets, the speciﬁcities of the risk to cover (e.g. long tail and the diﬃcult
diﬀerentiation between high- and low-risk policyholders) seem to exacerbate the volatility
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faced by private insurers. This, combined with the increasing severity and frequency of
claims, has over time discouraged insurers from working in this segment, leading to serious
problems of both availability and aﬀordability of malpractice policies.
In turn, the diﬃculties in ﬁnding appropriate coverage against third party liability may
ultimately impact on the provision of medical services both in term of costs and of access
to medical care. Doctors may pass on to patients high malpractice premiums by increasing
medical fees, but they may also adopt defensive behaviors by over-performing diagnostic
and/or therapeutic treatments or by refraining from risky treatments or cases with the main
aim of avoiding malpractice litigation.
Given the variety and complexity of the eﬀects produced by medical malpractice, a wide
range of policy interventions has been proposed to cope with this phenomenon. An accurate
understanding of how these legal interventions work in practice is particularly important,
because “the extent to which certain reforms are or are not eﬀective can shed light on the
strategic behavior of health care providers, medical liability insurers, and litigants facing a
changed legal regime. Understanding the eﬀorts of tort reforms is also important for policy
makers in their attempts to change the legal, health care, and insurance market.”1
In recent years, empirical Law and Economics has devoted much attention to the inves-
tigation of the impact of malpractice reforms. Nonetheless, there is still much more to be
learned and explored in order to achieve a deep understanding of these policies and of the
phenomenon of medical malpractice in general. Some types of reforms have been studied
much less than others, as in the case of schedules of noneconomic damages, and their eﬀects
remain highly debated. Moreover, the need for further research in this ﬁeld is even more
apparent in Europe, where this strand of the literature is less developed than in the U.S. and
both the legal and healthcare systems have remarkable speciﬁcities that make it diﬃcult to
automatically extend the conclusions from one institutional context to the other.
In this regard, the present work contributes to the study of medical malpractice and
related reforms – speciﬁcally of schedules of noneconomic damages – in a civil law country
with a public national health system, using Italy as case study. This is an institutional
framework that widely diﬀers from the American one and, precisely, the choice of such a
setting is one of the elements that make this analysis particularly interesting. In fact, this
study does not only oﬀer valuable insights into the eﬀects of schedules on the decisions of both
private insurers and hospitals in a public healthcare system. It also fosters the understanding
of this policy in relation to a public health system and tries to shed light on the mechanisms
and channels through which malpractice pressure works in such a context. Speciﬁcally, the
aim has been to investigate: (i) whether schedules do actually yield the theoretical results,
which are usually attributed to them with respect to malpractice insurance (i.e. increase in
market attractiveness for insurers and reduction in premiums), and (ii) whether the impact
of this policy goes beyond malpractice coverage, aﬀecting also healthcare providers.
The empirical investigation of such eﬀects beneﬁts from a quasi-experimental design due
to the scattered adoption of scheduled damages in Italy and is performed while controlling
for the functioning of the enforcement mechanism of schedules, that is, mainly the judicial
1Avraham (2007), pp. 184-185.
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system. The level of backlog of civil courts is taken as proxy of the performance of this
institutional element and this issue is particularly critical in Italy, a country which is well
known for its poorly performing judiciary. The argument underlying this choice is that parties
involved in malpractice cases react diﬀerently to the introduction of schedules, depending on
the level of performance of the enforcement mechanism of the policy itself. Insurers do not
only care about improving the certainty of paid compensations, which is expected to be
higher under a scheduled damages system than under a caps system. They are also aﬀected
by ineﬃciencies related to the timing of the payment and the deterrence level of the legal
system on healthcare providers. Similarly, the degree of malpractice pressure perceived by
healthcare providers is not solely determined by the level of damages they may have to
compensate, but also by the willingness of victims to ﬁle a claim.
An important general lesson that can be learned from this work is that malpractice reforms
– as in the case of schedules – may lead to unintended and unexpected consequences. Their
eﬀects ultimately reach several, if not all the stakeholders aﬀected by medical malpractice,
thus they may produce further eﬀects besides those immediately foreseen by policymakers.
In addition, a relevant determinant of their eﬀectiveness may be represented by their en-
forcement mechanism. The ﬁnal impact of these policies may be aﬀected by the institutional
context in which they are implemented. Therefore, assessing the eﬀectiveness of these inter-
ventions without also considering the institutional framework of reference may lead to biased
conclusions. These are all aspects that should be carefully evaluated by policymakers when
conceiving such policy interventions.2
Overall, medical malpractice proves to be an extremely complex topic, which involves a
multiplicity of diﬀerent categories of subjects. All these groups of stakeholders can be clearly
distinguished from each other, but they all coexist and the eﬀects on one of them may also
have signiﬁcant consequences for the others. In this regard, the contribution of empirical Law
and Economics can be of valuable assistance to provide further evidence of the dynamics of
this phenomenon especially with respect to those institutional frameworks that have been
less investigated to date.
Market Attractiveness
Traditionally, professional medical liability insurance has been framed as a problematic line of
business for insurance companies. Over time, the distress of the sector has been channeled by
(i) a skyrocketing increase in malpractice insurance rates; and (ii) the exit of some insurers
and a restriction of the operational market by others, who selected the geographical area
where to compete, the type of healthcare provider they are willing to cover and/or the type
of coverage they oﬀer. These phenomena have resulted in severe diﬃculties for healthcare
providers in ﬁnding adequate coverage against third party liability.
2In this respect, Zeiler and Hardcastle (2012) observe, with general reference to damages caps, that
“proponents of caps continue to make claims about their impact on medical malpractice insurance premiums,
and these claims continue to impact legislative outcomes and court decisions on the constitutionality of caps.
It remains important, therefore, to get a solid handle on general inferences we can draw from the empirical
literature that focuses on this albeit narrow question.”
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Limiting noneconomic damages has been noted among the most eﬀective policy devices to
cope with these problems. While debating the eﬃcacy of ﬂat and tired caps, scholars raised
concerns regarding their lack of both vertical and horizontal equity of compensations, and
have suggested alternative solutions such as the introduction of scheduled damages.3 Still, to
our knowledge, empirical evaluations of the impact of noneconomic damages schedules on the
insurance market are not available and the possible eﬀects of scheduled damages have been
mainly inferred by looking at the evidence obtained in relation to caps and at the potential
similarities with them. In particular, by containing the compensations granted to injured
parties, this policy intervention is expected not only to reduce the severity of malpractice
claims, but also to decrease the variance of malpractice awards. Hence, scheduled damages
should ultimately improve the predictability of payouts and, therefore, make it easier for
insurance companies to assess their risk exposure. If the degree of uncertainty faced by
private insurers lowers, insurance companies should be able to better predict their expected
future loss. The resulting possibility of a more accurate risk pricing should lead, in general,
to lower premiums, but it also implies that the insurance market for medical malpractice
should become more attractive for private companies as the diﬃculties of operating in this
line are eased.
The ﬁnal impact of the introduction of noneconomic damages schedules should consist in
an increase in the number of insurers oﬀering this type of coverage and in a decrease in the
insurance rates paid by healthcare providers. Since Italian public healthcare facilities have
the obligation to comply with the regulation on public procurement to select the insurance
company, the number of companies providing malpractice insurance is expressed by the num-
ber of bidding insurers in the awarding procedures run by Italian healthcare organizations.
Yet, the attainment of these results is not straightforward since it can be aﬀected by how
the schedules themselves are structured (i.e. the choice of the point monetary values) and
by the functioning of the enforcement mechanism of this policy (i.e. the judiciary). In par-
ticular, a well/poor performing judicial system is expected to inﬂuence how parties involved
in a malpractice case will react to the introduction of schedules. Insurance companies are
interested in reducing the uncertainty and unpredictability of paid compensations, which are
expected to be lower under a scheduled damages system than under a caps system, but their
decisions are also inﬂuenced by ineﬃciencies related to the timing of payouts and by the
deterrent inﬂuence of the legal system on healthcare providers. Hence, the ﬁrst purpose of
the present empirical investigation has been to study whether, and to what extent, schedules
of noneconomic damages are eﬀective in increasing the presence of private insurers in the
reference market and in containing malpractice premiums, conditional on the performance of
the judiciary in charge of their implementation.
In particular, our ﬁndings show that the eﬀectiveness of schedules in attracting private
insurers to the market for medical professional liability mainly depends on the judiciary in
which this policy is enacted. Both the direction and the intensity of the impact of sched-
ules on both proxies used to measure market attractiveness (i.e. the absolute and weighed
3See, for instance, Bovbjerg et al. (1989), Studdert et al. (2005), Shapiro and Rodriguez (2009), Avraham
and Bustos (2010), and Mello and Kachalia (2010).
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number of bidders) vary for diﬀerent judicial contexts. As a result, the actual impact of
schedules moves from negative to positive as judicial ineﬃciency rises up. So that, for a same
level of schedules adoption, insurance companies end up more frequently oﬀering malpractice
insurance contracts when civil courthouses perform more poorly. In such contexts, insurers
exploit the double advantage of a stronger bargaining power towards victims of malpractice,
who are more discouraged in ﬁling claims, and more certainty over the ﬁnal amount of com-
pensations to be paid. This is interpreted as evidence that, diﬀerently from other types of
ﬁrms, commercial insurers take advantage of judicial environments that allow them to defer
payments, since the costs for victims to ﬁle a claim are higher than in contexts where there
is a more limited possibility to defer.
At the same time, schedules prove not to signiﬁcantly aﬀect the malpractice premiums
paid by healthcare providers. In fact, even in cases of poorly performing courts in which
schedules lead to an increase in the number of bidding insurers, healthcare providers do not
beneﬁt from this new market conﬁguration as the increased number of competitors is not as-
sociated with a reduction in premiums. This might be due to limitations in the observational
period, therefore it would be necessary to extend the period of observation. Nonetheless, it
is also possible that healthcare providers are overall less likely to achieve better deals when
courthouses are more ineﬃcient. Essentially, all the eﬀects produced by an ineﬃcient judi-
ciary on the subjects aﬀected by malpractice not only make the evaluation of risk exposure
more diﬃcult for insurers, but also for healthcare providers. In addition, the diﬃculty en-
countered by healthcare facilities is even greater, because these organizations usually lack
professional knowledge of the insurance sector and are less familiar with the judicial environ-
ment. As a result, the capacity of healthcare providers in determining their coverage needs is
usually limited with negative consequences for their bargaining power with private insurers.
A poor performing judiciary ends up exacerbating this diﬃculty and healthcare providers are
not able to get lower premiums even when they should enjoy more leverage given the higher
number of competitors in the market.
From a policy perspective, these results have important implications. First, scheduled
damages do not necessarily favor insurers’ participation in the malpractice insurance business,
but their actual eﬀect is determined by the judicial environment in which they are applied.
In a country characterized by a high heterogeneity in terms of performance as Italy, this also
means that a same policy intervention may actually yield diﬀerent, if not contrasting, results
in diﬀerent area of the country. Moreover, the functioning of the judiciary does not only aﬀect
the impact of schedules, but it is capable alone of shaping insurers’ decisions. Therefore, the
possible inﬂuence exerted by the enforcing mechanism should always be included in the
evaluation of this policy intervention and, more in general, policymakers cannot abstract the
analysis of possible malpractice reforms from the judicial system in which these reforms are
introduced.
Second, schedules of noneconomic damages do not emerge as an eﬀective way to im-
prove the payoﬀ of healthcare providers. When the target is a decrease in insurance rates,
policymakers should be aware that increasing market attractiveness and/or facilitating the
assessment of insurers’ risk exposure is not suﬃcient. To reduce premiums, it is necessary
to improve the bargaining power of healthcare providers with respect to private insurers.
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This is particularly important in public health systems, where the public insurer (i.e. the
central government) can exert less control over the costs at which public providers acquired
malpractice coverage. In this regard, for example, a possible intervention may consist in
the implementation of monitoring systems of malpractice claims. In the case of Italy, the
incentives for healthcare providers, which are the entities in charge of contracting out these
insurance policies, might not be fully aligned with those of the public authorities, which ac-
tually provide the resources to pay for these expenses. Therefore, public healthcare facilities
may not have enough incentives to improve the bargaining process. On the contrary, by
monitoring all claims ﬁled against a provider from the beginning to the end and in terms of
both frequency of suits and levels of payouts, the providers themselves will have a greater
awareness of their risk exposure. The providers would improve their capacity to evaluate
the oﬀers submitted by insurance companies and have a greater amount of information to
bargain with them.4
Thirdly, the fact that premiums seem to remain unaﬀected by schedules implementation
due to the low bargaining power enjoyed by healthcare providers also raises questions as to
the eﬀectiveness of the procurement procedures. The general prohibition of renegotiating bids
that is foreseen by ordinary procedures (i.e. open and restricted auctions) and the limited
possibility of applying negotiations constitute per se a constraint to the bargaining capacity
of awarding authorities.5 To facilitate the acquisition process of malpractice insurance and
to increase the bargaining power of healthcare providers, it is important to improve the func-
tioning of public procurement as well. In this respect, the European Commission launched
a public consultation on the modernization of the European public procurement policy in
2011. The respondents to this public debate primarily “complain about an “excessive level of
formalization” and call for more ﬂexibility in the conduct of the procedure, such as possibili-
ties to contact participants in a ﬂexible manner to clarify open issues or to discuss elements
of the oﬀer. The most frequent proposal for improvement is the general acceptance of the
negotiated procedure with publication of a contract notice which is seen by many stakeholders
as a simpliﬁcation factor.”6 Hence, a possible policy intervention is to increase the possibil-
ity for contracting authorities of resorting to negotiated procedures with prior publication
of a contract notice. This would ensure more ﬂexibility and greater room for bargaining to
achieve procurement outcomes that better meet the needs of awarding entities.
Hospitals Activity
Noneconomic damages schedules, as any other policy intervention curtailing compensations
in malpractice cases, do not limit their possible eﬀects on the insurance market and its players
only. On the contrary, these reforms end up modifying the degree of malpractice pressure
perceived by clinicians, impacting on the medical decisions of healthcare providers.
4On the experience of Italian healthcare providers with malpractice monitoring systems, see Amaral-
Garcia and Grembi (2012). The authors show that the implementation of this policy reduced the premiums
paid by healthcare providers up to 29%.
5On the peculiarities of procurement procedures, see Appendix B to Chapter 4.
6European Commission (2011), p. 10.
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Traditionally, ceilings on malpractice compensations are expected to discourage injured
parties from ﬁling a suit as they reduce – at least, with respect to more severe injuries –
the potential amount of money that can be awarded in the event of a medical accident.7
Yet, once scheduled damages are applied, clinicians should face both a lower likelihood of
being sued in the hypothesis of an error and a lower ﬁnancial risk in the event of a legal
dispute. Consequently, doctors are potentially less concerned about litigation and have less
incentives to undertake – positive or negative – defensive practices. However, publicly em-
ployed physicians may actually not react, or react to a lesser extent, to such a reduction in
malpractice pressure, since the incentives and constraints to which they are subject diﬀer
from those of private practitioners. In the Italian healthcare system, doctors working for
public facilities do not actually bear the ﬁnancial costs of malpractice litigation since hospi-
tals themselves are responsible for providing their medical employees with coverage against
third party liability. This feature, combined also with the public nature of the system, not
only requires an investigation at the local healthcare provider level, but also makes the exis-
tence of a wide-hospital reaction to malpractice risk much less obvious than the response of
privately employed clinicians. Furthermore, since the main determinants of the volumes of
activity in Italian hospitals are public capacity and the epidemiological needs of the popu-
lation, physicians can be expected to eventually have a greater eﬀect on the organizational
arrangements through which treatments are provided to patients and not on the activity
volumes themselves.
Consistent with the empirical literature on defensive medicine that has traditionally re-
ported mixed ﬁndings on the eﬀects of caps on the behavior of doctors, our analysis provides
evidence that schedules do aﬀect the composition and the intensity of some of the treatments
provided by hospitals, while there is no signiﬁcant impact on other indicators. In any case,
the actual magnitude of the signiﬁcant eﬀects is ultimately determined by the judicial context
in which scheduled damages are enacted. A poorly performing judiciary turns out to weaken
the eﬀects of schedules introduction, whereas a well performing judiciary tends to strengthen
them. When schedules are introduced in an eﬃcient courthouse, clinicians perceive the sub-
sequent slackening of liability constraints to a greater extent than when this legal change
occurs in an ineﬃcient context. This happens because in courts characterized by a high level
of backlog, the malpractice risk perceived by physicians is already relatively low. Yet, a
further reduction of this risk triggers a smaller reaction than in a context where malpractice
pressure is perceived to be already higher. Again, the role played by the enforcing mechanism
of malpractice reforms emerges as particularly relevant.
Speciﬁcally, the results obtained indicate that changes in malpractice pressure aﬀect two
main indicators of medical treatments: the overall and the preoperative length of stay of
patients. Once schedules are implemented, physicians tend to shorten the period spent by
patients in the hospital (i.e. reduction in positive defensive practices), while they tend to
lengthen patients’ preoperative stay (i.e. reduction in negative defensive practices). Based
on the theoretical framework of Currie and MacLeod (2008), these outcomes oﬀer interesting
insights into the risk-risk trade-oﬀ perceived by physicians between deciding whether to
7See, Donohue III and Ho (2007).
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reduce or extend both the preoperative and the overall length of patients’ stay. For physicians,
the choice of hospitalizing a patient or extending her stay in the facility before a surgery
entails a higher probability of committing an error with possible legal consequences than the
opposite decision. By contrast, the litigation risk associated with the decision of increasing
the total number of days spent by a patient in the hospital is lower than the one ascribed to
a shortening of the overall length of stay.
An important lesson can be drawn from this empirical investigation and the ﬁndings
obtained. Due to their eﬀects on malpractice pressure, schedules of noneconomic damages
do inﬂuence the behavior of publicly employed physicians and shape to some extent their
treatment decisions as a side eﬀect. Speciﬁcally, this policy intervention has the general
advantage of reducing the adoption of some defensive behaviors on the part of clinicians.
However, the size of the ﬁnal eﬀect of scheduled damages is determined by the performance
of the judiciary in charge of their enforcement.
At the same time, this also means that publicly employed physicians are not neutral to
variations in malpractice pressure and, as a consequence, to the surrounding institutional en-
vironment. This phenomenon assumes a high policy relevance especially when it is considered
within the context of a public health system. As well described by Fiorentini et al. (2008),
“National Health Service systems are based on the principle of ensuring equal opportunities
of access to services with the guarantee of equal standards for equal need, irrespective of the
socio-economic circumstances of the individuals and of where they live.” However, such a
mission may be disregarded due to the fact that clinicians may modify the intensity and the
composition of the medical services they oﬀer according to the malpractice environment in
which they operate.
Given these considerations, it is important that policymakers scrutinize carefully all the
possible consequences (i.e. intended and unintended) of malpractice reforms, including those
for the provision of medical care. At the same time, these outcomes should be additional issues
for discussion and consideration for policy interventions also with respect to the incentives
and constraints provided by the public healthcare system to its medical employees.
Future Research
For a comprehensive view of the possible eﬀects of schedules of noneconomic damages, future
research needs to turn its attention to the litigation side. In particular, it would be inter-
esting to investigate whether and how injured parties react to the adoption of this policy
intervention. Proponents of such a legal change usually argue that scheduled damages will
decrease the frequency of malpractice suits, even though there is no grounded empirical evi-
dence in this regard. To have a deeper understanding of the dynamics triggered by schedules,
the frequency of claims should not be solely measured as the number of ﬁled lawsuits, but it
should be evaluated also in relation to the disputes that received a judgment for a positive
payout and to those closed without a payment. This would allow to appreciate not only
the general impact of the decision of whether to sue a doctor, but also of whether scheduled
damages aﬀect diﬀerently the potential plaintiﬀs of unmeritorious claims and those of meri-
torious ones. Again, the eﬀect of schedules regardless of their enforcing mechanism (i.e. the
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judiciary) would lead to potentially biased results. Moreover, in this case, the potential role
of the judicial context alone in driving the decision of victims is much more apparent than
with respect, for instance, to insurance companies, thus it cannot be ignored.
Another aspect of scheduled damages that is worth investigating is their ﬁnal impact
on the severity of claims. As discussed in the previous chapters, one of the main alleged
advantages of this policy is to foster both horizontal and vertical equity of malpractice com-
pensations, while reducing their variability. However, their ﬁnal eﬀect depends on how they
are structured and how they may aﬀect diﬀerently, for example, the awards granted for severe
injuries and those related to minor cases.
Besides the speciﬁc investigation of schedules, the study of malpractice reforms in civil
law countries still remains limited. In this perspective, another important issue for future
research is the impact of alternative procedures of dispute resolution. Policy interventions
that encourage injured parties and healthcare providers to voluntarily discard the possibil-
ity to resort to courts oﬀer an additional alternative path for reform. This issue may be
particularly relevant for the European experience since the number of medical malpractice
claims generally resolved by courts is very high in the European countries.8 In the speciﬁc
case of Italy, such a topic would be very interesting since mandatory mediation procedures
have been recently introduced. As of March 2011, injured parties may initiate a legal dispute
against healthcare providers only after having unsuccessfully resorted to mediation.9 More in
general, in civil law jurisdictions, little is also known about the cost of malpractice litigation,
that is, how much of every euro spent on damages awards goes to administrative expenses
and how much remains for victims.10
Finally, a possible extension of the present study would be the investigation of the po-
tentially diﬀerent role of public and private insurance on the behavior of physicians. As
explained in Chapter 2, in the attempt to cope with increasing malpractice insurance rates,
several Italian regional governments have switched from private insurers to diﬀerent schemes
of self-insurance. However, it is unclear whether these types of insurance may actually impact
on the activities of hospitals. Regions resorting to self-insurance may have greater incentives
to invest in monitoring systems and in improving their control over hospital activities. In
this case, it may be that physicians have even less room to adopt defensive practices, or,
on the contrary, they may perceive the greater control over their conduct as an increase in
malpractice pressure.
Yet, in the Italian context, a serious obstacle to many of such studies is represented
by the lack of publicly available data. However, the Italian case is just one example of
the more general problem of data retrieval in Europe, which slows down and makes the
empirical investigation of medical malpractice much harder than in the U.S. In this regard,
policymakers should make an attempt to improve the accessibility, the quality and the types
of information available when medical practice is concerned. There is still much to be done
8For instance, as already mentioned in Chapter 4, the share of malpractice claims settled in courts out of
all claims amounts to 40% in Germany, 60% in France, 86% in Italy and 100% in Portugal. See, Nys (2008).
9See, Legislative Decree 28/2010.
10According to Studdert et al. (2006), in the U.S., 54 cents of every dollar spent in malpractice compen-
sation goes to administrative expenses and other transaction costs.
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and learned in this ﬁeld by further improving empirical methods and the quality of the data.
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Summary 
 
In the last decades, medical malpractice has been framed as one of the most critical issues for 
healthcare providers and health policy, holding a central role on both the policy agenda and 
public debate. Given the variety and complexity of the effects produced by this phenomenon, a 
wide range of policy interventions has been proposed to cope with it. The Law and Economics 
literature has devoted much attention to medical malpractice and to the investigation of the actual 
impact of malpractice reforms. Nonetheless, some types of cap have been much less empirically 
studied as in the case of schedules of noneconomic damages, and their effects remain highly 
debated. Moreover, the need for further research in this field is even more apparent in Europe, 
where this strand of the literature is less developed than in the U.S. and both the legal and 
healthcare systems have remarkable specificities that make it difficult to straightforwardly 
extend the conclusions drawn from the American context.  
The present work seeks to contribute to the study of medical malpractice and of schedules of 
noneconomic damages in a civil law country with a public national health system, using Italy as 
case study, and at offering an evaluation of the policy implications of this investigation. Besides 
considering schedules and exploiting a quasi-experimental setting, the novelty of our 
????????????? ????????? ??? ???? ????????????? ??????????????????? ???? ?????????? ?????????? ??? ????????
civil backlog) in the empirical analysis. Traditionally, malpractice reforms have been analyzed 
regardless of the performance of their enforcement mechanism. Differently, our expectation is 
that the functioning of the judiciary alone is capable of influencing the main players of the 
malpractice system (i.e. physicians, victims and insurers), thus to condition the impact of 
schedules. 
The empirical analysis is twofold. First, it investigates how limiting compensations for pain and 
suffering through schedules impacts on the malpractice insurance market both in terms of 
presence of private insurers in the market and of premiums applied. In other words, the first 
purpose of the empirical analysis is to verify whether and to what extent schedules are actually 
effective in achieving their expected results. Second, it examines whether, and to what extent, 
healthcare providers react to the implementation of this policy in terms of both levels and 
composition of the medical treatments offered. In this case, the main purpose is to provide 
additional insights on the functioning of schedules, improving the understanding of those effects 
that go beyond the primary scope of schedules.  
Our findings show that the introduction of schedules increases the presence of insurers only in 
inefficient courts, while it does not produce significant effects on paid premiums. Judicial 
inefficiency is attractive to insurers for average values of schedules penetration of the market, 
with an increasing positive impact of inefficiency as the territorial coverage of schedules 
increases. Moreover, the implementation of schedules tends to reduce the use of defensive 
practices on the part of clinicians, but the magnitude of this impact is ultimately determined by 
the actual degree of backlog of the court implementing schedules.  
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Samenvatting 
 
In de afgelopen decennia worden medische fouten gezien als een van de meest cruciale kwesties 
voor zorgverleners en gezondheidszorgbeleid, en hebben daarmee een centrale rol op zowel de 
beleidsagenda als binnen het publieke debat gekregen. Gezien de diversiteit en complexiteit van 
de gevolgen van dit fenomeen, is er een breed scala aan beleidsmaatregelen voorgesteld om 
hiermee om te gaan. De rechtseconomische literatuur heeft veel aandacht besteed aan medische 
fouten en aan het onderzoek van de werkelijke impact van hervormingen van het beleid op het 
gebied van medische fouten. Desalniettemin zijn sommige vormen van beperking van 
schadevergoeding veel minder empirisch onderzocht dan bijvoorbeeld in het geval van 
normering van immateriële schade, en hun gevolgen/effecten staan nog steeds in grote mate ter 
discussie. Bovendien is de noodzaak voor verder onderzoek op dit gebied zelfs nog meer 
aanwezig in Europa, waar dit aspect van de literatuur minder ontwikkeld is dan in de VS en waar 
zowel de juridische als de gezondheidszorgsystemen specifieke kenmerken hebben die ervoor 
zorgen dat de conclusies die uit de Amerikaanse context zijn getrokken niet rechtstreeks 
toepasbaar zijn. 
Dit proefschrift tracht een bijdrage te leveren aan het onderzoek naar medische fouten en 
normering van immateriële schade in een civielrechtelijk land met een nationaal 
volksgezondheidsbeleid, met Italië als case study, en een evaluatie te bieden van de 
beleidsimplicaties van dit onderzoek. Behalve het bestuderen van normeringen en het gebruik 
maken van een semi-experimentele setting, ligt het vernieuwende aspect van dit proefschrift in 
het incorporeren van het functioneren van de rechterlijke macht (gemeten middels de vertraging 
bij het afdoen van civiele zaken) in de empirische analyse. Traditioneel werden hervormingen op 
het gebied van medische fouten onafhankelijk van het functioneren van hun 
handhavingsmechanisme geanalyseerd. In afwijking hiervan is het  onze verwachting dat het 
functioneren van de rechterlijke macht op zichzelf in staat is de belangrijkste spelers op het 
terrein van aansprakelijkheid voor medische fouten (zoals dokters, slachtoffers en verzekeraars) 
te beïnvloeden, en derhalve de invloed van de normering te beïnvloeden.  
De empirische analyse is tweeledig. Ten eerste wordt onderzocht hoe het beperken van de hoogte 
van smartengeld via normering invloed heeft op de verzekeringsmarkt inzake medische 
aansprakelijkheid, zowel voor wat betreft de aanwezigheid van private verzekeraars op de markt 
als voor de hoogte van de premies. Met andere woorden, het eerste doel van de empirische 
analyse is om na te gaan of en zo ja, in welke mate, normering daadwerkelijk de verwachte 
resultaten weet te bereiken. Ten tweede wordt gekeken of en zo ja, in welke mate, zorgverleners 
reageren op de implementatie van dit beleid, zowel voor wat betreft het niveau als voor de 
samenstelling van de aangeboden medische behandelingen. Het voornaamste doel is hier 
aanvullende inzichten over de werking van normering van schadevergoeding te verschaffen en 
hiermee het begrip te vergroten van deze effecten die verder gaan dan de primaire doelstelling 
van normering. 
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De resultaten laten zien dat de introductie van normering de aanwezigheid van verzekeraars 
alleen in inefficiënte gerechtshoven verhoogt, terwijl het geen significant effect op de betaalde 
premies heeft. Vertraging in de afdoening van zaken is aantrekkelijk voor verzekeraars bij 
gemiddelde waardes van normering in de markt, waarbij die vertraging een toenemende 
positieve invloed heeft naarmate de normering van schadevergoeding wijder verbreid is. 
Bovendien neigt de toepassing van normering het defensieve gedrag van clinici te verminderen, 
maar het te verwachten effect hiervan wordt uiteindelijk bepaald door de werkelijke achterstand 
van de rechter die de normering invoert. 
 
